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Abstract 
In response to questions like “How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the 
Ark?”, a large number of people will say “two”, failing to notice the substituted name. 
This semantic illusion occurs even though people can be shown to possess the 
knowledge that Noah and not Moses sailed the Ark. 
The aim of this thesis is to explore semantic illusions and to examine possible 
mechanisms underlying them. Semantic illusions are considered to be of theoretical 
relevance to theories of sentence comprehension, because of what they can reveal about 
the mechanisms underlying ordinary processing. 
A series of studies examined current theories of semantic illusions. Evidence was 
produced that semantic illusion sentences are materially different from sentences used 
in ordinary discourse. The processing requirements of semantic illusion sentences were 
also explored, both in terms of participant expectations of the task at hand, and in terms 
of processing load. 
In Part One, three experiments investigated the effects of the surface structure of 
semantic illusion sentences upon semantic illusion rate (Chapters 3 to 6), but only a 
comparison of question and statements revealed any significant effects, with questions 
leading to more semantic illusion responses. To explore the implications of this lack of 
effect, a rating scale study was designed to provide an overview of how semantic 
illusion sentences compare to sentences used in ordinary discourse: semantic illusion 
type sentences were found to differ significantly from other sentences along a number 
of salient dimensions. 
In Part Two, three further experiments related semantic illusions to problem solving and 
examined the processing requirements of semantic illusions. Findings indicated that 
semantic illusions are subject to a kind of ‘functional fixedness’, which prevents 
thorough processing (Chapters 9 and 10). This may in part be explained by the load that 
semantic illusion sentences place on working memory, as was indicated by the results of 
two further experiments, which investigated the role that the different components of 
working memory play in semantic illusion processing (Chapter 11). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part One: 
Describing semantic illusions 
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Chapter 1: 
Semantic Illusions: An Introduction 
 
When asked “How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the Ark?” most people 
will respond with something like “Two”, as if the question was perfectly 
unexceptionable (Erickson and Mattson, 1981). Most people know that there were two 
animals of each kind on the Ark – they learnt it in Sunday school, for example – just as 
they learnt that Noah was the man who sailed the Ark and not Moses. What is 
interesting about this question, which often appears as a playground game, is not just 
that people do not notice the substituted term, but that it appears impossible to filter out 
errors of this kind in a reliable fashion. The existence of such a processing glitch calls 
into question many of the assumptions that have been made about sentence processing 
and discourse comprehension. Over the course of the research dealing with this 
phenomenon, it came to be called the semantic illusion. For the purpose of this thesis, a 
semantic illusion will be defined as follows: 
A semantic illusion occurs when an individual interprets a sentence containing a 
substituted word of similar but distinct semantic content as if no substitution had 
been made, under circumstances where the individual can be shown to have the 
correct knowledge of the idea expressed in the sentence. 
Semantic illusions are of interest to theories of sentence processing in much the same 
way that visual illusions are to theories of visual perception. The processes responsible 
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for the strange perceptual experiences caused by illusion stimuli are exactly the same 
processes with which people perceive the ordinary world and make sense of it (e.g. 
Jackendoff, 1993). Visual illusions allow researchers to contemplate visual processes in 
situations where these do not lead to a desired outcome, but instead to a mis-
understanding of the data that is available to the eye. This suggests that the brain makes 
an active contribution to the interpretation of input, drawing on previous experiences 
and knowledge about the world to make sense of what is seen. It appears that there is a 
reflexive (as opposed to reflective) quality to perceptual processes (e.g. Fodor, 1983, 
1985, 1986), and these ‘mental reflexes’ can also be shown to affect language 
perception. Proof-reading errors (e.g. Healy, 1981) are an example of this, and so is 
what Jackendoff (1993) refers to as a ‘mental grammar’ which allows people to make 
accurate judgements about the acceptability of an indefinitely large range of sentences. 
By analogy to visual illusions, semantic illusions provide evidence of the processes used 
to deal with ordinary language. Drawing on previous knowledge and experiences, the 
brain makes an active contribution to the interpretation of the linguistic input and people 
make sense of what they hear or read. In the case of semantic illusions the same strategy 
is used but does not lead to the correct outcome. The sentence is processed and made 
sense of, even though the input does not technically make sense as such. Thus, unlike 
many visual illusions, the outcome of the glitch in processing that leads to a semantic 
illusion does not enter the reader/listener’s consciousness. Instead, the substituted word 
is not detected as inappropriate in its context, but appears to fit in adequately. 
This apparent failure to notice a word in the middle of a sentence, even though it 
appears to be processed in some superficial way, calls into question many assumptions 
about how human beings process language. It also has implications concerning the way 
in which memory for knowledge about the world is organised and the necessary 
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flexibility that must be associated with such a store if it is to function efficiently. 
Semantic illusions also provide evidence that much of the cognitive processing that is 
done every day is subject to trade-offs between speed and accuracy, to allow for the 
processing of the most information for the least amount of effort. It seems that semantic 
illusions occur because people are used to extracting meaning from language stimuli, 
even if these are degraded. 
Many different aspects of linguistic information affect ease of processing. For example, 
context, attention, familiarity and semantic/syntactic complexity all play an important 
part in comprehension and processing and so also in the occurrence of semantic 
illusions. It is the aim of this thesis to provide a detailed profile of the semantic illusion 
phenomenon and to explore what semantic illusions can reveal about normal language 
comprehension. 
In this thesis, a number of the issues related to sentence comprehension will be touched 
upon and the implications of the knowledge gained about semantic illusions will be 
examined. The first part of the thesis establishes what is known about semantic illusions 
to date and then explores aspects of semantic illusions as a part of the language 
comprehension process, including investigations of the surface form of semantic 
illusion sentences and their relation to other sentences used in day-to-day uses of 
language. The second part deals with semantic illusions as a kind of problem solving 
paradigm, describing how the usual strategies of dealing with language information will 
lead to problems in the case of semantic illusions. As well as this problem solving 
approach to semantic illusions, the impact of processing limitations of the cognitive 
system is also examined in the second part of the thesis, relating semantic illusions to 
working memory research. 
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In Chapter 2, the literature on semantic illusion research and a few closely related 
phenomena is reviewed, describing semantic illusion paradigms and methods used, as 
well as the main findings. Different theories that have been proposed in order to account 
for semantic illusions are examined, including issues of reader/listener co-operation, 
sentence focus, semantic and phonological similarity between the target word and its 
substitution, and the effects of task demands. Theories that potentially account for 
semantic illusions include the suggestion that there is a failure at the level of encoding, 
that there is only a partial match between the stimulus sentence and the related memory 
representation, and that the global goodness-of-fit of the substitution in the context of 
the sentence is good enough not to trigger more thorough checks of coherence. 
The aim of the first four experiments described in this thesis was to make explicit 
certain assumptions that had been made about semantic illusions, and in this context to 
replicate some of the findings described in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 3 contains a description of an exploratory study that attempted to answer a few 
questions about semantic illusions that emerged from previous research, but had not 
been explicitly addressed: do semantic illusions solely occur for substituted proper 
nouns with a sentence, or can words from other form classes lead to the same effect? Is 
it possible to prime the substituted word selectively to draw a participant’s attention to it 
and reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of semantic illusions? The effects of 
selectively priming either the target word or its substitution are examined for target 
sentences in which words from four different form classes (proper noun, noun, verb and 
adjective) have been substituted. It is hypothesised that priming the substitution will 
lead to a greater semantic illusion rate. The second hypothesis is that words from 
different form classes – which can be shown to have varying processing requirements – 
will be likely to lead to different semantic illusion rates. 
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In Chapter 4, Experiment 1 is described. It addresses another previously unanswered 
question arising from the literature review: do question-answering and statement-
verification, the two tasks generally used in semantic illusion research lead to equal 
semantic illusion rates, or do questions such as that used in the “Moses” example above 
lead to more semantic illusion responses than corresponding statements-to-be-verified? 
The same target concept is presented as either a question or as a statement-to-be-
verified, to allow a direct comparison between the two semantic illusion tasks to be 
made. The hypothesis is that question format will lead to more semantic illusion 
responses because of differences in task demands for questions and statements-to-be-
verified. 
Chapters 5 and 6 continue with the exploration of the effects of sentence structure upon 
semantic illusions. Sentence length and the position of the substituted word in the 
sentence are examined for English sentences in Chapter 5, in an attempt to replicate and 
bring together findings from a number of previous studies. Reder and Cleeremans 
(1990) and Reder and Kusbit (1991) demonstrated that the more items relevant to the 
‘illusion answer’ that a question contains, the more likely a semantic illusion is to occur. 
Experiment 2, attempted to find out if this effect also applies to statements-to-be-
verified. Apart from one study (van Jaarsveld, Dijkstra and Hermans, 1997), the 
position of the substituted word in a semantic illusion sentence has not been 
investigated systematically for semantic illusion sentences, hence Experiment 2 is also 
concerned with taking another look at the effects of word position on the semantic 
illusion rate in statements-to-be-verified. 
In Chapter 6 the effects of position are investigated for German sentences, as German is 
a language less dependent on word order for semantic cues than English. Instead, word 
order in German is often used to indicate focus and stress information. Several of the 
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previous semantic illusion studies have been carried out in languages other than English 
and were found to lead to similar results as English studies. But to date, semantic 
illusion research has not been carried out on a language which relies more heavily on 
inflections than on word order to convey semantic information. Experiment 3 is 
designed to test the hypothesis that word order will have a greater effect on German 
semantic illusions, as in German word order conveys different information than it does 
in English. 
Chapter 7 describes how semantic illusion type sentences are perceived by people in 
comparison with samples from written discourse taken from real-life samples. It was 
hypothesised that semantic illusions might require a definite linguistic format in order to 
occur: semantic illusion sentences are generally lengthy and contain enough information 
to be responded to without needing the semantic contribution of the substituted word. 
They also must deal with information that is at least in part familiar to the 
reader/listener. So how do semantic illusion sentences fit in with normal discourse? A 
series of rating scales, a focus determination task and a categorisation task will be used 
to access information about how semantic illusion type sentences are perceived in 
relation to sentences taken from real-life sources of written discourse. 
Chapter 8 is the first chapter of the second part of the thesis. The second part aims to 
examine the question of how semantic illusions are processed. In Chapter 8 various 
analogies between problem solving research and semantic illusion research are 
described in an attempt to enhance an understanding of the semantic illusion 
phenomenon. Partial matching – a mechanism likely to underlie not only semantic 
illusions and similar phenomena, but much of human information processing in general 
– is also discussed and related to the schema theory of memory (Bartlett, 1995[1932]) 
which provides a suggestion as to how knowledge might be stored in long-term memory 
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and how this structure may contribute to semantic illusions. Evidence for the fact that 
comprehension of linguistic information requires an active input from the reader/listener 
is also discussed and related to findings about semantic illusions. 
In Chapter 9, two experiments are described that attempt to tackle semantic illusions 
from a different angle to that used in previous studies, trying first to phrase the 
instructions differently, to affect participants’ expectations about the task at hand, and 
then changing the way in which semantic illusions are presented, to rule out an 
‘automatic’ component to sentence processing. In Experiment 4a, a simple attempt is 
made to eradicate the associations related to the words ‘true’ and ‘false’, which are 
thought to have strong connotations related to knowledge testing. It is hypothesised that 
presenting semantic illusion sentences in a slightly different task – asking participants to 
judge if each statement presented is ‘natural’ or ‘unnatural’ – will remove some of the 
potentially perceived requirement to perform well on the knowledge retrieval 
component of the task, allowing participants to concentrate more easily on the surface 
structure of the sentences. 
In Experiment 4b, the task was to rebuild so-called ‘sentence puzzles’. This 
manipulation was developed to eradicate the ‘automatic’ component of sentence 
processing, which makes it almost impossible for participants not to read a sentence for 
meaning before looking at its component parts. The device of presenting the sentences 
as fragments to be assembled should force participants to pay more attention to each 
individual word and semantic illusion rate might therefore be reduced. 
Chapter 10 continues with the attempt to look at semantic illusions from an information 
processing perspective and examines the effect of the context provided by ‘filler’ 
statements upon semantic illusion rate in statement-to-be-verified tasks. Since no 
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processing is ever done in isolation and much of it is not done logically or 
systematically, the hypothesis is that the nature of the filler statements-to-be-verified 
(whether they were generally truthful or not), will affect the way in which semantic 
illusions sentences are perceived and processed. A set of semantic illusion statements 
was presented in either of two filler statement contexts. The experimental hypothesis is 
that statements surrounded by many false fillers will be less likely to lead to semantic 
illusion responses than those surrounded by many true statements. 
Chapter 11 relates semantic illusion research to working memory research and explores 
the involvement of the different components of working memory on semantic illusion 
processing. It was thought that from this manipulation more information could be 
gleaned about how semantic illusions are processed. A semantic illusion task was 
combined with concurrent tasks designed to affect the sub-components of working 
memory differentially. The concurrent tasks either affected the phonological loop by 
preventing rehearsal of linguistic inputs, or the central executive by placing a greater 
overall processing load on working memory. The pattern of interference between the 
semantic illusion task and the concurrent tasks should help to establish to what extent 
the processing of such sentences taxes the cognitive system. One possible explanation 
for semantic illusions is that the sentences from which they arise place heavy processing 
demands on working memory, so that the failure to detect substitutions is a direct 
consequence of capacity-maximising strategies, which allow the most efficient 
processing given a limited capacity to manipulate incoming information. The hypothesis 
was that semantic illusion rates will increase as concurrent demands on working 
memory become greater. 
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In Chapter 12 the conclusions from the thesis are presented and implications of the 
findings are discussed in relation to sentence processing research, to general theories of 
cognitive processing, and to applications of such research to the real world. 
It is the aim of this thesis to explore the phenomenon of semantic illusions, to tie the 
findings from this research in with current theories of cognitive processing, and – if 
possible – to suggest a more complete theory of semantic illusions. It is hoped that the 
findings from this research will help to turn semantic illusions into a paradigm which 
might be used for future research into cognitive mechanisms underlying the storage and 
retrieval of knowledge and to language. Insights into the phenomenon may also suggest 
why errors occur in real life in comprehension of texts by students and by academic 
researchers (cf. Vicente and Brewer, 1993). 
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Chapter 2: 
What is known about Semantic Illusions: A Literature Review 
 
Even though it is likely that generations of school children have tricked each other with 
the Moses and the Ark question, it was not until relatively recently, that semantic 
illusions were first documented in scientific research. Erickson and Mattson first 
described semantic illusions in 1981, and it was not until 1987 that the next relevant 
paper was published (Baker and Wagner, 1987). Since then the question of semantic 
illusions has continued to intrigue a number of researchers and papers related to 
semantic illusions have been published from time to time. But the literature is rather 
fragmented, with groups of researchers preferring to concentrate on certain favourite 
topics. This chapter contains an overview of the research that has been done on 
semantic illusions and a few very closely related phenomena. In an attempt to bring 
together what is known about semantic illusions to date, eight potential explanations for 
the semantic illusion are presented and relevant findings are described. Existing 
positions are summarised and evaluated in view of the empirical evidence provided by 
semantic illusion research, and important key ideas are established. 
2.1 The experimental paradigms most frequently used 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are two basic tasks used in semantic illusion research: 
a question-answering task and a statement-verification task. In the question task, 
participants are asked to give short answers to general knowledge questions addressing 
familiar topics. In each target question an appropriate word is replaced by a 
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semantically related, but distinct word rendering the question technically meaningless 
(e.g. “How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the Ark?”). Participants are 
generally instructed to give an answer to each correctly phrased question, and to reply 
with “wrong” or “can’t say” if they identify the problem with a target question. In the 
statement – verification task, participants are asked to verify a series of general 
knowledge statements (e.g. “Moses took two animals of each kind on the Ark”). This 
experimental set-up will be referred to as statements-to-be-verified. Often the semantic 
illusion task is followed by a knowledge check, so that the experimenter can ascertain 
that each participant has the necessary knowledge to experience a semantic illusion. 
This usually requires participants to respond to a series of questions which test the 
knowledge replaced in the target sentences (e.g. A participant would have to answer a 
question about who had sailed the Ark). 
Semantic illusion researchers have presented their participants with a number of 
variations on these basic tasks, including spoken and written semantic illusions, as well 
as semantic illusions in different languages (see Appendix 1 for an overview of task 
variations used). The target materials are generally compiled on an intuitive basis and 
have to be adapted to a target audience (Brédart and Modolo, 1988). Many researchers 
piloted their materials and checked empirically to establish whether they fit the required 
criteria for the research at hand. 
The following sections (2.2 to 2.9) present possible explanations for semantic illusions 
and evaluate these in the light of semantic illusion research to date. 
2.2 Semantic illusions occur because the listener/reader co-operates 
The simplest explanation for the occurrence of semantic illusions is that people know 
what is meant by the question and ignore the substitution, choosing to respond to the 
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task at hand as if there was no problem (cf. Grice, 1975). If this were the case, 
participants should find it easier (or at least no more difficult) to detect substitutions 
than to treat the sentence as if it did not contain a substituted term when faced with a 
substitution detection task. However, empirical data (Reder and Kusbit, 1991; Reder 
and Cleeremans, 1990) showed that participants found it easier to perform a ‘gist’ task 
in which target sentences were to be responded to as though the substitution did not 
exist, than a ‘literal’ task in which participants were specifically instructed to look out 
for substitutions. The ‘gist’ task was performed both faster and more accurately than the 
‘literal’ task. The findings showed that participants found it much harder to detect 
substitutions than to ignore them, and people’s tendency to fall for semantic illusions 
cannot be the result of a conscious decision to be ‘co-operative’. Instead it is more likely 
to reflect a default strategy in sentence comprehension (Reder and Cleeremans, 1990). 
2.3 Semantic illusions occur because the focus is not on the substitution 
Another explanation of semantic illusions could be found in the way that the sentences 
are phrased. It is possible that the structure of the sentence places little focus on the 
word that has been substituted, causing the substitution to be overlooked. Erickson and 
Mattson (1981) suggested that presenting semantic illusion sentences as questions 
directed participants’ attention towards answering the questions and away from the 
substituted word. They tested this hypothesis by presenting target materials used in a 
previous experiment as statements-to-be-verified, but a substantial number of semantic 
illusion responses still occurred for each semantic illusion item used. 
2.3.1 Manipulating sentence focus using cleft phrases 
Even when a stronger manipulation of the focus of the target sentence is used to direct 
attention to a specific part of the sentence, semantic illusions still take place. Brédart 
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and Modolo (1988) presented sentences as cleft phrase statements-to-be-verified: some 
had the substituted name in the initial phrase (e.g. “It was Moses who took two animals 
of each kind on the Ark”), and others had another item of information in the cleft phrase 
(e.g. “It was two animals of each kind, that Moses took on the Ark”). The results 
showed a marked reduction, but not a complete eradication of semantic illusion 
responses when the wrong name was brought into focus in the cleft phrase. In the other 
sentence form condition the semantic illusion rate was comparable to that reported by 
Erickson and Mattson. The data showed that misdirection of focus clearly has an effect 
on semantic illusion rate, but can only partially explain why semantic illusions occur. 
2.3.2 Shifting focus without syntactic change 
A serious criticism of the use of a cleft phrase sentence structure to manipulate focus is 
that it might affect the ease of interpretation of a sentence. Clefting the phrase produces 
a shift in semantic focus but also requires a change in syntactic structure (Brédart and 
Docquier, 1989) and the majority of the sentences used in Brédart and Modolo’s study 
with the incorrect name in focus were cleft-subject sentences (e.g. “It was X, who…”), 
whereas most of the items in the second condition were cleft-object sentences (e.g. “It 
was X, that…”). It has been shown that cleft-object sentences are syntactically more 
complex than cleft-subject sentences, and this difference is likely to affect ease of 
interpretation (e.g. Waters, Caplan and Hildebrandt, 1987). In order to rule out the 
possibility that the focalisation effect observed by Brédart and Modolo was caused by a 
shift in syntactic complexity and not a shift in semantic focus, Brédart and Docquier 
(1989) repeated the focalisation study with slight modifications: sentences were 
presented in the same form for both control and ‘focus’ conditions, but in the ‘focus’ 
condition the substituted item was capitalised and underlined to draw attention to it 
while in the ‘non-focus’ condition another item of information was underlined and 
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capitalised. It was reasoned that using typographical rather than syntactic manipulation 
of focus would reveal whether the focalisation effect existed. The results obtained were 
consistent with those of Brédart and Modolo. When the substituted name was in focus 
the mean semantic illusion rate was significantly lower than in the non-focus condition. 
Brédart and Docquier concluded that focus structure has a decisive influence on word 
meaning analysis, and directly affects the extent to which semantic illusions occur. 
2.3.3 Is there a response bias at work? 
While the use of paratextual cues such as capitalisation sidesteps the problem of a shift 
in syntax, it might also bias participants to give an increased number of false detection 
responses, where a truthful statement is wrongly identified as a semantic illusion. 
Kamas, Reder and Ayers (1996) attempted to make participants more sensitive to 
substitutions by influencing their memory structure. Before completing a question-
answering task, participants studied statements of the facts to be tested in which either 
the to-be-substituted word (e.g. “NOAH took two animals of each kind on the Ark”), 
the answer term (e.g. “Noah took TWO animals of each kind on the Ark”) or nothing 
was presented in capitals. The results indicated improved performance on semantic 
illusion questions for which the target word had been capitalised during study, but this 
was offset by an increase in the rate of false detections. Participants did not suddenly 
improve their ability to detect substitutions, instead they had shifted their response 
criterion on the basis of the form of the sentence during study. 
2.3.4 Detecting false information in logically subordinate sentences 
When a sentence consists of a main clause and a subordinate clause, participants are 
likely to interpret the information in the subordinate clause as presupposed and the 
information in the main clause as new and in focus. On the basis of normal stress 
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patterns in speech, people also tend to consider information presented earlier in a 
sentence to be given, and information presented later to be new (Halliday, 1967). Baker 
and Wagner (1987) demonstrated that logical subordination is a factor in substitution 
detection by using complex sentences made up of an independent clause and a non-
restrictive dependent clause (i.e. a clause that does not identify or limit the meaning of 
the word it modifies, but rather supplies further details). Sentences with a substitution in 
the subordinate clause (e.g. “Bloodletting, generally accomplished with the aid of rats, 
was thought to remove ‘poisons’ from the blood.” The word “rats” has been substituted 
for “leeches” in this sentence) lead to more detection failures than sentences with the 
substitution in the main clause (e.g. “Bloodletting, thought to remove ‘poisons’ from the 
blood, was generally accomplished with the aid of rats”) regardless of the specific 
context of false information. Baker and Wagner concluded that people are less likely to 
allocate attention to information when it is conveyed via a linguistic structure which 
suggests that it is incidental. 
In order to control for the possibility of a serial position effect upon error detection 
causing false propositions at the end of a sentence to be detected with higher 
probability, Baker and Wagner also compared the detection rate of false information in 
complex sentences to the detection rate in compound sentences. In compound sentences, 
the two clauses are joined by the word “and” and neither clause is logically subordinate 
to the other (e.g. “Bloodletting was thought to remove ‘poisons’ from the blood and was 
accomplished with the aid of rats” or “Bloodletting was accomplished with the aid of 
rats and was thought to remove ‘poisons’ from the blood.”). The detection rate for false 
information in the subordinate clause in complex sentences was significantly lower than 
that for either the main clause in the complex or for first or second positions in 
compound sentences, suggesting that the central/peripheral effect demonstrated for 
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complex sentences is not due to more thorough processing of information at the end of a 
sentence. 
2.4 Semantic illusions occur because the substitution and the target are so similar 
It is intuitively obvious that the substituted term in a semantic illusion sentence must be 
in some way like the target word it replaces or the semantic illusion would not occur. 
For example, the substitution has to be of the same form class as the target, it has to be 
able to fill the same role slot, and it has to be similar enough to the replaced word to 
lead to a ‘feeling of cohesion’. But what makes the terms similar in this way? 
2.4.1 Phonological similarity 
One possible cause for semantic illusions is that target and substitution sound/look 
similar enough to be confused. There is little empirical evidence to support this 
hypothesis, however. Erickson and Mattson (1981) found that phonological similarity 
alone led to very few semantic illusions. Indeed, Shafto and MacKay (2000) argued that 
phonological similarity never leads to semantic illusions, but to a different type of 
illusion termed the ‘Armstrong’ illusion. This refers to detection failures in sentences 
such as “What was the famous line uttered by Louis Armstrong when he first set foot on 
the moon?” in which “Louis Armstrong” replaces “Neil Armstrong.” Shafto and 
MacKay claimed that this is an instance of phonological similarity, since Louis and Neil 
Armstrong had little in common semantically. 
However, while the Armstrong illusion rate is comparable to semantic illusion rate, 
Shafto and MacKay neglected to take into account the small but likely relevant semantic 
similarity between the two Armstrongs, such as their shared fame, the fact that they 
were both American, and the fact that in the context of the first moonlanding 
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“Armstrong” is a perfect match for the role-slot regardless of the associated first name 
(cf. Barton and Sanford, 1993; see section 2.9). It appears that phonological similarity 
can contribute to the causes underlying semantic illusions, but a purely phonological 
theory cannot account for semantic illusions. 
2.4.2 Semantic similarity 
A more likely explanation for semantic illusions would be that somehow the target and 
the substitution mean similar things, by virtue of sharing a number of semantic features 
or by being otherwise associated. Empirical data shows that semantic similarity clearly 
affects semantic illusion rates (Erickson and Mattson, 1981; van Oostendorp and de 
Mul, 1990; Shafto and MacKay, 2000) with more similar substitutions leading to a 
greater semantic illusion rate. But there appears to be no special type of semantic 
feature which the substitution must share with the correct name. For example, Moses 
and Noah are both Old Testament patriarchs; Captain Nemo and Captain Ahab are both 
fictional sea captains. 
2.4.3 The nature of the semantic relationship 
Van Oostendorp and de Mul (1990) compared detection rates and response times for 
substituted names which were highly related to the target name to those for low-related 
pairings of names. Semantic illusion responses were more frequent in the high-related 
condition than in the low-related one and participants took longer to respond correctly 
(detect the substitution) in the high-related condition than in the low-related condition. 
However, contrary to expectation, the response time data showed that semantic illusion 
responses were made equally quickly in the high-related condition as in the low-related 
condition, rather than being made more slowly for low-related pairs. These results imply 
that in processing semantically low-related sentences, qualitatively different knowledge 
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from that activated in processing high-related sentences is used, since more errors were 
made in the same length of time for high-related statements than for low-related ones, 
and it took longer for detections to be made in the high-related condition. 
Van Oostendorp and de Mul suggested that readers apply an internal criterion based on 
perceived semantic cohesion of a representation (how well the ideas within a sentence 
fit together). Depending upon this monitoring, further processing may, or may not, take 
place. The cohesion of a representation is defined by the number and strength of 
relations between the concepts involved. So in the case of a high-related substituted 
name, the set cohesion criterion is reached sooner or more easily and therefore the 
activation of information (via inferences) which is crucial for thorough processing 
might be omitted (den Uyl, 1980; see also section 2.9 on global goodness-of-fit.) 
2.4.4 Conceptual relatedness  
Readers appear to be able to activate just the required amount of knowledge from 
memory in order to comprehend a text, possibly by continuously monitoring the text’s 
conceptual cohesion. The initial mental representation is made upon the basis of 
connections immediately available to working memory rather than the specifics 
connecting the concepts. The conceptual cohesion then depends upon the relatedness 
between facts which is determined by shared semantic attributes, and by the strength of 
the relations in semantic memory (e.g. Anderson, 1983, 1984). Strong conceptual 
relations can be induced experimentally through the study of arbitrarily connected 
concepts (as for example in a paired-associate learning task), and lead to inappropriate 
judgements of sufficient cohesion (e.g. Anderson, 1983). The identification of what 
each aspect of a text refers to is also an important factor in the establishment of 
coherence. Once the referents are determined, a mental model can be constructed, but 
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there appears to be a trade-off between conceptual cohesion and underlying details, 
especially when perceived semantic cohesion is high to begin with. 
Thorough processing of a sentence usually takes more than an evaluation of conceptual 
cohesion – information not directly linked to a specific concept within the semantic 
network may need to be activated in order to construct a coherent mental representation. 
Van Oostendorp and Kok (1990) assumed that making such inferences and evaluating 
their appropriateness would be harder and take more time than the initial conceptual 
relatedness check. Erickson and Mattson’s findings about semantic similarity were seen 
to support the notion of conceptual cohesion monitoring, as the similarities between 
names such as Moses and Noah give the impression of sufficient cohesion during initial 
processing, and thus lead to a failure to spot the substitution in a semantic illusion 
sentence. 
Van Oostendorp and Kok demonstrated that participants made more semantic illusion 
responses when the names in a target sentence were conceptually highly related, but 
also when the relations between a substituted name and the sentence context were 
strengthened as the result of a paired-associate learning task. The results suggest that the 
relatedness of proper nouns affects the process of knowledge activation in sentence 
processing: readers are particularly likely to fail to identify referents correctly, when the 
names in question are conceptually similar or highly related. 
2.4.5 Phonological and semantic similarity 
Shafto and MacKay (2000) demonstrated that it is possible to get an even stronger 
version of the Moses illusion (called the mega-Moses illusion), if Moses-factors and 
Armstrong-factors were combined, i.e. if the target word shared semantic as well as 
phonological features with the substitution in a semantic illusion sentence. The mega-
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Moses illusion is more likely to occur than either the Armstrong illusion or the Moses 
illusion. For example, in the question “The 1868 impeachment trial involving former 
vice president Andrew Johnson [correct] followed what major American war?” 
substituting “Samuel Johnson” for “Andrew Johnson” should lead to an Armstrong 
effect due to shared phonological and lexical-surname similarity. In the same question, 
the Moses effect should be observed by substituting “Theodore Roosevelt” for “Andrew 
Johnson”, as these names are semantically similar (both became president after the 
assassination of their respective predecessor), but phonologically dissimilar. But if 
“Andrew Johnson” was replaced with “Lyndon Johnson” an enhanced illusion effect 
would be expected, as these names share semantic (again, both became president after 
the assassination of their respective predecessor) as well as phonological information. 
(Example taken directly from Shafto and MacKay, 2000). 
2.5 Semantic illusions occur because participants prioritise the answering task 
Much of the empirical evidence that has been gathered about semantic illusions comes 
from manipulations of discourse properties like the similarity between target words and 
correct words, or the focus of the sentence. In all of these investigations an implicit 
assumption seems to be that the depth of semantic processing is determined only by 
characteristics of the stimulus materials. But it is highly likely that the depth of semantic 
processing is also affected by task demands. This in turn suggests that task demands 
will have an effect upon semantic illusions. 
2.5.1 Accuracy vs. speed 
Van Jaarsveld, Dijkstra and Hermans (1997) investigated the effect of participants’ 
ability to vary the depth of semantic processing by manipulating specific task demands. 
In a ‘balanced’ condition participants were asked to respond to questions as quickly and 
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as accurately as they could, while monitoring for semantic illusions. In the ‘accurate’ 
condition, the task was to respond as accurately as possible disregarding time taken to 
complete the task. It was found that participants are able, to a certain extent, to control 
their ability to detect semantic illusions. Detection rates were higher when accuracy was 
stressed in the instructions rather than when both accuracy and speed were stressed, but 
there was a greater false detection rate in the accurate condition than in the balanced 
one. Presumably, there is more semantic processing in the ‘accurate’ condition, which 
results in more extensive checking of a target word’s semantic features and of relations 
between concepts within the sentence (cf. Erickson and Mattson, 1981), but only by 
tolerating a higher false alarm rate for correct sentences. 
Van Jaarsveld, Dijkstra and Hermans’ results confirmed indications that the detection of 
semantic illusions is rather difficult, even when there is little time pressure, or where a 
warning about the occurrence of semantic illusion sentences is given. People’s inability 
to detect semantic illusions reliably even when explicitly instructed to do so, may be 
due in part to lapses of attention and falling back to more superficial semantic 
processing. But it is also likely that participants will have set their own temporal 
deadline (despite having been told that response times were in no way relevant), which, 
however lax, is almost certainly shorter than would be required for an exhaustive check 
of all relations between the constituent concepts in a sentence. As a result some 
distorted terms will always remain undetected. 
2.5.2 Processing tends to be minimal with regard to task demands 
From recent research on text processing it appears that the depth of semantic processing 
is determined at least in part by task demands. Participants process materials to the 
extent that is needed to perform a given task. Unnecessary elaborative semantic 
processing is avoided (Foertsch and Gernsbacher, 1994; cf. also McKoon and Ratcliff, 
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1992). Indeed, participants appear able to adjust the depth of their semantic processing 
to quite subtle aspects of the task demands (Wilson, Rinck, McNamara, Bower and 
Morrow, 1993). 
In any particular task, semantic processing is likely to continue only until enough 
information has been gathered to enable a participant to make a response. Response 
requirements vary for different tasks, with respect to amount or type of information 
needed, and thus the effects of substitutions may depend upon the task to be carried out. 
Van Jaarsveld, Dijkstra and Hermans (1997) demonstrated the effect of the minimal 
semantic processing strategy upon semantic illusion rates by comparing a question-
answering task (with no requirement to monitor for substitutions) and a substitution-
detection task (with no requirement to answer the question), as the similarity of the 
substituted word should have different effects for each task, with greater similarity 
being detrimental in the detection task, but helpful in the question-answering task. This 
‘similarity effect’ (first described by van Oostendorp and de Mul, 1990) was found to be 
significant for both tasks and went in opposite directions as predicted. In the question-
answering task, there were longer response times for dissimilar terms than for similar 
terms, as more similar terms allow for an easier establishment of the gist of the question 
(e.g. It is easier to respond as if there was no substitution to the question “How many 
animals of each kind did Moses take on the Ark?” than to the question “How many 
animals of each kind did Adam take on the Ark?”). 
In the detection task, there were longer response times for similar terms than for 
dissimilar terms, as dissimilar terms disrupted the flow of semantic processing to a 
greater extent (e.g. It is easier to detect the substitution in the “Adam” question 
mentioned above, as “Adam” sticks out more). Analyses of the percentages of correct 
responses for the similarity conditions were carried out separately for each task. For the 
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question-answering task, there was no significant difference in the number of correct 
responses for similar and dissimilar terms, whereas the effect was highly significant in 
the detection task, with a much higher rate of correct responses for questions with 
dissimilar terms than for questions with similar terms. This last finding can be explained 
in terms of interrupted flow of sentence processing. It also replicated the similarity 
effect as reported in previous studies (Erickson and Mattson, 1981; van Oostendorp and 
de Mul, 1990; van Oostendorp and Kok, 1990). 
2.5.3 If semantic processing is minimal, the position of the substitution should 
affect semantic illusion rate 
Van Jaarsveld, Dijkstra and Hermans predicted that word order would have an effect 
upon processing whenever the experimental task could be completed on the basis of 
processing only part of the sentence. If the distorted word occurred in the part of the 
sentence that need not be processed to perform the task, detection rates should be lower 
than if the complete sentence had to be processed. In a statement-to-be-verified task the 
complete sentence was thought to require processing whereas in a question-answering 
task only the gist of the question needs to be understood, and the question-answering 
task could be performed on the basis of part of the sentence only. 
2.5.4 The similarity effect and minimal semantic processing 
Assuming left to right processing when dealing with written information, Van Jaarsveld, 
Dijkstra and Hermans reasoned that substitutions at the start of a sentence would have a 
different effect from that for substitutions at the end of a sentence, depending on task 
demands. For a statement-verification task, in which the entire sentence needs to be 
processed, it was thought that a substitution would be equally likely to be detected 
irrespective of the position it was in and the similarity effect would be equally great in 
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either position. But for a question-answering task, in which processing only part of the 
sentence might be sufficient to complete the task at hand, the similarity of the 
substitution should have a different effect depending on the position of the substitution 
in the sentence. A dissimilar term would, for example, be expected to be more 
disruptive at the beginning of the sentence, and less so at the end of the sentence. Hence 
variations in the depth of semantic processing can be assessed by comparing the size of 
the similarity-effect for substitutions at the start of a sentence with substitutions at the 
end of the sentence, for a statements-to-be-verified task compared with a question-
answering task. 
In the verification-task, where the entire sentence needs to be processed, results showed 
that statements with initial similar terms were responded to more rapidly than 
statements with initial dissimilar terms, and conversely, statements with final dissimilar 
terms were responded to more quickly than statements with final similar terms. 
Contrary to expectation, response times were not significantly faster for dissimilar 
substitutions than for similar ones. But the number of correct responses covaried with 
similarity, with more correct detections made for dissimilar terms. Analyses of semantic 
illusion responses found that these followed the same pattern as correct responses: 
initial similar terms led to more rapid semantic illusion responses than initial dissimilar 
terms, whilst final dissimilar terms led to more rapid semantic illusion responses than 
final similar terms (also, similar terms led to more semantic illusions than dissimilar 
terms). 
In the question-answering task, where only enough of the sentence needs to be 
processed to understand the gist of the question, answers to items with similar terms at 
the beginning of the question were given more rapidly than for dissimilar terms, while 
there was no significant difference in response times for similar or dissimilar terms in 
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questions with the substituted term at the end. Overall, similar terms led to more rapid 
responses than dissimilar terms, but the position of the substituted term had no 
significant overall effect upon response times. Fewer correct answers were given to 
sentences with dissimilar terms than to sentences with similar terms, indicating that 
there might be a small negative effect of dissimilar terms upon the activation of relevant 
knowledge for answering the question. 
Van Jaarsveld, Dijkstra and Hermans explained the differences in the similarity-effect 
with respect to the two positions for each task in terms of differences in semantic 
processing as a result of task requirements. In the verification task, there is no effect of 
word position, because processing of the entire sentence has to be carried out – thus the 
two different types of sentences are processed in equal depth. In the question-answering 
task, semantic processing can be stopped as soon as the gist of the question is 
understood. Therefore words at the end of a question are processed only superficially or 
not at all. The absence of a similarity-effect for final substituted terms is in keeping with 
parallel models of question-answering (Graesser, McMahen and Johnson, 1994; 
Robertson, Ullman and Mehta, 1992). 
2.6 Semantic illusions occur because participants fail to retrieve the correct 
information 
Semantic illusions might be caused by incomplete retrieval of information from 
memory which means that participants do not have the information necessary to detect 
discrepancies between the target word and its substitute (Reder and Kusbit, 1991). In 
order to make sure that people already had the necessary information stored, 
participants studied (or committed to memory) a series of facts before answering the 
questions, as exposure to the correct information should eradicate the problem of 
incompletely retrieved or impoverished knowledge. The sentence studied always 
 27
contained the correct (unsubstituted) target term. So, for example, a participant might 
later be asked “Who does Clark Kent become when he changes in a toll booth?” but the 
studied sentence would be “Clark Kent becomes Superman when he changes in a phone 
booth”. In the question phase, some participants were asked the unmodified correct 
question, while others were asked the semantic illusion question. Reder and Kusbit 
looked at performance for both the literal task (in which participants were asked to 
detect the substitutions) and the gist task (in which participants were asked to ignore the 
substitutions; see section 2.2). 
The basic pattern of the results matched previous findings: the literal task took more 
time than the gist task, and was less accurate; distorted questions were answered more 
slowly and less accurately in both tasks, and the effect of substitutions was much more 
detrimental to accuracy in the literal task than in the gist task. While previously studied 
items were answered more quickly overall, there was no evidence that priming helped 
differentially with the detection of substitutions. Thus the improvement in performance 
caused by the priming task appears to be a knowledge effect, which simultaneously 
enhances the effects of the other variables which produce the illusion. Even though 
increased familiarity with the information improved performance with responses being 
faster and more accurate overall, the pattern of previously established findings 
concerning semantic illusions was not altered. So imperfect retrieval from memory 
cannot on its own account for the occurrence of the illusion. 
2.7 Semantic illusions occur because participants do not encode the substitution 
2.7.1 Reading the sentence aloud 
One of the simplest explanations for the semantic illusion is that the substituted name is 
never encoded, as many semantic illusion victims claim not to have seen the substituted 
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name. Erickson and Mattson (1981) tested this hypothesis by asking participants to read 
the semantic illusion questions aloud before answering them. This should ensure that 
the substituted word was encoded at least at a phonemic level. If a failure to encode lay 
at the root of the illusion, this simple manipulation should eliminate the occurrence of 
semantic illusions. However, the semantic illusion occurred despite reading aloud, and 
Erickson and Mattson argued that a failure to encode cannot be the reason for the 
phenomenon. 
2.7.2 A look at target word reading times 
Reder and Kusbit (1991) also concerned themselves with the question of encoding. 
They made the assumption that reading time should vary depending on whether or not a 
semantic illusion response was made. Participants should take longer to read a sentence 
when a substitution is detected than when the question is responded to as though it 
contained no substitution. Contrary to their hypothesis, Reder and Kusbit found that 
reading appeared to slow down when the target word was substituted and a semantic 
illusion response occurred, but there was little evidence of slowing-down due to a 
substitution if the question was answered correctly. There was also no difference 
between reading time for substituted words when a participant failed to notice the 
substitution and reading time when the substitution was detected. Reder and Kusbit 
concluded that an inadequate encoding hypothesis could not be the explanation of the 
semantic illusion, provided that reading time could be used as a fair indication of the 
amount of processing or encoding time spent on each word. 
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2.8 Semantic illusions occur because participants only perform a partial matching 
check between input and information stored in long term memory 
Another possible explanation for the semantic illusion could be that an incomplete 
memory match is carried out (Reder and Kusbit, 1991). It was suggested that the 
memory trace – while brought back into working memory in its entirety – is not 
exhaustively matched to information in the test question before the answer is generated. 
In most situations a complete match between stored knowledge and a given situation is 
unlikely to occur, so people are used to tolerating small discrepancies and highly similar 
but not identical terms are allowed to slip by. Therefore it makes sense for a memory 
matching process to be carried out at the level of concepts and features rather than 
words. If there is heavy feature overlap, a mismatch tends to go unnoticed. Such 
similarity is dependent upon the knowledge state of an individual and also upon their 
cultural or social context. This explanation of the semantic illusion appears plausible if 
not quite complete, as in real life situation-matches are not usually exact and most 
mismatches that occur are inadvertent and unintentional so that, for example, it makes 
more sense to ignore slight mispronunciations than to check for an error. However, 
there are always cognitive safeguards for dealing with large discrepancies, such as 
global goodness-of-fit (see section 2.9). 
Reder and Kusbit looked at reading time after priming: participants who had been given 
a chance to familiarise themselves during the priming phase with the information that 
was to be questioned, answered semantic illusion questions while the reading time for 
each word was monitored. Reading times were found to be longer when participants 
made mistakes than when they answered correctly, except for primed sentences in the 
literal condition when the question was distorted, where there was a trend for the 
distorted term to be read faster when a semantic illusion occurred. Priming the materials 
before the task produced much faster reading overall, as was expected. Reading times 
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for the substitution in the literal task were slower when the question had been primed 
(as predicted), but priming did not appreciably lower people's tendency to be deceived 
by semantic illusion sentences. Even though the effect was not statistically significant, 
Reder and Kusbit drew attention to the fact that more available information (made more 
available by the method of priming) appeared to draw more attention to the substituted 
word, so that it took longer to read than when the target was not substituted. Participants 
read the substitution slightly faster when they noticed it, than when they did not. In the 
gist task, which did not monitor for semantic illusions, this effect was not seen. In 
summary: participants in the literal task appeared to be especially thorough in 
scrutinising experimental questions when they had also been primed. 
2.8.1 How partial matching might work 
Reder and Cleeremans (1990) proposed a potential model for semantic illusions based 
on a parallel distributed processing (PDP) framework, because such frameworks are 
capable of processing incomplete information or information containing small 
distortions without affecting overall performance. The PDP model consists of a network 
of three interconnected pools of processing nodes – one represents input information 
and is connected to a second (hidden) pool. All units in the second pool are connected to 
the units in the third pool that generates the outputs of the network. The system 
processes inputs as specific patterns of activation, which spread through the 
interconnections between the pools of processing units to the output layer. The correct 
mappings from input layer to output layer are achieved by ‘training’ the network by 
repeatedly presenting input/output pairs to be learned. Using a learning algorithm called 
‘back-propagation’ (Rumelhart, Hinton and Williams, 1986), the network can modify 
the connections between input and output in such a way as to reduce the ‘error’ between 
the actual and the target output. Once the error drops below a given threshold, the 
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network will have developed an internal representation in the hidden layer of units, 
which will allow it to produce the target pattern of activation in the output layer in 
response to the corresponding input pattern. 
Reder and Cleeremans’ ‘Moses-network’ was trained using correct statements like 
“Noah took two animals of each kind on the Ark”. After training, the model can be 
‘tested’ by presenting it with incomplete patterns (‘questions’) and measuring how well 
it can complete the patterns (‘answer the undistorted questions’). If one now assumes 
that each bit of input information is represented by a large number of ‘microfeatures’ 
that form certain patterns of activation on different subsets of input nodes, a little like 
semantic features make up certain concepts, then similar concepts (e.g. “Moses” and 
“Noah”) can be represented by overlapping patterns of activation on specific subsets of 
input units (cf. ‘distributed representation’, Hinton, McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986). 
Similar input patterns will lead to similar output patterns, and thus – if the overlap 
between two concepts is large enough – an incomplete pattern including a substitution 
will still be able to produce the correct and complete output pattern. Basically, the 
model responds to the ‘question’ as if it were not distorted. 
The PDP model can be used to account for a number of different findings about the gist 
task, if one assumes that the ‘error’ associated with each output is proportional to 
response time and accuracy. A large error arising from large discrepancies between 
input and output would lead to a garbled output from the network (“don’t know” or 
wrong responses); a small error would weaken the output, essentially leading to a 
slower response (as was observed). This can be used to account for the basic finding 
that participants can answer questions in the gist condition as long as the substitution is 
similar enough to the target. By the same token, the network model can explain how it is 
harder to detect substitutions when more related terms are contained in a question: the 
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ratio of mismatched to matched features will be smaller when there are more related 
terms. Focus effects could be accounted for by assuming that focal items are assigned 
greater weight, so that distorting this concept would cause a larger degradation of the 
output than distortions of unfocussed concepts. The difference between expert and 
novice performances in semantic illusion tasks could be explained by the fact that 
experts are likely to have richer representations of certain facts than novices, so that the 
ratio of shared to overall features between two concepts like “Moses” and “Noah” will 
tend to be smaller for experts than for novices. 
However, while the network model can account for the phenomena observed in the gist 
condition, it is far from obvious how the observations of performance in the literal 
condition can be modelled. As it stands, the model could monitor for error, but it could 
not distinguish between “don’t know” and “can’t say” responses. Similarly, quality of 
retrieval and extent of matching processes would be confounded, unless two different 
measures of the network’s performance can be found that correspond in behaviour to 
the finding that strengthening memory traces (i.e. priming certain inputs) affects only 
the ease of retrieval but not that of the match process. Reder and Cleeremans did not 
offer a solution to this problem, but concluded that further empirical research would be 
required before any clearer answers could be given. 
2.8.2 Partial matching at the semantic feature level 
Kamas, Reder and Ayers (1996) demonstrated that emphasising certain parts of a 
semantic illusion sentence can cause shifts in response bias (see section 2.3.3). It was 
concluded that there must be another component to the partial-matching process, at a 
level lower than the morpheme or word-level – i.e. at a semantic feature level. Kamas, 
Reder and Ayers reasoned that the substitution would be more readily detected if the 
semantic features that distinguished the substituted term from the correct term were 
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emphasised by manipulating the salience of particular features of the critical term. Thus, 
each target question was immediately preceded by a question that either emphasised 
features shared by the target and substituted terms, or that emphasised features 
distinguishing the two terms, or that was irrelevant to the target question. The results 
showed that the substitution was detected more easily when the preceding question drew 
attention to the features distinguishing target from substitution. When sensitivity and 
bias measures were calculated, these showed that participants became more sensitive to 
substitutions when a target question is preceded by a distinguishing question. Bias was 
not affected by this manipulation, suggesting that participants did not change their 
response criterion as a result of the manipulation. The results thus indicated that 
detection rates improve when a preceding question focuses on features that distinguish 
the substituted term from its original counterpart, and that the emphasis on shared 
features does not impair detection rates. 
2.8.3 Two mechanisms contribute to semantic illusions 
Hannon and Daneman (2001) looked at semantic illusions from an individual 
differences point of view, suggesting that there might be two separate mechanisms 
which contribute towards the occurrence of semantic illusions. One is related to an 
individual’s ability at accessing and reasoning about knowledge from long term 
memory. This ability allows participants to detect the substituted target word. The 
second mechanism is related to an individual’s capacity to process and store information 
in working memory at the same time. This capacity allows participants to avoid being 
‘led up the garden path’ by the context of the sentence containing the substitution. 
Hannon and Daneman claim that thinking of the partial matching process as a single 
mechanism cannot easily be justified, as evidence from research about reading 
mechanisms suggests that knowledge-based processes and text-based processes are not 
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the same (e.g. Hannon and Daneman, 2001; Kintsch, 1988). There appears to be a 
distinction between the processes that rely on the incorporation of knowledge about the 
world with information within a text and the processes that rely on the integration of 
information that is contained explicitly in a text. The former processes are those needed 
to detect the difference between the substitution and the information about the correct 
target that has been retrieved from memory. The latter are those that allow someone to 
integrate contextual cues and to detect a problem with them. Hannon and Daneman 
designed an experiment in which they varied the semantic relatedness of target to 
substitution as well as the number of contextual cues relating to the correct target word. 
They predicted that people would make most semantic illusion responses when both the 
semantic relatedness of the substitution to the target was strong and the context was 
highly related to the target, and that semantic illusions responses would occur least often 
when the substitution was less related and the context was weak. Hannon and Daneman 
also predicted that the context effect and the semantic relatedness effect would be 
additive and not interactive, as two different mechanisms were thought to underlie the 
respective sources of cognitive error. 
Participants’ ability to integrate text-based information with information retrieved from 
long term memory was measured using a knowledge access task that required 
participants to study three sentence paragraphs that described relations between a 
number of real and nonsense terms. By using the relations described in the sentences 
and by integrating them with knowledge about the real world, participants can construct 
different linear orderings, comparing the real and nonsense terms (e.g. size orderings, 
weight orderings; see Table 2.1 for an example). After studying the three sentences, 
participants responded to true/false statements about them. Some of the statements were 
referred to as ‘knowledge access statements’, which tested reasoning about prior 
knowledge. 
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Table 2.1: An example of materials used in the knowledge access task used to 
measure participants’ ability at integrating text-based information with knowledge 
stored in long-term memory (adapted from Hannon and Daneman, 2001). 
Bird Item 
Study paragraph 
A MIRT resembles an OSTRICH but is larger and has a longer neck. 
A COFT resembles a ROBIN but is smaller and has a longer neck. 
A FILP resembles a COFT but is smaller, has a longer neck, and nests on land. 
Features/relations 
Size 
Neck length 
Nests on land 
Doesn’t nest on land 
 
mirt > OSTRICH > ROBIN > coft > filp 
mirt > OSTRICH > ROBIN; filp > coft > ROBIN 
Filp, OSTRICH 
coft, ROBIN 
Test statements  
Knowledge access 
A ROBIN lives in CANADA, whereas a PENGUIN typically doesn’t. 
A BLUEJAY lives in CANADA, whereas an OSTRICH typically doesn’t. 
A PENGUIN lives in CANADA, whereas a ROBIN typically doesn’t. 
An OSTRICH lives in CANADA, whereas a BLUEJAY typically doesn’t. 
 
 
(True) 
(True) 
(False) 
(False) 
Text memory  
A MIRT is larger than an OSTRICH. 
An OSTRICH is larger than a MIRT. 
 
(True) 
(False) 
Knowledge integration 
A MIRT has a longer neck than a ROBIN. 
A ROBIN has a longer neck than a MIRT. 
 
(True) 
(False) 
 
Participants’ working memory span was also measured using a version of Daneman and 
Carpenter’s reading span test (1980). Participants read increasingly longer sets of 
unrelated sentences aloud, made an acceptability judgement about each sentence and 
then after the end of each set, they were asked to recall the final word of each sentence 
in the set. The reading span thus determined correlates well with global reading 
comprehension (e.g. Daneman and Carpenter, 1980; Daneman and Merikle, 1996). This 
measure was thought to provide an indication of participants’ ability to resist being ‘led 
up the garden path’ by sentence context. 
Hannon and Daneman’s results showed that both substitution relatedness and context 
strength influenced semantic illusion rate, with substitution relatedness having the 
greater effect upon detection performance. There was no significant interaction between 
the two effects, and the effects of relatedness and context strength were not correlated, 
suggesting that the cognitive mechanisms underlying the two effects might be different. 
The extent to which the theoretically motivated knowledge access and working memory 
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capacity measures contribute to the detection of substitutions was analysed by 
regression analyses. There was evidence that each measure accounted for independent 
amounts of the variance. Knowledge access was a better predictor of detection 
performance when the substituted word was strongly related to the target but in a weak 
context, and working memory span was the better predictor when the substitution was 
embedded in a strong context. 
Hannon and Daneman further evaluated their theory by using structural equation 
modelling (using a computer programme called LISREL, Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993), 
which tested an independent model in which knowledge access and working memory 
span made separate, additive contributions to detection performance, and a non-
independent model in which knowledge access and working memory span both 
influence the contributions from the sentence context and from the substitution. The 
independent model was found to provide the best theoretical explanation for Hannon 
and Daneman’s data, and both the structural equation model and the results of the 
regression analyses supported the theory that knowledge access is important for the 
detection of the substitution itself, while working memory capacity is important for the 
integration of the context surrounding the substitution. 
2.9 Semantic illusions occur because the substitution does not interfere with global 
goodness-of-fit 
While it is relatively easy to account for people’s ability to ignore small discrepancies, it 
is harder to explain people’s ability to make sense of given inputs, and the fact that 
more often than not, they easily spot problems with a body of text. In order to 
comprehend a passage of text, a person must be able to construct a coherent mental 
representation of what is being expressed in the text containing no logical or semantic 
contradictions. This is a fairly standard view of text comprehension (e.g. Johnson-Laird, 
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1983; Garnham, 1985; van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983), based upon a schema-like 
framework (Bartlett, 1995[1932]; c.f. Schank and Abelson, 1977; see also section 8.4.1) 
in which certain role-slots need to be filled adequately in order for coherence to be 
established. Knowledge activation seems to be subject to the global goodness-of-fit of 
the information contained in a role-slot in any given context. Global goodness-of-fit 
refers to how well an item is perceived to fit a given context: any filler for a ‘slot’ has to 
meet the criteria for the role, and anomalies are easily discovered if the filler fails to do 
so. For example, in a sentence such as “Mary ate some rocks for dinner” the anomaly is 
quickly identified – rocks are not edible. It appears that people are extremely good at 
detecting such anomalies under most circumstances, and this observation leads to the 
assumption that fillers are checked thoroughly against role-specifications as a part of 
normal processing. But the existence of semantic illusions calls this view into question. 
2.9.1 Local meaning before global meaning? 
A common assumption made in theories of sentence processing is that local meaning is 
established before global meaning (e.g. Kintsch and van Dijk, 1978), so that first the 
meaning of component morphemes is combined to find the meaning of phrases, which 
are in turn put together into the meaning of a sentence. Another frequent assumption is 
that processing occurs incrementally. Carpenter and Just (1983), for example, suggested 
that each word is analysed as deeply as possible upon being first fixated by the eye. But 
while there is some evidence for such word-by-word analysis and while this suggestion 
is coherent with the ideas of local before global meaning establishment, these ideas are 
not compatible with the evidence from studying semantic illusions, which are basically 
sentences in which anomalies are clearly not detected and where item processing is 
shallow or incomplete. 
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Barton and Sanford (1993) linked the explanation of semantic illusions to a number of 
other points that had been raised by various researchers regarding sentence verification. 
Anderson (1983), for example, found that participants would sometimes classify a 
sentence like “A cat is a snake” as true in a speeded judgement task when they had 
previously learned arbitrary propositions such as “The cat attacked the snake”. This 
appears to suggest that under certain conditions participants do not carry out a full 
semantic analysis of the statement-to-be-verified, provided that the concepts within the 
statement are highly related, and instead verification judgements are based upon a 
priming process. Similarly upon verifying general knowledge statements, participants 
quite often make a judgement on the basis of semantic overlap, so that a proposition 
such as “A whale is a fish” might be marked as true (Smith, Shoben and Rips, 1974; 
Reder, 1982, 1987). A good match on a few basic features appears to supersede any 
further processing. 
To explain the observations reported above, van Oostendorp and den Uyl (1984) 
suggested that the initial evaluation of a representation depends upon the strength and 
number of connections in working memory (conceptual coherence) rather than on the 
specific nature of such connections (semantic coherence). Similarly, Sanford and 
Garrod (1989) suggested that good global fit in working memory may pre-empt more 
detailed and time-consuming analysis. These claims also appear to fit with the parallel 
distributed sentence processing model developed by McClelland, St John, and Taraban 
(1989), in which comprehension depends upon multiple soft-constraint satisfaction. 
Contextual constraints imposed by the current representation of a sentence are assumed 
to determine the extent to which each newly encountered word can affect this current 
representation. Thus in the case of semantic illusions the constraints associated with the 
word “Moses” are not strong enough to override the constraints imposed by the context. 
This model does not rely upon a view in which the meanings of each word have to be 
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combined to get to the meaning of a sentence, but instead the contributions of words to 
sentence meaning are seen as graded. The model also explicitly breaks the distinction 
between word meaning and more general aspects of significance – that is, local meaning 
is not assumed to precede global meaning. Instead global meaning may influence the 
contribution of a local word meaning to the entire text. 
2.9.2 The effect of global goodness-of-fit upon subsequent analysis 
Barton and Sanford (1993) examined the claim that global goodness-of-fit influences 
the extent of subsequent analysis. They explored the type of contextual agreement 
necessary for participants to detect an anomaly in a sentence. Using a cognitive illusion 
similar to the semantic illusion based on the premise of a plane crash: “If an air plane 
crashes, where do you bury the survivors?” Many people failed to notice the anomaly in 
this proposition (survivors would generally object to being buried!), even when it was 
presented under straightforward reading conditions rather than as an aspect of testing 
statements against knowledge stored in memory. 
Barton and Sanford tested whether making the information “is alive” more available 
through the semantics of the target word would improve anomaly detection rate. To this 
end they compared the detection rate of “survivors” – which implicitly contains the 
information “is alive” – to the detection rate of various “injured”-terms (“injured”, 
“wounded”, “maimed”) which they argued do not implicitly contain “is alive”. 
Significantly fewer detections occurred for injured-terms than for “survivors”, 
suggesting that presupposed information enhanced anomaly detection. Barton and 
Sanford also looked at the effect of adding the qualifier “surviving” to the injured terms 
upon detection rate: detection levels were brought back up to the level of “survivors” 
itself. 
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But even though the term “survivors” has “is alive” as a central part of its meaning, 
there were still a significant number of detection failures in sentences where “survivors” 
was used to replace “dead”. Barton and Sanford suggested that a possible explanation 
for this finding was that the close association between “dead” and “survivors” was 
sufficient to satisfy the processing needs for the establishment of cohesion and thus for 
comprehension of the sentences in question. 
2.9.3 A partial match is sufficient to satisfy role-slot demands 
Based on the partial match theory (Reder and Kusbit, 1991), it seems likely that a good 
partial match will inhibit further analysis, and a term will be accepted as a role filler. 
Barton and Sanford used the anomalous noun phrase “surviving dead” to investigate this 
assumption: “dead” offers a perfect fit to the role-slot in the scenario used, and thus 
Barton and Sanford assumed that “surviving dead” might produce a much reduced 
detection rate. The results showed this to be the case – the detection rate went down to 
23% compared with the 66% base rate for previous experiments. This extremely low 
detection rate suggests that the local semantics of the noun phrase are not processed 
before a more global representation of the text is established (cf. the Armstrong illusion, 
see section 2.4.1). 
2.9.4 Detection rate is affected by scenario-based expectation 
The detection rate can also be affected by the expectations of the participants with 
respect to the likelihood of the victims of an accident being dead. Instead of using an 
elaborate scenario in this experiment participants were asked a single stand-alone 
question of the type: “When an aircraft crashes / a bicycle accident occurs, where 
should the survivors be buried?” The sentences were presented with the verb phrase 
referring to burying the survivors appearing either in passive (“where should the 
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survivors be buried”) or in active (“where should you bury the survivors”) formats, and 
with the position of the scenario (bike accident / air crash) being presented either early 
or late in the question. This was done to allow for a test of any effects of the order in 
which constraining information was presented (see Table 2.2). 
The results showed no reliable difference between the four question types, but the 
scenario type effect was significant, as the bicycle accident was thought less likely to 
result in deaths. Detection rate was considerably lower in the air crash scenario than in 
the bicycle accident scenario. Thus no evidence was found to support a strictly 
incremental interpretation of sentence comprehension. There was a trend towards higher 
detection rates with sentences in which the verb phrase was active, but there was no 
difference between early and late scenarios with respect to detection rate. 
Table 2.2: Variations of scenario type and verb voice as used by Barton and 
Sanford (1993) in experiment 3.  
1. early 
scenario 
passive 
verb 
When (an aircraft crashes / a bicycle accident occurs), where should the 
survivors be buried? 
2. early 
scenario 
active 
verb 
When (an aircraft crashes / a bicycle accident occurs), where should you bury 
the survivors? 
3. late 
scenario 
active 
verb 
Where should you bury the survivors, when (an aircraft crashes / a bicycle 
accident occurs)? 
4. late 
scenario 
passive 
verb 
Where should the survivors be buried, when (an aircraft crashes / a bicycle 
accident occurs)? 
 
Barton and Sanford argued that these results showed a strong global effect of scenario 
type, which is in keeping with the idea that detection rate is affected by schema or 
scenario-based expectation. Barton and Sanford also took the fact that the early scenario 
is no different from the late scenario as evidence that the target word is not fully 
analysed as it is encountered before processing moves onto subsequent material, and 
thus later input can influence the impact of any word upon the way in which the 
sentence is understood. 
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2.9.5 Adding ‘relevant’ information affects detection rate by shifting the focus of 
the sentence 
Barton and Sanford tested the idea that if information relevant to the question of place 
of burial was easily accessed, then a deep analysis of the term “survivors” would not 
take place. A two-sentence version of the questionnaire format was used. The basic 
control version of this questionnaire was: “Suppose that there was an air crash with 
many survivors. Where should they be buried?” The scenario was then elaborated by 
adding relative clauses, which were either relevant to answering the question (e.g. “… 
with many survivors who were mostly European”), irrelevant to answering the question 
(e.g. “…with many survivors, which happened last week”), or focusing on the 
substituted word (e.g. “… with many survivors who were mostly unhurt”). The results 
showed that there was a drop in detection rate for question-relevant information clauses. 
There was no significant difference between basic control and question-irrelevant 
information clauses. The target item-focusing question led to a 100% detection rate, 
which was significantly different from the other two groups. The findings supported the 
relevance hypothesis: if information relevant to answering the burial question is made 
easily available, this provides a level of coherence satisfactory to the comprehension 
system, and the critical item “survivors” receives only cursory analysis. Thus detection 
rates are low. If the information is not as readily available other sources of information 
for example word meanings will be explored more fully and detection rates are higher. 
Barton and Sanford claim that the strength of this substitution detection paradigm lies in 
the fact that it reveals shallow underlying processing, that ties in with previous claims 
that exhaustive checks are not carried out in normal comprehension, and that such 
exhaustive checking of attributes is not even feasible (e.g. Erickson and Mattson, 1981; 
McClelland, St John and Taraban, 1989). From other research it is also apparent that the 
failures to notice substitutions are genuine, and not just a case of failure to report. 
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Barton and Sanford supposed that the comprehension system would accept partial 
matches and assume coherence as default. Therefore the failure to detect an anomaly 
can be taken as evidence for relatively shallow semantic processing. From Barton and 
Sanford’s experiments it appears that the establishment of coherence goes no further 
than a level that is adequate to allow the sentence to be dealt with. Thus processing of 
terms during reading seems to be rather shallow, and if there is a good semantic match 
between a role-slot and a role-filler, further analysis does not necessarily take place. 
2.10 And now? 
In this chapter the research that has been carried out upon semantic illusions to date has 
been reviewed. It was found that semantic illusions are a very robust phenomenon, and 
their detection is not under reliable conscious control of the people who experience the 
semantic illusion. There are a number of ways in which the occurrence of semantic 
illusions can be affected, such as through varying the point of focus of the sentence by 
using cleft phrases, by capitalisation of the substituted term, or by providing information 
that distinguishes between the correct word and the substituted word before the 
participant makes a response. Asking participants to be particularly careful about 
spotting substitutions in semantic illusion sentences also affects semantic illusion rate 
compared with a task that stresses speed and accuracy. But while these manipulations 
reduce semantic illusion rate, they do not eradicate it completely. 
The nature of the semantic relationship between the correct word and the substituted 
word also affects semantic illusion rate. If the two terms have a lot in common, a 
semantic illusion is more likely to go unnoticed than if they do not share as many 
semantic features. But in a task where participants are required to respond to the gist of 
a sentence including a substitution, a term that is semantically highly similar to its 
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replacement aids performance of the task, while a more dissimilar term disrupts 
processing. 
All the research to date suggests that there is essentially one mechanism which provides 
a plausible explanation for the occurrence of semantic illusions: when people deal with 
incoming information they carry out a matching procedure of incoming data against 
knowledge already stored in memory. Such a matching process is necessarily 
incomplete, as in real life people do not usually deal with information in exactly the 
same format time after time. So the very mechanism of partial matching, which allows 
people to process information quickly and efficiently in their day to day lives, trips them 
up in the case of semantic illusions. It is not clear exactly how this partial matching 
process works, but there is evidence to suggest that the sentence context and the 
substitution in a semantic illusion sentence make separate contributions to the likelihood 
of semantic illusions occurring. This suggests that partial matching consists of two 
processes: one which integrates the information contained in the sentence, the other 
accessing relevant knowledge stored in long-term memory. 
There are still a number of aspects of semantic illusions that have not been explored, 
such as the question of how semantic illusions fit in with normal discourse processing. 
Another issue is the question of the nature of the semantic illusion task: is it a question 
to be answered, or a kind of problem to be solved in which a participant’s attention is 
deliberately misdirected? And are semantic illusions in questions theoretically 
indistinguishable from semantic illusions as part of a statement-to-be-verified? There 
are some questions about distributional issues: do semantic illusions occur only in 
relatively long and convoluted sentences? Do they work only for names, or can they 
also be found for verbs, adjectives and other nouns? Finally there are questions about 
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the cognitive mechanisms involved in semantic illusion responses, such as how working 
memory restrictions affect semantic illusions. 
Some of these issues have been touched upon in the research to date, but it would be 
useful to try to tie together and tidy up the theoretical understanding of semantic 
illusions into a more complete and coherent profile. In the next four chapters issues 
relating to the surface structure and linguistic make-up of semantic illusion sentences 
are explored in an attempt to answer a few questions that have not yet been raised in 
semantic illusion research. 
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Chapter 3:  
The pilot study: Form class, priming and semantic illusions 
 
Whilst the various studies of semantic illusions that have been carried out to date range 
widely over different aspects of the phenomenon, several questions have been glossed 
over and there are still a few gaps, even in the basic description of the semantic illusion 
vehicle. In Chapter 3, a pilot study is described that deals with the issues of form class 
of the target words and selective priming of either the correct word or its substitute. In 
previous semantic illusion research most target words used were names, but sometimes 
words of other form classes were used, without this ever being commented upon as a 
potential source of variability in semantic illusion rate. In this exploratory study an 
attempt was made to compare the effect of substitutions from different form classes on 
semantic illusion rate. While the question of priming comes up on occasion in the 
semantic illusion literature, nobody has tried to prime selectively the substituted word as 
opposed to the word that would have been correct in the context. This kind of 
manipulation was also attempted in the study reported below. 
3.1 On form class and sentence processing 
Almost all research on semantic illusions to date has used names as target words. Reder 
and Kusbit’s (1991) work is an exception, in that they use semantic illusion sentences 
with dates, nouns, verbs and even phrases replaced, but they did not comment upon this 
difference between the stimuli in their study and those used in other studies. However, 
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the use of proper nouns as target words might mean that the findings are restricted to a 
category of stimuli for which the semantics are predominantly extensional (i.e. 
dependent on their referent; van Oostendorp and de Mul, 1990), and an empirical 
clarification of whether or not semantic illusion findings do extend across form class 
boundaries would be of interest. 
The distinction between names and words of other form classes is not merely syntactic, 
but empirical evidence shows that there are processing differences. For example, 
McWeeny, Young, Hay and Ellis (1987) demonstrated that names were harder to 
remember than occupations in an experiment, in which participants were shown 
photographs of middle-aged men’s faces, and told the occupation and name for each. 
Recall performance for occupations was much better than that for names. It also appears 
that memory for names is stored in a different part of the brain than memory for other 
meaningful information about individuals (Harris and Kay, 1995). Moreover, there is 
evidence that cross-modal priming (in which an auditory stimulus prepares for a visual 
stimulus or vice versa), which cannot be reliably observed for lexical decision tasks, 
does occur for familiarity decisions primed by a celebrity’s name presented first 
auditorily and later visually (Valentine, Hollis and Moore, 1998). 
Processing differences can also be shown to exist between other form classes. For 
example, people find it easier to remember nouns than verbs when learning word lists 
(Fillenbaum, 1970; Engelkamp, Zimmer and Mohr, 1990; Langenmayr, 1997). 
Similarly the effects of omitting words from a sentence are different depending on the 
form class of the omitted word. The omission of a verb has a greater effect than the 
omission of a noun on both understanding (Reynolds and Flagg, 1976) and on 
remembering (Raeburn, 1979). 
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Since the findings described above suggest that there is a difference in the way in which 
words from different form classes are processed, it seems likely that the form class of 
the substituted word in a semantic illusion sentence will have an effect upon semantic 
illusion rate. As a result of this line of reasoning, the stimuli for the pilot study were 
constructed with a view to exploring this issue further. 
3.2 On selective priming and semantic illusions 
Various theories of semantic illusions are based on the assumption that the requisite 
information to detect the substitution is not at hand. Simply allowing participants to 
study the relevant facts, or even getting them to commit relevant facts to memory does 
not increase the semantic illusion detection rate (Reder and Kusbit, 1991). If 
information relevant to ‘answering’ the question is added to the semantic illusion 
sentences, participants are more likely to experience the semantic illusion (Barton and 
Sanford, 1993). But preceding the question with information that emphasises the 
features distinguishing between the target and the substitution improves detection 
performance (Kamas, Reder and Ayers, 1996). The following study examines whether 
semantically priming the target word before the presentation of the semantic illusion 
sentence leads to smaller detection rates than semantically priming the substitution – i.e. 
the word the participants actually see in the target sentence during the test phase. 
Priming the correct word rather than its substitute could affect the allocation of mental 
resources for recognising and dealing with a sentence following the prime. How the 
allocation of mental resources varies with expectation was demonstrated in an ingenious 
experiment carried out by Posner and Snyder (1975). Posner and Snyder presented their 
participants with pairs of letters and asked them to decide whether the letters were 
identical to or different from each other. Before the presentation of each letter a fixation 
point was displayed. This fixation point was either neutral (a plus sign “+”), a stimulus 
 49
that appropriately primed one or both of the upcoming letters (e.g. “A” followed by 
“AA” or “AB”), or a stimulus that misleadingly primed the upcoming letters by 
displaying a letter that was unlike both upcoming ones (e.g. “F” followed by “AA” or 
“AB”). Posner and Snyder used two different presentation distributions. For one (low-
validity), only 20% of all cases were primed appropriately. For the other (high-validity), 
only 20% of all cases were misleadingly primed, while the rest were primed 
appropriately. In the low-validity condition, response times showed that there was a 
small benefit of priming and no cost to being misled. In the high-validity condition there 
was much greater benefit from priming, but also a significant cost in terms of response 
time to being misled. 
If a correct word for a given context is primed, a semantic illusion effect seems more 
likely, because the items priming the relevant word will also be relevant to the context 
of the sentence, so that attention will not be drawn to the substituted word in particular. 
On the other hand, if the substituted word is primed, a semantic illusion response will be 
less likely – the context of the sentence will not have been primed, whereas the 
substituted word and its context will have been. Preparing for a specific input usually 
means that the expected input is much more easily perceived and processed than 
unexpected inputs (cf. Posner and Snyder, 1975). Thus it seems likely that special 
attention would be paid to a primed substituted word, as its appearance in the sentence 
would have been anticipated, whereas the rest of the semantic illusion sentence would 
be unexpected. 
In the light of this reasoning, it was hypothesised that participants would be better at 
detecting substitutions when the substituted word is primed than in a non-primed 
condition. By the same token, it was thought that priming the correct word – and with it 
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the rest of the semantic illusion sentence – would lead to a greater semantic illusion rate 
than in the non-primed condition. 
3.3 Method 
Participants: 15 participants volunteered to take part in the pilot study. All were either 
undergraduates or educated to university level. 
Materials: Forty sentence frames were constructed for statements-to-be-verified. Each 
sentence frame could be transformed into any of three versions: ‘correct’ in which the 
statement was true and no word was replaced; ‘semantic illusion’ in which the target 
word was replaced by a semantically similar word; or ‘incorrect’ – where the target 
word was replaced with an obviously incorrect word. Ten of the statements were 
designed to have proper nouns (i.e. names) as their target words; ten had common 
nouns, ten had verbs and ten had adjective target words (see Table 3.1 for examples; full 
set of sentences used in Appendix 2). 
There were three priming conditions: ‘not primed’, in which no priming words preceded 
the presentation of the semantic illusion sentence; ‘target primed’, where a number of 
words relevant only to the correct word preceded the sentence (for example, “wicked 
witch, uninvited guest, spinning wheel” would be used to prime “Sleeping Beauty”); or 
‘substitution primed’, where the primes specifically referred to the substituted word (for 
example, “seven dwarfs, glass coffin, poisoned apple” would be used to prime “Snow 
White” in the example above. Full list of primes used in Appendix 2). Primes were 
displayed for two seconds before each sentence appeared in the centre of the computer 
screen. The statements-to-be-verified stayed on the screen until the participant made a 
response. Sentences and primes were selected on the basis of agreement between two 
independent judges on the appropriateness of an item to the relevant category. 
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Table 3.1: Examples of the three sentence variations for each form class. 
Form class Version Example Sentence 
Correct After Sleeping Beauty pricked her finger, she slept for 100 years.  
Semantic illusion After Snow White pricked her finger, she slept for 100 years.  
Name 
Incorrect After Cilla Black pricked her finger, she slept for 100 years. 
Correct Whales are the largest aquatic mammals on Earth. 
Semantic illusion Elephants are the largest aquatic mammals on Earth. 
Noun 
Incorrect Camels are the largest aquatic mammals on Earth. 
Correct Wearing two pairs of socks can help to avoid blisters. 
Semantic illusion Washing two pairs of socks can help to avoid blisters. 
Verb 
Incorrect Knitting two pairs of socks can help to avoid blisters. 
Correct Gas central heating helps to keep the house warm. 
Semantic illusion Gas central heating helps to keep the house rosy. 
Adjective 
Incorrect Gas central heating helps to keep the house dark. 
 
Apparatus: The materials were presented on a PC using a Superlab 2.0 experimental 
script to display each sentence in the centre of the computer screen. The computer was 
set up to record the responses made by each participant consisting of pressing one of 
three response keys marked ‘true’, ‘false’, and ‘don’t know’ on a Cedrus-600 6-button 
response box. The other three response keys were covered with a cardboard sleeve to 
prevent any confusion about which keys to use. 
Procedure: Participants were asked to read the sentences that appeared in the middle of 
the screen and to decide as quickly as possible if each sentence was true or false. There 
were no instructions regarding the primes. Participants were given an opportunity to 
practice the experimental procedure, before the experiment proper commenced. The 
experiment was broken down into three subsections of forty trials each. Each statement 
was shown to each participant three times, once in each of the three versions described 
above. The idea was that repeating the statements would preclude the need for a 
separate knowledge check, as participants who answered ‘true’ to both the ‘correct’ and 
the ‘semantic illusion’ versions of a sentence could be considered to have experienced 
the semantic illusion. Type of prime was counterbalanced across the statements of each 
form class, so that each participant saw examples of each combination of form class, 
sentence type and type of prime. The whole procedure took about half an hour to 
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complete. At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed and asked a few 
questions about their subjective experiences. 
3.4 Results and discussion 
Since the experiments described in the literature can be subdivided into two groups, 
depending on whether the experimenters report the correct response rate or the semantic 
illusion rate, both of these are presented here. 
3.4.1 Semantic illusion rate 
A semantic illusion was considered to have occurred when a participant judged the 
‘semantic illusion’ version of a statement to be true and also judged the ‘correct’ 
version of the same statement to be true. Two sentences were excluded from the 
analysis, because they were found not to produce semantic illusion effects. In the 
sentence “The eruption of a volcano caused Pompeii to be destroyed 
(correct)/evacuated(SI)” the substitution of the intended ‘semantic illusion’ target also 
leads to a truthful statement, and the sentence was excluded from the analysis. A similar 
problem arose with the sentence “The phone directory is usually bound in a 
soft(correct)/yellow(SI) cover.” It was expected that people would make a distinction 
between the standard telephone directory and the ‘Yellow Pages’ commercial directory. 
This was not found to be the case and the sentence was dropped from the analysis. 
The semantic illusion rate for this study was found to be very low overall (see Table 
3.2). An analysis of variance was carried out to explore the effects of form class and 
type of priming on semantic illusion rate using participants as subjects. There was no 
effect of form class (F=0.641; d.f.=3, 168; p=0.590) or of type of prime (F=1.177; 
d.f.=2, 168; p=0.311). Nor was the interaction between form class and type of prime 
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significant (F=0.778; d.f.=6, 168; p=0.588). It appears that people are equally likely to 
experience semantic illusions for words from any of the form classes manipulated, and 
that the priming provides neither a handicap nor a bonus to processing the statements-
to-be-verified. 
Table 3.2: Mean semantic illusion rate (percent) for each form class and type of 
priming (standard deviations in parentheses). 
 Not primed Target 
primed 
Substitution 
primed 
Total 
Name 8.9 (15.2) 4.4 (11.7) 8.9 (15.2) 7.4 (14.0) 
Noun 2.2 (8.6) 5.6 (11.6) 4.4 (11.7) 4.1 (10.6) 
Verb 1.7 (6.5) 12.8 (19.6) 8.9 (18.8) 7.8 (16.4) 
Adjective 3.3 (12.9) 7.8 (16.5) 6.7 (14.8) 5.9 (14.6) 
Total 4.0 (11.4) 7.6 (15.2) 7.2 (15.1) 6.3 (14.0) 
 
3.4.2 Correct response rate 
A second analysis of variance was carried out upon the correct response data. As with 
the semantic illusion rate there was no effect of either form class (F=1.622; d.f.=3, 168; 
p=0.186) or priming (F=0.859; d.f.=2, 168; p=0.426), nor was there a significant 
interaction (F=1.028; d.f.=6, 168; p=0.409). Overall people performed equally well for 
each condition (see Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3: Mean correct response rate (percent) for each form class and type of 
priming (standard deviations in parentheses). 
 Not primed Target 
primed 
Substitution 
primed 
Total 
Name 77.2 (27.9) 81.7 (28.6) 78.3 (23.9) 79.1 (26.3) 
Noun 90 (19.5) 92.8 (15.7) 86.7 (21.1) 89.8 (18.6) 
Verb 95 (10.4) 73.3 (31.2) 83.3 (21.8) 83.9 (24.0) 
Adjective 87.8 (21.3) 82.8 (23.7) 82.8 (24.7) 84.4 (22.9) 
Total 87.5 (21.2) 82.6 (25.8) 82.8 (22.5) 84.3 (23.2) 
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3.4.3 Presentation order 
The order in which the statement-variations had been presented was recorded, so as to 
examine whether more semantic illusions would occur if the semantic illusion version 
of a particular sentence frame was seen first. It was found that more than half (51.5 
percent) of the semantic illusions occurred on a first presentation of that particular 
sentence frame, while the rest of the semantic illusion responses were spread evenly 
across the other two groups (see Table 3.4). This decline in semantic illusion rate 
together with reports from participants led to the conclusion that for future experiments 
repetition of individual sentences should be avoided. Participants thought that repeated 
sentences were often recognised at a glance so that only the target word was given full 
attention in context. Repeated sentence frames were thus processed more quickly. A 
number of the participants remarked that the repetitions led to speculation about 
previous responses to the same sentence frame or to a sense of impatience with the task 
at hand. Some participants also reported that they found the repetition of sentences 
confusing or distracting. Others commented that the repeated sentences were easier to 
process when the correct sentence had been presented first, and that repeated sentences 
did not have to be read as carefully (or even read at all), as each sentence frame was 
rapidly recognised and attention was easily turned to the word which differed in the re-
presentation (i.e. to the target word). Mean response times became shorter as a function 
of the number of times a participant had seen each sentence. 
Table 3.4: Distribution of semantic illusions occurring for consecutive 
presentations of statements (percent). 
 First Second Third 
Percentage of SIs 51.5 27.3 21.2 
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3.4.4 Stimulus design 
The variability of semantic illusion rate across sentences in this study was very large, 
and there was a ceiling effect for a number of the individual sentences which were 
responded to very accurately. This may in part be due to some supposedly confusable 
pairs of words not being particularly confusable at all and the reported semantic illusion 
rates are unlikely to reflect a successful manipulation of people’s sensitivity to semantic 
illusions. 
The lack of confusability between target and substitution could be due to the subject 
matter being too familiar to the participants, making them ‘experts’ for these particular 
sentences and therefore more likely to spot any substitutions (cf. Reder and Cleeremans, 
1990). Another possibility is that in some cases the semantic illusion version of a 
sentence was not regarded as unambiguously wrong, once the substitution was pointed 
out. For a semantic illusion to occur the substitution has to be a similar but distinct term, 
so that the sentence appears to be coherent and makes global sense, with all role-slots 
adequately filled. This is easiest to achieve with names, for which the role-slot is very 
obvious. For example, in the sentence “After Sleeping Beauty/Snow White/Cilla Black 
pricked her finger, she slept for a hundred years”, Snow White and Sleeping Beauty 
clearly have a lot in common. They are both female fairytale characters associated with 
princes, magic and fairy godmothers, but they are two distinct characters. Cilla Black, 
meanwhile, is a TV presenter, who is known for hosting “Blind Date” and not for 
relationships with fairies and princes. As the results of this study have shown, it is 
possible to do much the same with words from other form classes, although stimuli have 
to be chosen very carefully since verbs and adjectives that are perceived as associatively 
similar are often synonymous (for example, “laugh” and “giggle”) or antonymous 
(“light” or “dark”). 
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Even though there was no significant effect of priming upon semantic illusion rate, 
many participants commented in a debriefing session after the experiment, that they had 
found the primes distracting and had not made the connection between the primes and 
the sentences. Since the participants had not been given any instructions about the 
primes, it is possible that they found it harder to make sense of them because they did 
not know what to expect (cf. Bransford and Johnson, 1972; Dooling and Lachman, 
1971), and thus received neither benefit nor handicap from the primes. 
3.5 Conclusions 
Though the semantic illusion rate for this study was extremely low overall, it was found 
that semantic illusions occur not only for names, but also for words belonging to other 
form classes, such as verbs, adjectives and nouns. There was no significant difference 
between the rate at which participants gave semantic illusion responses, and the data 
from this study did not provide evidence for a form class effect. It was decided that in 
future research semantic illusion sentences containing non-name target words could be 
used without affecting the overall results, provided the target and substitution words 
were sufficiently similar but distinct to meet the criteria required to lead to a semantic 
illusion. 
The priming procedure used in this experiment did not cause a significant priming effect 
and since priming in various other semantic illusion studies (e.g. Reder and Kusbit, 
1991; Kamas, Reder and Ayers. 1996) had not led to a differential effect of priming on 
semantic illusion rate either, it was decided not to continue with this line of research. 
Since the repetition of sentences led to a drop-off in semantic illusion rate after the first 
presentation of a sentence, future studies should not use the design of having two 
statements-to-be-verified – one containing a substitution and one not – as a way in 
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which to circumvent the need for a post-experimental knowledge check. A specific 
knowledge check also makes it possible to identify with greater certainty whether a 
semantic illusion occurred, or an error due to guesswork. 
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Chapter 4: 
Experiment 1: Questions versus Statements 
 
Just as the question of the form class of the target word had never been systematically 
examined in previous semantic illusion research, another issue that had not been 
explained was whether semantic illusions were more likely to occur in response to a 
target question or a statement-to-be-verified. The first full-scale study set out to deal 
with this issue and compared the semantic illusion rate for questions to that for 
statements-to-be-verified with the same semantic content. When Erickson and Mattson 
(1981) attempted to research whether focus had an effect upon semantic illusions, they 
turned the semantic illusion questions they had been using into statements-to-be-
verified. Though they noted a decrease in semantic illusion rate, semantic illusion 
responses continued to occur. Erickson and Mattson concluded that focus was not solely 
responsible for the occurrence of semantic illusions. However, Erickson and Mattson 
did not comment upon the fact that they had not only changed the format of the target 
sentences, but they had also changed the presentation of the stimuli from a five-second-
per-sentence display on a computer screen to a one-printed-sentence-per-page paper 
booklet for a self-paced pencil and paper task. 
Since Erickson and Mattson’s study, questions (e.g. Reder and Kusbit, 1991) and 
statements-to-be-verified (e.g. Brédart and Docquier, 1989; Brédart and Modolo, 1989; 
van Oostendorp and de Mul, 1990) have been treated as essentially equivalent to each 
other in their ability to elicit semantic illusion responses. But it has not been explicitly 
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investigated whether there is a difference in semantic illusion rate between question and 
statement formats. 
When dealing with questions people have to meet slightly different processing demands, 
than when dealing with statements of similar semantic content. In the processing of 
questions the same presuppositions about content are made as for declarative 
statements, but questions then also require further presuppositions to be made before 
successful processing can take place. For example, wh-questions (those starting with 
who, why, what, how, and so on) presuppose the concepts obtained by replacing the wh-
word by the appropriate ‘existentially quantified variable’ (Levinson, 1983): so who 
would be replaced by someone, how by somehow and so on. For example, the question 
“How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the Ark?” presupposes that Moses 
took a certain number of animals on the Ark. These ‘placeholding’ presuppositions take 
up some of the processing resources available to a reader: there is neuropsychological 
evidence from event-related potential studies and from functional magnetic resonance 
imaging, that wh-questions cause distinct patterns of activation during processing 
(Fiebach, Schlesewsky and Friederici, 2001). 
People also generally work on the assumption that certain standard conditions are met 
when they deal with language (e.g. Thomas, 1995). For example, when faced with 
questions, people tend to assume that Grice’s maxim of quality (1975, 1978) applies: if 
someone asks a question, they will usually be taken to be asking sincerely and because 
they are interested in receiving a relevant answer to the question asked. This type of 
linguistic interaction is not based on logic or semantics but on pragmatics: generally we 
would attempt to interpret whatever follows a question to be a relevant answer to the 
question (e.g. Mey, 2001). This pragmatic heuristic is violated in semantic illusion 
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questions, as the perceived task (to answer the question) will not lead to the correct 
response (to identify the substitution). 
With the verification of declarative statements, the task at hand is much more 
straightforward. While the same presuppositions have to be made regarding the 
semantic content of the statement as for the corresponding question, there is only ever 
one other presupposition necessary: the statement at hand is either true, or it is not. Thus 
participants are required to fulfil the task that they perceive: trying to decide whether the 
statement at hand is true or false. When young children are asked to complete a 
verification task and a question-answering task in which the questions correspond to the 
statements in the verification task, they perform better on verification than on question-
answering (Akiyama, Takei and Saito, 1982). 
The hypothesis of Experiment 1 was that questions are more likely to cause semantic 
illusions than statements-to-be-verified due to the difference in task requirements. 
Statements-to-be-verified require the participant to deal with one straightforward task: 
to verify the statement at hand. Strictly speaking a statement with one word substituted 
is no more than an untrue statement. For example, the statement “Moses took two 
animals of each kind on the Ark” is simply not true: Moses did not sail the Ark in the 
first place. Provided the participant carries out precisely the task they are instructed to 
perform, they have a chance of unmasking the semantic illusion. In the case of a 
question, however, the task requirements are different and slightly more complex. Not 
only do the participants have to access their knowledge store to retrieve the information 
relevant to answering the question, but they are also required to scan the question for 
any internal inconsistencies at the same time in a very unusual task. From schema 
theory (e.g. Bartlett, 1995[1932]), which suggests that overall meaning is likely to 
appear more important than details such as the inconsistencies caused by semantic 
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illusion substitutions, and from the results of previous semantic illusion research, which 
showed that gist is more easily dealt with than the literal words (e.g. Reder and Kusbit, 
1991), it seems likely that question answering will take precedence over the monitoring 
task. As a result, questions were expected to lead to more semantic illusions than 
statements-to-be-verified. 
4.1 Method 
Participants: 40 Oxford Brookes undergraduates volunteered to take part in this study 
when approached at the main entrance area of the university’s campus. They were split 
into two groups of 20: ‘questions first’ or ‘statements first’. 
Stimuli: 8 target sentences were constructed from ‘general knowledge’ facts and piloted 
by presenting them to 10 volunteers. Each target could be presented as either a question 
to which a short (one-word) answer could be given (e.g. “What many-coloured garment 
was Jacob given by his father?”) or as a statement for which the participant was 
required to make a true or false judgement (e.g. “Jacob was given a coat of many 
colours by his father”). 4 targets were presented to each participant as questions 
embedded among 16 filler questions, and 4 targets were presented as statements-to-be-
verified, also embedded among 16 filler statements (12 true and 4 false). Each target 
was presented equally often as a question or as a statement-to-be-verified. The order of 
presentation (questions first or statements first) was counterbalanced across participants. 
(Examples of questionnaires used are presented in Appendix 3.) 
Procedure: Each participant was given a leaflet consisting of 3 sheets of A4 paper, with 
instructions printed in bold above a grid containing the fillers and target items. For 
questions the instructions read: ‘Questions: Please read each question and write down 
the answer to it as fast as you can. Some questions don’t actually make sense, answer 
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those with “can’t say”.’ The instruction ‘Please do not turn the page until you have 
completed it’ was printed at the top of each page. For statements the instructions were: 
‘Statements: Please read these through as fast as you can and circle for each statement 
whether you think it is true or false.’ Participants proceeded at their own pace. The final 
page of the booklet was there to provide a knowledge check: 8 multiple-choice 
questions, which tested whether participants had the prerequisite knowledge to 
experience a semantic illusion. (Using the Jacob/Joseph example, a knowledge check 
question could take the following form: the question “Who was given a coat of many 
colours by his father?” followed by the response choices “a) Jacob, b) Joseph, c) 
Benjamin, d) Isaac”.) Instructions for this section were ‘Multiple choice questions: Take 
as much time over these as you like, and answer them as accurately as possible, please.’ 
4.2 Results 
A response was coded as a semantic illusion response only for statements where the 
participant judged the statement to be true and gave the correct answer in the multiple 
choice knowledge check. For questions, a semantic illusion was considered to have 
occurred if the participant responded correctly to the gist of the question and then gave 
the correct answer in the knowledge check (i.e. if a participant had written down a 
correct response to a question treating that question as though there was no substituted 
name at all. Using the Jacob/Joseph example again: a participant had to reply with 
“Coat” to the question “What many-coloured garment was Jacob given by his father?” 
and then during the knowledge check they had to choose “Joseph” (option b) in the 
example above, thus showing that they had the correct knowledge.) A response was 
considered to have been correct only if the participant responded with “can’t say” for 
questions and also gave the correct answer for the multiple-choice knowledge check. 
For statements, participants had to indicate that they thought the statement was false and 
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give the correct response in the knowledge check. All other responses were classed as 
“don’t knows”. The number of semantic illusion responses made for each target 
sentence was recorded for both the question form and the statement form of the sentence 
as was the number of correct responses and “don’t know” responses. Then the semantic 
illusion rate was calculated for each individual sentence in both its forms. The same 
procedure was repeated for the correct response rate and for the rate of “don’t know” 
responses.  
4.2.1 Semantic illusion rate 
A t-test for paired samples was carried out comparing semantic illusion rate for 
statements-to-be-verified to semantic illusion rate for questions for each sentence. As 
predicted, the mean semantic illusion rate for questions was significantly higher than 
that for statement responses (t= -3.05; d.f.= 7; p= 0.019; see Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1). 
Figure 4.1: Mean semantic illusion rate (percent) for question format and 
statement-to-be-verified format. 
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Table 4.1: Mean semantic illusion rate and standard deviations (percent) for 
questions and statements. 
 N  Mean Std. Dev. 
Statements 8 31.3 18.9 
Questions 8 47.5 14.4 
 
4.2.2 Correct responses 
A paired samples t-test was also carried out upon the rate of correct responses made for 
each sentence. It was found that the number of correct responses was significantly lower 
for questions than for statements (t= 4.57; d.f.= 7; p= 0.003; see Figure 4.2 and Table 
4.2.). 
Figure 4.2: Mean correct response rate for question format and statement-to-be-
verified format. 
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Table 4.2: Mean correct response rate and standard deviations (percent) for 
questions and statements. 
 N  Mean Std. Dev. 
Statements 8 50.6 18.6 
Questions 8 16.3  7.9 
 
4.2.3 “Don’t know” responses 
The “don’t know” response rates for questions and statements were also analysed, and a 
paired samples t-test was carried out for the sentences. As with semantic illusion 
responses, it was found that “don’t know” responses were significantly more likely to 
occur for questions than for statements (t= -4.529; d.f.= 7; p= 0.003; see Figure 4.3 and 
Table 4.3.). 
Figure 4.3: Mean “don’t know” response rate (percent) for question format and 
statement-to-be-verified format. 
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Table 4.3: Mean “don’t know” response rate and standard deviations (percent) 
for questions and statements. 
 N of sentences Mean Std. Dev. 
Statements 8 18.1 13.1 
Questions  8 36.3 12.2 
 
4.3 Discussion  
The results for the semantic illusion rates for each sentence type were in keeping with 
the hypothesis, suggesting that semantic illusion rates vary with the tasks participants 
are required to carry out. In a question-answering task, the emphasis is placed on the 
completion of a schema-like structure, which each participant is expected to be able to 
do, given that the stimuli are based on ‘general knowledge’. This aspect of the task 
appears to take precedence over the second task set out in the instructions to monitor 
each question for internal consistency. In the case of the statement-verification task, the 
emphasis is placed upon checking the internal consistency of the schema-like structure 
of each statement. So essentially the difference in performance can be viewed as a 
question of multiple versus single task performance. This hypothesis is also 
corroborated by the observations about the other types of response analysed here. In the 
statement-verification task, the number of correct responses outnumbered both the 
“don’t know” and the semantic illusion responses, with just over fifty percent of all 
target statements being correct. For the questions, the single largest group of response 
type is in the semantic illusion category, in fact, almost fifty percent of the responses 
made to target questions were semantic illusions. The next largest group of responses 
were the “don’t knows” for target questions. This suggests that the task demands for the 
statement verification task are more straightforward than those for the question-
monitoring task. For the question task, participants found it easy enough to respond to 
 67
the gist of the question, but not to its literal form (cf. Reder and Kusbit, 1991). This may 
be partially due to the fact that a different type of memory search is required to 
complete the question answering task compared to the verification task. In the 
verification task, all the material making up a coherent (except for the substitution) story 
is present and a recognition check can be carried out. But in the question answering 
task, a part of the schema has to be recalled from long-term memory. This process is 
likely to be mediated by a content-addressable memory system, which is not dependent 
on exact matches for an answer to be retrieved (e.g. McElree, 2000). 
4.4 Conclusions 
From the results of this experiment it seems quite clear that the outcome of any 
semantic illusion study will be affected by the form in which the target sentences are 
presented, and so comparisons between semantic illusion rates in studies that have used 
statements as presentation form and those in which the target materials have been 
presented as questions have to be made with care. Since the overall performance is 
better for target-statements, with a significantly smaller portion of “don’t know” 
responses, and since participants found it easier to complete the verification task, it was 
decided to use only the statement verification task in further experiments. 
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Chapter 5:  
Experiment 2: Sentence length and target word position 
 
The fact that questions and statements-to-be-verified are apparently not processed in the 
same way raises the question of whether variations within each sentence format also 
have an effect upon semantic illusion rate. When going over the semantic illusion 
literature – whether the individual studies use questions or statements-to-be-verified – 
semantic illusion sentences are generally quite long, containing two or more separate 
propositions which need to be incorporated into the mental representation of the 
sentence being processed. Thus “Moses” took two animals of each kind, and he took 
them on the Ark. Or “Captain Nemo” was after a whale, that whale was white and the 
story of this is told in the novel Moby Dick. The various propositions within each 
sentence – except for the substituted word – form a coherent picture, which should 
allow the participant to build a mental representation of each sentence, which they can 
easily respond to. One question that arises from this idea is whether, therefore, the 
amount of coherent material combined into a sort of schema has an effect on the 
occurrence of semantic illusions.  
5.1 Shorter sentences are easier to interpret 
Studies of aphasics’ error rates in interpretation tasks show that the number of 
propositions in a sentence affects the ease of interpretation, with two propositions being 
more difficult to interpret than one (Caplan, Baker and Dehaut, 1985). Similarly, Waters 
Caplan and Hildebrandt (1987, see also section 11.1.2.1) found that interpretation of 
 69
two proposition sentences was more affected as a result of the performance of a 
secondary task than interpretation of one proposition sentences. By analogy with these 
findings, it seems likely that, if the number of propositions pertaining to a given 
scenario is altered, the semantic illusion rate for such a scenario might change also. 
Thus a longer sentence might cause the semantic illusion rate to increase, whilst true 
and false judgements can be made quickly if only one proposition needs to be checked 
against background knowledge and a replaced name might be relatively easy to spot. In 
the case of a longer sentence, containing three or four propositions more information 
contributes to the overall schema, and thus there is more information with which the 
replaced name needs to be integrated. Semantic processing also needs to proceed in 
parallel with more complex syntactic processing requirements. It has already been 
demonstrated that participants find it harder to detect substitutions in questions 
containing a greater number of concepts associated with the answer (Reder and 
Cleeremans, 1990; Reder and Kusbit, 1991). 
5.2 The substitution is more disruptive in a shorter sentence 
Shafto and MacKay (2000) assumed that the target word received semantic-level 
priming from the sentence context, while the substituted word receives sensory priming 
only. If this assumption holds true, a target word would receive more priming from a 
longer sentence which provides more context, thus leading to a greater chance of a 
semantic illusion occurring. Another way of looking at it is this: there is an increased 
chance of a semantic illusion, because the information contained in the substituted 
word, which is required for the comprehension and processing of the semantic illusion 
sentence, contributes proportionally more to the understanding of a short sentence than 
to that of a long sentence. Thus processing of a short sentence will be more disrupted by 
the presence of a substitution. Additionally, sentences with fewer propositions are easier 
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to interpret (Caplan, Baker and Dehaut, 1985; Waters, Caplan, and Hildebrandt, 1987). 
As a consequence of this line of reasoning, longer sentences are expected to lead to 
more semantic illusion responses than shorter ones, as the inconsistencies caused by a 
substitution would be more obvious in the contexts of a shorter sentence. 
5.3 The position of the substituted word within the sentence 
Another aspect of sentence format that has received little systematic attention is the 
position that a substituted word occupies with in a sentence. English is not a free-word-
order language and many grammatical functions are indicated by word order, including 
the topic of discourse. It can be demonstrated that English listeners rely more heavily on 
word order cues than, for example, Italian listeners who rely more heavily on semantic 
cues (Bates, McNew, MacWhinney, Devescovi and Smith, 1982). In relatively fixed 
word-order languages like English, word order is sometimes used to denote a change in 
the topic of a sentence. For example, ‘left-dislocated’ sentences (Ross, 1967) mark the 
topic by shifting it to the initial position of a sentence (e.g. ‘That blouse, it’s simply 
stunning.’) Studies of the actual usage of left-dislocation show that there is a correlation 
between what participants are talking ‘about’ and the words appearing in that position, 
but the connection is not always straightforward (Geluykens, 1992). Even in longer and 
more complex sentences, the processing cost of non-canonical word order tends to be 
greater in English than, for example, in Italian (Bates, Devescovi and D’Amico, 1999). 
In keeping with these pragmatic findings, Erickson and Mattson (1981) claimed that 
locating the semantic illusion term at the start of the sentence would bring it into focus. 
Since their claim is based on only two example sentences which had been turned from 
question form to statement-to-be-verified form, confounded with a shift in paradigm 
from using a time-limited computer presentation to a self-paced pencil-and-paper task, 
Erickson and Mattson’s results are far from conclusive. Consequently it would be of 
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interest to investigate whether there really is an effect of word position upon semantic 
illusion rate in statements-to-be-verified. Other research indicates that word position 
does not have much effect on semantic illusions. Baker and Wagner (1987) found no 
significant effect of word position on semantic illusion rate in compound sentences; 
neither did Barton and Sanford (1993): positions of the anomalous word in their 
research before or after the scenario was presented had no impact on whether or not 
people spotted the anomaly in a sentence. Reder and Kusbit (1991) carried out a post-
hoc analysis on word position and found no position effect, but this could have been due 
to variations in how ‘good’ their particular stimulus sentences were.  
Van Jaarsveld, Dijkstra and Hermans (1997) set about investigating word position more 
systematically and found that the similarity-effect differed at different word positions, 
but only for a question-answering task. In a question, a dissimilar substitution presented 
before the scenario caused more disruption to the flow of processing than a similar 
substitution in the same position, or a dissimilar substitution presented after the 
scenario. Van Jaarsveld, Dijkstra and Hermans explained their finding by suggesting 
that word position had no effect in a verification task, because the entire sentence would 
need to be processed. Nevertheless, it was thought worthwhile to test for an effect of 
word position upon semantic illusion rate in a study specifically designed with this 
objective in mind, as there often is a pragmatic link between word position and 
meaning.  It was hypothesised that words at the front of a sentence would often be taken 
to be in focus, and central to the meaning of the sentence. As a consequence it was 
thought likely that words at the front of a sentence would undergo more careful checks 
than words in the middle or at the end of a sentence.  
 72
5.4 Verification is likely to be easier for true sentences than false ones 
A final consideration for Experiment 2 was the question of whether semantic illusion 
sentences were more difficult to judge correctly than other false statements. According 
to Chomsky’s Standard Theory (1965), the negation of a sentence is achieved by 
placing a transformational marker in the sentence’s deep structure, so that a negative 
sentence has to be processed similarly to a positive one and then the transformation is 
processed. Generally, negative sentences take longer to process and are less accurately 
recalled and processed relative to a given state of affairs than a corresponding positive 
sentence would be (e.g. Horn, 1989; Glenberg, Robertson, Jansen and Johnson-
Glenberg, 1999). By analogy, it was hypothesised that participants would find it easier 
to verify true statements compared to semantic illusion statements or false statements, 
with a potential effect upon the rate of correct responses made for each response 
category.  
From research on word recognition there is evidence (e.g. Rubenstein, Garfield and 
Millikan, 1970; Stanners and Forbach, 1973) that non-words that are not in keeping 
with the rules of English orthography (e.g.  xgyz) produce very fast ‘no’ responses in a 
lexical decision task, while non-words that could be, but happen not to be, real words 
such as nint take even longer to be rejected than it takes to accept infrequent words. 
There is also evidence that the greater the similarity between non-words and real words, 
the harder it becomes to reject the non-word (e.g. Coltheart, Davelaar, Jonasson and 
Besner, 1977). A similar process might affect the verification of entire sentences. By 
analogy with the lexical decision paradigm, the false-filler statements in semantic 
illusion research can be regarded as like obvious non-words. They should be more 
readily recognisable as false than semantic illusion statements, which as ‘almost true’ 
sentences resemble plausible non-words, being closely similar to true statements with 
much the same content. While for this experiment, response times were not considered, 
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it was thought that the correct response rate for each group of statements might reveal 
the existence of such a potential ‘sentence-similarity’ effect. It was expected that 
semantic illusion statements would be associated with the smallest number of correct 
responses after false-fillers, with true-fillers leading to the greatest correct response rate. 
5.5 Method 
Participants: 324 participants completed a questionnaire for this study. The age of the 
participants ranged from 16 to 76 years, with most participants being university students 
or having received university education. 
Stimuli: A general knowledge ‘quiz’ consisting of 45 true/false statements was 
presented to each participant. Nine of the statements were target statements, which 
included a substituted name. The other 36 sentences were fillers constructed along 
similar lines to the target sentences, varying in length and the position of names within 
the sentence. Ten of these statements were false; the other 26 were true. Each of the 
target sentences could appear in one of nine different versions: target word at the front, 
in the middle or at the end of the sentence; and as a short, medium or long sentence. The 
length of a sentence was measured in propositions, so that for a short sentence the 
potential illusion name had to be matched only on one fact. For a medium length 
sentence, two facts had to be matched up; and for a long sentence, three facts had to be 
checked (see Table 5.1 for an example). 
Each sentence was presented equally often for each potential combination of length and 
position and each participant saw one of each type of combination (i.e. each participant 
saw one sentence as front short, one as front medium, one as front long, one as middle 
short, etc.) The presentation order of the target sentences was varied systematically, so 
that each sentence variation appeared equally often in each of 9 designated target 
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sentence slots within the questionnaire. (An example of the questionnaire used and a full 
list of target sentences are presented in Appendices 4 and 5.) 
Table 5.1: Example of the 9 possible variations in which each semantic illusion 
sentence could appear. 
Length→ 
Position↓ 
 
SHORT 
 
MEDIUM 
 
LONG 
FRONT Wellington’s victory is 
commemorated in 
Trafalgar Square. 
 
Wellington’s victory is 
commemorated by his 
column in Trafalgar 
Square. 
 
Wellington’s victory over 
the Franco-Spanish navy 
is commemorated by his 
column in Trafalgar 
Square. 
MIDDLE In Trafalgar Square, 
Wellington’s victory is 
commemorated. 
 
In Trafalgar Square, 
Wellington’s victory is 
commemorated by his 
column. 
 
In Trafalgar Square, 
Wellington’s victory over 
the Franco-Spanish navy 
is commemorated by his 
column. 
END Trafalgar Square 
commemorates the 
victory won by 
Wellington. 
 
The column in Trafalgar 
Square commemorates 
the victory won by 
Wellington. 
 
The column in Trafalgar 
Square commemorates 
the victory over the 
Franco-Spanish navy won 
by Wellington. 
 
Procedure: Each participant was given a leaflet of two sheets of A4 paper, with the 
verbal instruction: “On the first sheet are 45 general knowledge statements. Read each 
through and respond as quickly as possible by indicating whether you think the 
statement is true or false by marking the appropriate response on the sheet. The 
statements are not intended to be difficult, but if you are not entirely sure, feel free to 
guess. This task is not really about what you know but about how you process 
sentences. When you are finished with page 1, let me know and I will tell you what to 
do for page 2.” Page 2 was a knowledge check: the 9 targets were presented as multiple 
choice questions. Each such question was matched in length to the version of the target 
statement that each participant had seen. Participants were encouraged to respond to the 
knowledge check questions as accurately as possible and were told that there was no 
time constraint for this part of the experiment. 
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5.6 Results 
A semantic illusion was considered to have taken place when a participant judged a 
target statement to be true and showed the correct knowledge in their response to the 
corresponding multiple choice question in the knowledge check. The semantic illusion 
rate was determined for each target statement variation. The rate of correct responses for 
each target statement was also recorded. A correct response required both the 
identification of the relevant target statement as false and a correct response in the 
knowledge check. All other responses to target questions were classed as don’t know 
responses. Finally the rate of correct responses for true-fillers and false-fillers was 
determined, to compare the rates of correct responses for all three types of statements-
to-be-verified. 
5.6.1 Semantic illusion rate 
A repeated measures analysis of variance was carried out on the semantic illusion data 
using sentences as subjects. Mauchly’s Test was used to check the sphericity 
assumption. Mauchly’s test of sphericity was found to be significant only for the 
sentence length effect, and therefore Pillai’s Trace was used to determine the 
significance of this effect. Sentence length was found not to affect the semantic illusion 
rate (F= 0.703; d.f.= 2, 7; p= 0.527). For the word position effect and for the interaction 
between length and word position, Mauchly’s test of sphericity was insignificant. The 
interaction between word position and sentence length was not significant (F= 1.413; 
d.f.= 4, 32; p= 0.252). The word position effect was found to be marginally significant 
(F= 3.455; d.f.= 2, 16; p= 0.057), and post-hoc t-tests for paired samples were carried 
out using the Bonferroni correction. This means that an adjusted criterion for 
significance was set at p= 0.0167 (see Table 5.2 for means). 
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Table 5.2: Mean semantic illusion rates and standard deviations (percent) for 
each word position.  
Position N Mean Std. Dev. 
Front 27 29.1 2.5 
Middle 27 32.2 3.0 
End 27 24.7 2.7 
 
Only the difference between middle and end positions proved to be significant (t= 
2.853; d.f.= 26; p= 0.008; 0.008<0.0167, hence significant by adjusted criterion), with 
target words at the end of the sentence being less likely to cause a semantic illusion 
response. There was also a non-significant trend (t= 2.449; d.f.= 26; p= 0.021; 
0.021>0.0167, hence not significant by adjusted criterion) suggesting that substitutions 
at the end of a sentence may also be more easily unmasked than those at the start of the 
sentence. But there was no significant difference between front and middle positions (t= 
-1.263; d.f.= 26; p= 0.218). Finally the mean semantic illusion rates were calculated for 
each length and word position combination (see Figure 5.1 and Table 5.3). 
Figure 5.1: Mean semantic illusion rate (percent) at all different combinations of 
sentence length and word position. 
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Table 5.3: Mean semantic illusion rates and standard deviation (percent) for 
each combination of sentence length and target word position. 
             Position → 
↓ Length 
Front Middle End 
Short 29.6 (16.0) 35.2 (20.6) 23.8 (17.9) 
Medium 30.3 (14.8) 27.5 (12.8) 24.1 (11.7) 
Long 27.5 (9.0) 33.9 (11.6) 26.2 (13.3) 
 
5.6.2 Correct responses to semantic illusion statements 
In order to compare the results from this experiment with the results of previous 
experiments described in the literature, correct responses to semantic illusion questions 
were also analysed in a repeated measures analysis of variance using sentences as 
subjects. The sphericity assumption was not violated for any of the effects measured. 
There was no effect of either sentence length (F= 1.129; d.f.= 2, 16; p= 0.348), or word 
position (F= 0.505; d.f.= 2, 16; p= 0.613); and there was no significant interaction 
between sentence length and word position (F= 1.074; d.f.= 4, 32; p= 0.386). The mean 
correct response rates were calculated for each length and word position combination 
(see Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4: Mean correct response rates and standard deviations (percent) for 
each combination of sentence length and target word position. 
             Position → 
↓ Length 
Front Middle End 
Short 59.4 (16.6) 53.0 (19.3) 65.8 (17.1) 
Medium 60.2 (15.8) 63.0 (11.4) 64.8 (12.5) 
Long 60.5 (11.4) 58.7 (12.3) 62.3 (16.0) 
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5.6.3 Correct responses for fillers and targets  
A repeated measures analysis of variance was carried out upon the correct response rate 
data for correct target responses, correct true-filler responses, and correct false-filler 
responses using participants as subjects. A true-filler response consisted of a participant 
correctly judging a true statement to be true and a false-filler response consisted of a 
participant judging a false statement to be false. 
Mauchly’s test of sphericity was found to be significant (W= 0.836; d.f.= 2; p<0.001) 
and Pillai’s Trace was used to determine the significance of the analysis of variance. 
The analysis of variance was found to be significant (F= 574.099; d.f.= 2, 322; 
p<0.001), and a series of post-hoc comparisons were carried out, using t-tests for paired 
samples with a Bonferroni correction. As predicted, the highest rate of correct responses 
was achieved in the true-fillers category, but false-fillers and targets led to equal correct 
response rates (t= 0.690; d.f.= 323; p= 0.491). There were significantly more correct 
responses made for true fillers than for false fillers (t= 31.342; d.f.= 323; p= 0.001), and 
significantly more correct responses for true fillers than for targets (t= 22.861; d.f.= 
323; p= 0.001; see Table 5.5 for means). 
Table 5.5: Mean correct response rates and standard deviations (percent) per 
participant for the three types of statement. 
Type of statement N Mean Std. Dev. 
True-fillers 324 89.8 9.3 
False-fillers 324 59.9 14.9 
Targets 324 59.0 24.3 
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5.7 Discussion  
It is surprising that there is no effect of sentence length upon the semantic illusion rate, 
as it would seem that a longer internally consistent sentence (except for the target word) 
would match more closely overall to a schema stored in memory because a greater 
number of propositions related to the schema would match perfectly, leading to greater 
goodness of global fit (Barton and Sanford, 1993). In a shorter sentence where only one 
proposition needs to be matched up with the target, the overall goodness of fit would 
presumably be proportionally smaller. Reder and Kusbit’s (1991) partial matching 
hypothesis of semantic illusions essentially describes such a theory at the word level. 
According to this theory semantic illusions occur because the partial match process is 
sensitive to the similarity of all the concept words in the sentence to the representation 
of the relevant knowledge stored in memory. If the features of the target word and the 
correct but substituted word overlap, the semantic illusion word tends to go unnoticed. 
A similar matching process could be envisaged for the entire schema accessed by the 
statement-to-be-verified in the experimental task: the more propositions in the sentence 
match the stored schema, the more likely the semantic illusion word is to be overlooked. 
The fact that there is no effect of length suggests that once a schema is accessed through 
a sentence referring to information stored in the schema, the subsequent judgement of 
truth is relatively automatic and independent of the details of the sentence. This 
suggestion is in keeping with other observations made about semantic illusion 
responses: they are made very rapidly and with great confidence (e.g. Erickson and 
Mattson, 1981); often the participant will realise they have just made a mistake 
immediately after they have given the semantic illusion response. Automatic actions are 
generally characterised as stereotyped, rapid, hard to inhibit (e.g. Shiffrin and 
Schneider, 1977). 
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It has previously been shown that information from different sentences is rapidly 
integrated into a schema-like memory structure, to the extent that participants will 
recognise the gist of the sentences in recognition tasks, but cannot distinguish between 
sentences they have actually seen and those that are new but in keeping with the 
semantic content of the sentences seen (Bransford and Franks, 1971). Given this 
‘abstraction of linguistic material’, it is possible to explain the lack of an effect of length 
upon semantic illusion rate by thinking of the fact that the content of a target sentence 
has to be familiar to the participant in order for an semantic illusion to occur at all. One 
can assume that the semantic content of the target sentence has previously been 
integrated into long-term memory and is there contained within a schema, which can be 
accessed by shorter sentences as well as by longer ones. Thus the longer sentences 
might not be very different in terms of processing demands, because the information 
contained within such sentences has already been integrated at a previous point in time. 
Word position is associated with an effect that was not anticipated: target words at the 
end of a sentence are spotted significantly more accurately than target words at the 
beginning or embedded in the middle of a semantic illusion sentence. A possible 
explanation for this effect could be that words at the end of a sentence are subject to a 
recency effect (e.g. Glanzer and Cunitz, 1966). When a sentence is processed the actual 
words are rapidly forgotten (e.g. Sachs, 1967), but the semantic content is retained to a 
greater degree. This appears to be associated with the shift from building one sub-
structure to starting with the next (Gernsbacher, 1985). In the case of a word at the end 
of a sentence it might be the case that the word has not completely vanished from 
working memory by the time a true/false judgement is made. Thus this particular word 
is taken at face value as opposed to having already been processed for meaning by the 
time the judgement is made, and hence the ‘intruder’ stands a better chance of being 
discovered. It could also be that the substituted word at the end of a sentence stands out, 
 81
because the placing of a name at the end of a sentence usually requires the use of 
slightly unusual and more complex syntactic structures, such as phrasing the sentence in 
the passive voice (Chomsky, 1965), which might draw attention to the name in 
question.  
The comparison of correct response rates showed that participants found it generally 
easier to verify true statements. This is in keeping with findings showing that processing 
negatives is more difficult than processing positive statements. The proposed analogy 
between target statements and word-like non-words did not hold and participants 
performed equally well on false-fillers verification as they did on target verification. On 
the whole, however, both types of false statements led to a much smaller correct 
response rate than the true statements, suggesting that people have a fundamental 
problem at dealing with false information. 
5.8 Conclusions 
Even though there were some (marginally significant) variations in semantic illusion 
rate observed in this study, the semantic illusion rates fall within the usual range for 
semantic illusion responses reported in previous studies. It appears that Brédart and 
Modolo (1989) were justified in their criticism of Erickson and Mattson’s claim that 
putting the substituted name at the front of the sentence would bring it into focus: target 
words at the front of a semantic illusion statement led to no fewer semantic illusion 
responses than target words embedded in the middle of a statement. The length of a 
semantic illusion statement was also shown not to affect the semantic illusion rate, 
suggesting that not much information is required for a schema to be successfully 
activated in long-term memory. This is in keeping with Reder and Kusbit’s partial 
match hypothesis (see section 2.8.). Another point arising from this experiment comes 
from the comparison of the correct response rate for false filler statements compared to 
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targets. It would appear that part of what affects the processing of semantic illusion 
statements is to do simply with the fact that these statements are false, and as such 
harder to verify, as a falsehood can only ever be established on the basis of absent 
confirmatory evidence. This finding raises the question of how semantic illusion 
sentences might differ from other forms of discourse and how they fit into ‘normal’ 
language usage. 
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Chapter 6:  
Experiment 3: Semantic illusions in German 
 
Many previous semantic illusion studies have been carried out in different languages, 
including English (Erickson and Mattson, 1981; Reder and Kusbit, 1991; Reder, Kamas 
and Ayers, 1996; Shafto and MacKay, 2000; Hannon and Daneman, 2001), French 
(Brédart and Modolo, 1989; Brédart and Docquier, 1990), and Dutch (van Oostendorp 
and de Mul, 1989; van Oostendorp and Kok, 1990; van Jaarsveld, Dijkstra and 
Hermans, 1997). This observation led to further considerations of the potential effect of 
word order upon semantic illusion rate. Even though little effect of word-order per se 
has been found, there is evidence that at least in Dutch, the similarity effect (see section 
2.5.2) changes in magnitude for semantic illusion questions depending on whether the 
substitution is more or less similar to the target it replaces (van Jaarsveld, Dijkstra and 
Hermans, 1997). Furthermore, it was found in Experiment 2 (see chapter 5), that 
substitutions at the end of a statement are marginally easier to detect. 
However, the three languages used in semantic illusion research to date are all more 
‘configurational’ languages that make much use of word order as a syntactic indicator. 
In less ‘configurational’ languages, such as German, word order is of smaller 
importance, and inflections are used to convey syntactic information. For example, 
subject and object in German are determined by the case endings attached to the 
relevant words in combination with specific matching articles, and not only by the order 
in which they appear in a sentence. For example, MacWhinney, Bates and Kliegl (1984) 
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showed that English speakers relied heavily on word order in a task in which they were 
required to determine the actor in simple transitive sentences (e.g. “The dog grabs the 
pencil.”) German speakers, on the other hand, relied more on agreement between the 
verb and the subject, which is usually indicated by a system of case markings (e.g. “Der 
Hund greift den Stift.” [transliterated: “The {masculine singular nominative article} dog 
grabs the {masculine singular accusative article} pencil.”]) As a result of this, it was 
thought that manipulations of word order in German sentences would be likely to be 
interpreted as a way of signalling information about the focus of the sentence, with 
words near the front being perceived to be in focus. Indeed, it can be shown that word 
order affects processing of sentences starting with transitive verbs in a condition where 
semantically related distractors are presented, while the same interference is not 
observed when the transitive verb is in a non-initial position (Schriefers, Teruel and 
Meinhausen, 1998). There is also neuropsychological evidence from the study of event-
related brain potentials (ERPs) recorded while native speakers of German read 
sentences in which the word order had been systematically varied. The pattern of ERPs 
shows that sentences deviating from the usual word order of subject, indirect object, 
direct object were more difficult to process and led to different patterns of brain activity 
(Roesler, Pechmann, Streb, Roeder and Hennighausen, 1998). 
As a result of these findings, a study was designed to investigate the effect of 
substitution word positioning upon semantic illusion rate in a German statement 
verification task. It was hypothesised that statements with a substitution near the 
beginning of a sentence would lead to fewer semantic illusions for the following two 
reasons: 1) names nearer the beginning of a sentence would tend to be seen to be in 
focus, and 2) smooth flow of processing of German sentences was thought to be more 
likely to be disrupted, when difficulties (inconsistencies) were encountered nearer the 
start of a sentence. 
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6.1 Method 
Participants: 66 participants educated at least to the German equivalent of ‘A’-level 
participated in this study on a volunteer basis. 
Stimuli: The nine statements-to-be-verified used in Experiment 2 were translated into 
German. Three sentences were excluded as they were found to use knowledge that was 
too specifically ‘British’ when piloted. The remaining six sentences were manipulated 
so that they could appear in either of two forms: ‘first word substituted’ (e.g. “Ali Baba 
befreite im Märchen in 1001 Nacht den Geist aus der Wunderlampe.” [transliterated: 
“Ali Baba freed in the tale in 1001 Nights the genie from the magic lamp.”]) or 
‘substituted word nearer to end’ (e.g. “Der Geist aus der Wunderlampe im Märchen in 
1001 Nacht wurde von Ali Baba befreit.” [transliterated: “The ghost out of the magic 
lamp in the tale in 1001 Nights was by Ali Baba freed.”]) The word positions could not 
be matched exactly with those used in the English language experiment, as it is very 
difficult to create an idiomatic German sentence of the kind used as semantic illusion 
sentences in experiment 2 that ends in a name, without putting strong emphasis on that 
name. Once the targets were prepared they were integrated with 24 filler statements-to-
be-verified constructed along the same lines as the targets (17 fillers were true 
statements and 7 were false) to form a general knowledge ‘quiz’ consisting of a total of 
30 true/false statements to be presented to each participant. (Examples of the 
questionnaires used are presented in Appendix 6.) 
Procedure: Each participant was handed an A4 sheet of paper with 30 statements-to-be-
verified printed on it. Instructions were printed at the top of the sheet, asking 
participants to read each sentence as quickly and carefully as they could and then to 
make a mark in the allocated column on the paper to indicate whether they thought the 
sentence was true or false. When participants had completed the 30 judgements in their 
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own time, they were handed a separate sheet on which 6 knowledge check questions 
were printed with multiple-choice answers to be indicated by circling or otherwise 
marking. Instructions for the knowledge check were printed at the top of the page. 
Participants were encouraged to complete this part of the questionnaire as accurately as 
possible and told that there was no time limit for the completion of this task. 
6.2 Results 
As in the previous studies, a response was coded as a semantic illusion only if the 
participant had judged the given statement to be true and given the correct answer in the 
multiple choice knowledge check. The number of semantic illusion responses for 
substituted words in each of the two positions was recorded for each target statement. In 
order to compare the results of this experiment to the results of previous studies 
described in the literature, the rate of correct responses to target questions was also 
recorded and analysed. A response was considered to be true if the participant judged 
the statement as false and gave the correct answer in the knowledge check. The rate of 
correct responses for each participant was also recorded for targets and both types of 
filler statement (true fillers and false fillers). 
6.2.1 Semantic illusion rate 
A t-test for paired samples was carried out to compare the semantic illusion rate for 
statements with the substituted word at the front of the sentence (position 1) with that 
for statements with the substitution nearer the end of the sentence (position 2), using the 
statements as subjects. There was no significant difference between the mean semantic 
illusion rate in positions 1 and 2 (t= 1.480; d.f.= 5; p= 0.0995, one-tailed; see Table 6.1 
and Figure 6.1.) 
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Table 6.1: Mean semantic illusion rate and standard deviations (percent) for 
substitutions in position 1 and position 2. 
Position of 
substitution 
N Mean Std. Dev. 
Position 1 6 39.4 11.3 
Position 2 6 31.8 13.4 
 
Figure 6.1: Mean semantic illusion rate (percent) for position 1 (at the start of the 
statement) and position 2 (nearer the end of the statement). 
 
6.2.2 Correct responses to semantic illusion statements 
A t-test for paired samples was carried out to compare the correct response rate for 
statements with the substitution at the front of the sentence (position 1) to the correct 
response rate for statements with substitutions nearer the end of the sentence (position 
2). Again, statements were used as subjects. There was a non-significant trend in the 
opposite direction to that predicted, with more correct answers given to semantic 
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illusion statements with the substitution in position 2 (t= -1.909; d.f.= 5; p= 0.0575, 
one-tailed; see Table 6.2. for means). 
Table 6.2: Mean correct response rate and standard deviations (percent) for 
substitutions in position 1 and position 2. 
Position of 
substitution 
N Mean Std. Dev. 
Position 1 6 48.5 7.7 
Position 2 6 57.7 14.6 
 
6.2.3 Correct responses for fillers and targets 
The rate of correct responses in each statement category was determined and compared, 
and a repeated measures analysis of variance was carried out upon the correct response 
rate data for correct target responses, correct true-filler responses, and correct false-filler 
responses, using participants as subjects. A true-filler response consisted of a participant 
correctly judging a true statement to be true and a false-filler response consisted of a 
participant judging a false statement to be false, as in Experiment 2.  
Mauchly’s test of sphericity was significant (W= 0.805; d.f.= 2; p= 0.001) and so 
Pillai’s Trace was used to determine the significance of the analysis of variance. The 
analysis of variance was significant (F= 92.253; d.f.= 2, 64; p= 0.001), and a series of 
post-hoc comparisons were carried out, using t-tests for paired samples with a 
Bonferroni correction (adjusted criterion for significance p= 0.0167). The highest rate of 
correct responses was observed for true fillers, but false fillers and targets led to equal 
correct response rates (t= 2.239; d.f.= 65; p= 0.029). There were significantly more 
correct responses made for true fillers than false fillers (t= 11.800; d.f.= 65; p= 0.001), 
and significantly more correct responses for true fillers than for targets (t= 10.327; d.f.= 
65; p= 0.001; see Table 6.3 for means).The pattern of results followed that of the results 
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of the English language study carried out in Experiment 2 (see Chapter 5, and see Table 
6.4 for means). 
Table 6.3: Mean correct response rates and standard deviations (percent) per 
participant for the three types of statement. 
Type of statement N Mean Std. Dev. 
True-fillers 66 84.9 9.9 
False-fillers 66 60.2 14.5 
Targets 66 53.2 24.6 
 
Table 6.4: Mean correct response rates (percent) for the three types of statement 
for Experiment 2 (English statements) and for Experiment 3 (German 
statements). 
Type of statement Mean (English) Mean (German) 
True-fillers 89.8 84.9 
False-fillers 59.9 60.2 
Targets 59.0 53.2 
 
6.3 Discussion 
The results were not in keeping with the hypothesis that a substituted word at the 
beginning of a semantic illusion sentence would be more easily detected in a German 
sentence than in an English one, as in German word order was thought to be an 
indicator of sentence focus, but not of the syntactic function of the word within the 
sentence. Nor did a substitution near the beginning of a statement disrupt the flow of 
processing in such a way that more semantic illusions were detected. Instead, the 
direction of the difference in semantic illusion rate goes in the same direction as the 
findings for the English sentences, with slightly more semantic illusions occurring for 
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sentences which start with a substitution. It is possible that the way in which sentences 
were manipulated in order to place the target word in either position 1 or position 2 had 
an effect on semantic illusion rate. In order to place the target word in the desired 
position, the usual word order (in German) of subject, indirect object and direct object 
has to be varied. It has been shown that sentences deviating from this canonical word 
order are harder to process (Roesler, Pechmann, Streb, Roeder and Hennighausen, 
1998). Hence it is possible that statements with the substitution (which in this study was 
always a name) in position 1, where it occupied the role of the subject of the sentence, 
were easier to process overall, and thus less disruption was caused. Conversely, 
statements with the substitution in a non-initial position, might generally have been 
harder to process overall, allowing the substitution to cause greater disruption of the 
flow of processing, and consequently the substitutions were detected more easily. 
When the overall rate for correct responses for each type of statement used in this 
experiment was examined, the same pattern of results emerged as in Experiment 2: 
participants found it generally easier to verify true statements. In fact the actual correct 
response rates are very close to those in the English language study. This suggests that 
the extent to which these languages are ‘configurational’ does not affect semantic 
illusions. 
6.4 Conclusions 
As in van Jaarsveld, Dijkstra and Hermans’ (1997) and Barton and Sanford’s (1993) 
findings, word position was not found to have a significant effect upon the semantic 
illusion rate for semantic illusions in German. It therefore seems that even in a language 
that is more highly inflected than English, the semantic illusion phenomenon follows 
much the same pattern that has been reported in previous studies, and it appears that the 
semantic illusion phenomenon is – at least partially – language independent. 
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From the results of Experiments 2 and 3 it appears that the actual order or number of 
words used in a semantic illusion sentence has little to do with the likelihood of a 
substituted target word being detected. So what is it about semantic illusion type 
sentences that makes them what they are? Are they in some way different from other 
sentences that are encountered in day-to-day processing? The next chapter is concerned 
with the question of how semantic illusion type sentences fit into ordinary discourse. 
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Chapter 7: 
Semantic illusions as part of normal discourse 
 
When looking at semantic illusion research, it quickly becomes apparent that the 
sentences used to elicit semantic illusions are restricted to a definite format. They have 
to contain information already known to the reader in order for the illusion to occur. 
Semantic illusion sentences also tend to be fairly long and to contain redundant 
information, presumably so that a coherent mental representation can be established, in 
which the substituted word fills a specific role-slot sufficiently well not to be noticed. 
The question that arises out of such observations is how sentences which are 
constructed identically to semantic illusion sentences – but lack the substituted target 
word – compare to other sentences used in the kind of written discourse that is seen on a 
day-to-day basis. Even though written discourse varies widely, so that it is almost 
impossible to establish whether in some absolute sense semantic illusion type sentences 
(referred to in this chapter as SITS) are different from ‘other’ sentences, it would be of 
considerable interest if SITS can be shown to resemble each other more than they 
resemble other types of sentences. 
In order to compare SITS with other sentences, participants were asked to rate/classify 
each of a set of fifteen sentences on a series of semantic description tasks (see Table 7.1 
for an overview). Eight of the sentences used were SITS based upon examples of 
semantic illusions used in the literature but presented in their ‘correct’ version. For 
example, the statement “Noah took two animals of each type on the Ark” was used as 
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Erickson and Mattson used a very similar sentence in their original experiment. The 
control sentences were chosen at random from a number of different sources, such as 
novels, textbooks, academic journal articles and newspapers. Each task was designed to 
be relatively intuitive and to elicit participants’ subjective evaluation. Instructions were 
supplied for each task, and for the rating scales examples of the extremes of the scales 
were provided. 
Table 7.1: Overview of the sentence description tasks to be carried out 
by the participants. 
1. What kind of text is it? (categorisation task)  
2. How great is the quantity of background knowledge required to 
understand the sentence? (rating scale)  
3. How important is it to know the context of the sentence in order to 
understand it? (rating scale)  
4. How specific are the meanings of the individual words used in the 
sentence? (rating scale)  
5. How familiar is the proposition stated in the sentence? (rating scale)  
6. How grammatical is the sentence? (rating scale)  
7. How complex is the sentence? (rating scale)  
8. How formal is the style of the sentence? (rating scale)  
9. How natural (i.e. likely to be encountered in normal discourse) is the 
sentence? (rating scale)  
10. How literally is the sentence meant? (rating scale)  
11. Underline the part of the sentence that the main focus is placed upon.  
 
7.1 The categorisation task 
Participants were first asked to classify each sentence by deciding which semantic/ 
ontological category of text it might belong to. People approach written material with 
certain genre-specific expectations and processing strategies acquired during past 
encounters with other examples of text from the same category. It can be shown that 
people remember more surface information about the same text if the text’s ostensible 
genre is fiction, than they do if the text is presented as news (Zwaan, 1994). Similarly a 
different perspective can easily affect the way in which a participant interprets and 
remembers a ‘story’. If, for example, a story about a house were to be read with a view 
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to breaking in as opposed to buying, it can be shown that participants are likely to recall 
different aspects of the same text according to the context they were initially provided 
with (Anderson and Pichert, 1978). Hence the semantic/ontological category to which a 
participant assigns a sentence is likely to play an important role in the interpretation of 
the sentence. This task was included to see how participants would class the SITS: 
would they all be seen as belonging to a certain category, and if so, which one? From 
the observations made in semantic illusion research one could assume that SITS would 
generally be seen as ‘factual’, snippets of knowledge usually known to each participant, 
and thus might be processed in a similar way as news items, with little attention to 
surface details (cf. Zwaan, 1994). 
7.2 Background and context 
The first two rating scales were concerned with the question of background and context. 
‘Background’ was defined as the amount of extraneous knowledge required to 
comprehend the ideas within a sentence. In this chapter the term ‘background’ is used to 
refer to ‘that which is assumed or taken for granted’. This idea is often referred to as 
‘pragmatic presupposition’ (e.g. Stalnaker, 1977 [1974]). Specifically, ‘background’ 
here denotes information that is assumed by the speaker/writer to be shared by them and 
the hearer/listener (e.g. Jackendoff, 1972).  
‘Context’, by contrast, is used to refer to the specific context in which a sentence might 
be encountered and its potential effect upon the interpretation of that sentence. Thus 
context is defined very narrowly in this chapter, referring only to the immediate 
situation in which each sentence might be encountered. Specifically, the notion of 
context here is defined negatively in terms of how ‘understandable’ a sentence would be 
if it appeared on an anonymous postcard (cf. ‘null-context’; Katz, 1977). 
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Another way of describing the difference between background and context in this 
chapter would be to think of background as analogous to ‘global’ or ‘discourse’ setting, 
while the word ‘context’, is analogous to ‘local’ or ‘sentence’ setting. Both background 
and context were considered to be of relevance because there is a lot of variation in how 
much background knowledge different types of written discourse presuppose of their 
readers. There is also evidence that global context has more effect on naming times in 
lexical processing than local context (Hess, Foss and Carroll, 1995). The distinction 
between background knowledge required and the effect of context is also of interest, as 
semantic illusion sentences appear to require a certain level of background knowledge, 
but are relatively self-contained apart from that, and thus have meaning independently 
of the specific context in which they may be found. It was assumed that SITS would 
therefore score relatively low ratings on both these scales. 
7.3 Specificity of individual words 
The third scale was concerned with how participants perceived the specificity of 
individual words within each sentence. This referred to the extent to which a given word 
was used in a restricted, context-specific and unambiguous way. For example, 
depending upon context the meaning of the word “paper” can refer to anything made of 
that material, but also to a piece of academic writing. This is of relevance to processing 
of semantic illusion sentences, as it can be shown that the central meanings of words 
(e.g. “firm” as in “hard” as opposed to “firm” as in “strict”) are easier to process 
(Williams, 1992). The notion of the specificity of individual words is also closely 
related to the notion of context as defined above and it requires participants to look 
individually at each word within a sentence to see how context-free or context-
dependent each word is. Participants were asked to rate each sentence according to how 
specifically they felt the words were being used. The assumption was that ambiguously 
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used words would require more processing in order to extract meaning from the 
sentence (cf. ‘garden path’ sentences: sentences such as The horse raced past the barn 
fell that leads a reader down a ‘garden path’ to a momentarily wrong conclusion (e.g. 
Crain and Steedman, 1985; Milne, 1982). It was hypothesised that SITS would be 
considered to be particularly specifically phrased compared to other sentences, using 
central meanings of the words involved, therefore making SITS appear easier to 
comprehend, as the meaning of the individual words used would be easily accessible. 
7.4 Ease of processing 
Semantic illusions only occur under circumstances where participants already know the 
information contained within the sentence being processed. Therefore a fourth scale was 
constructed asking participants to rate the ‘familiarity’ of the ideas expressed in each 
sentence. ‘Familiarity’ here refers to the participant’s specific knowledge of the ideas 
expressed in each sentence rated and is as such related to the background required to 
understand the sentence. A familiar sentence was thought to contain a number of 
pragmatic presuppositions that are shared by the participants, and that the participants 
are likely to believe are shared by other people. This is a similar view to that espoused 
in Koriat’s (1993) model of the feeling of knowing. The model predicts that feeling of 
knowing will be higher for questions that many people know the answer to, as more 
partial information would usually be available for these questions. It was thought that 
most forms of written discourse would be used to convey novel information, while 
familiar information would generally be assumed rather than spelled out as in SITS, and 
thus SITS would be rated as more familiar than control sentences. 
In order to establish whether there was something about the way in which SITS are 
constructed that participants found inherently odd or even just noteworthy compared to 
how control sentences were constructed, a fifth rating scale was concerned with the 
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perceived ‘grammaticality’ of each sentence. Native speakers of a language are able to 
make judgements about the ‘well-formedness’ of sentences intuitively in so-called 
‘grammaticality judgements’, and neuropsychological evidence shows that people are 
very sensitive to grammatical violations (e.g. Meyer, Friederici and von Cramon, 2000). 
Grammaticality judgements reflect the linguistic knowledge of an individual and are 
part of that person’s linguistic competence (cf. Chomsky, 1965). There is empirical 
evidence that ungrammatical sentences lead to longer response times compared to 
grammatical sentences (Vos, Gunter, Kolk and Mulder, 2001), suggesting that they are 
more difficult to process. It was hypothesised that SITS would be regarded as inherently 
odd in their grammatical construction as a result of the built-in redundancy of 
information, and thus it was thought that they would be rated as less grammatical and 
therefore harder to process than control sentences. 
Another point of interest is the perceived complexity of SITS. Complexity in sentence 
processing is made up of syntactic complexity (to do with the way in which a sentence 
is structured, e.g. Chomsky, 1957) and of semantic complexity (to do with the number 
of inferences required to comprehend the sentence). SITS are usually quite lengthy, 
often consisting of a number of different but highly familiar sub-clauses. It was thought 
that perceived complexity – as rated by the participant – would be highly likely to be a 
combination of syntactic and semantic components, since semantic cues play an 
important role in comprehending syntactically complex sentences. For example, 
Schlesinger (1968) demonstrated that nested (repeatedly embedded) sentences are much 
easier to process when semantic cues are available. For example, participants found it 
much easier to grasp the content of a sentence like “This is the hole, that the rat, which 
our cat, whom the dog bit, made, caught” as compared with a sentence with minimal 
cues about which noun goes with which verb, such as “This is the boy, that the man, 
whom the lady, whom our friend saw, knows, hit”. This is true, even though the cues in 
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the rat-cat-dog-example are incongruous, and participants nearly always give an 
interpretation in line with semantic expectations and not with correct syntactic analysis, 
much as seems to happen in semantic illusion sentences. Semantic illusion sentences 
were therefore expected to be perceived as simple rather than complex, as they contain 
much highly familiar material. Thus the interpretation of the sentence would be in line 
with semantic/referential expectations – a strategy that participants can be shown to 
employ when resolving structural ambiguities in garden path sentences (Ni, Crain and 
Shankweiler, 1996). 
7.5 Style of the sentence 
The last three rating scales were devised to determine how the wording of SITS was 
generally perceived in comparison with that of other sentences found in written 
discourse. Participants were asked to rate each sentence for how formally it was phrased 
in terms of the vocabulary and syntactic structures used (‘formality’). The term 
‘formality’ was used to refer to the linguistic resources that speakers have at their 
disposal to mark their attitude towards the people they communicate with. This is also 
sometimes called the ‘register’ of an utterance (e.g. Brown and Gilman, 1961; Lyons, 
1977) and it refers to the way in which ‘the language we speak or write varies according 
to the type of situation’ (Halliday, 1978). In certain situations, such as formal meetings, 
or for certain types of language use (e.g. report-writing versus writing a note to a close 
friend) a more formal register is needed and expected (e.g. Thomas, 1995). It can be 
shown empirically that some sentence structures are seen to be more formal than others 
and will be attributed to formal rather than informal listeners (Levin and Garrett, 1990). 
It was thought that more formal sentences would be seen to convey information with 
greater authority and would thus be less likely to be questioned. Following this line of 
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reasoning, it was hypothesised that SITS would be regarded as more formal than other 
sentences and would generally be taken as read. 
Participants were also asked to rate how likely they thought they might be to come 
across each sentence in normal discourse (‘naturalness’). People are very good at 
judging the naturalness of conversational structure, choosing original naturally 
occurring conversations over reconstructions of the same conversation as most natural 
in a naturalness judgement task (Goldthwaite, 1997). This ability is likely to be due to 
people’s implicit knowledge about conversational pragmatic structure. The naturalness 
of a sentence is connected with its ease of use – more natural sentences being easier to 
process (e.g. Liberman, 1995). Hence it was hoped that this rating scale would provide a 
measure of the ease with which participants could imagine using each of the sentences. 
It was hypothesised that SITS would seem rather artificial, due to the degree of 
informational redundancy in each sentence, and thus be rated to be less natural.  
The last rating scale was concerned with how literally each sentence was perceived to 
be meant (‘literalness’). The basic assumption about a sentence is that it is meant 
literally, but in language use, many utterances perform an action over and above the 
meaning of the words used. For example, in the exchange “Let’s go to the movies 
tonight” – “I have to study for an exam” the second sentence primarily performs the 
function of rejecting the proposal of the first sentence (e.g. Searle, 1975). Literalness is 
closely related to the familiarity scale, as non-literal uses of language – in which the 
words used have taken on a meaning over and above their lexical definitions (e.g. legal, 
military or religious language) – implies that little or no attention is paid to individual 
words in such an utterance. Literally meant sentences would be expected to take longer 
to read (cf. Cronk and Schweigert, 1992; Cronk, Lima, and Schweigert, 1993). It was 
thought that SITS would generally not be seen to be performing another function over 
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and above conveying the meaning of the words within the sentence, and thus they were 
expected to be rated as more literal than sentences from other sources. 
7.6 The focus determination task 
The final task that participants were asked to perform was to underline what they 
perceived to be the focal point of each of the fifteen sentences. This task was included 
to build on the work by Erickson and Mattson (1981) and Brédart and Modolo (1988). It 
was assumed that this task would help to establish if substituted words in SITS were 
generally thought to be in focus. The hypothesis was that SITS would have more clearly 
defined focus points than most control sentences, and that these focus points would 
generally not coincide with the position of the target word. 
7.7 Method 
Participants: 68 volunteer participants with at least undergraduate level education 
completed self-timed questionnaires consisting of the 11 tasks described above to be 
carried out upon 15 sentences. The participants were aged between 18 and 45 years with 
a mean age of 22 years. 
Materials: Fifteen sentences were rated: 8 SITS and 7 control sentences. The 8 
sentences that were used as SITS were based upon examples of SITS used in the 
literature. One sentence was also based upon the style of questions of the experiment 
described in Chapter 4 (see Table 7.2). 
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Table 7.2: SITS used and the experiments in which similar SITS were used for 
semantic illusion research (the potential target word is underlined in each 
sentence). 
Sentence: Based upon: 
1. Noah took two animals of each type on the 
Ark. 
Erickson and Mattson, 1981; experiment 2; 
substitution: Moses.  
(N.B. the original sentence reads “two animals of 
each kind” – the replacement of “type” for 
“kind” is accidental.) 
2. Bloodletting, generally accomplished with the 
aid of leeches, was thought to remove “poisons” 
from the blood. 
Baker and Wagner, 1987; experiment 1, 
subordinate clause condition; substitution: rats 
3. It was President Kennedy, who was killed in 
Dallas in 1963. 
Brédart and Modolo, 1988; Condition 1; 
substitution: Luther King 
4. Snow White was sheltered by seven dwarfs 
before marrying her prince. 
Brédart and Docquier, 1989; substitution: 
Cinderella 
6. In the October revolution of 1917 the 
Bolsheviks took under the leadership of Lenin 
the power in Russia. 
van Oostendorp and de Mul, 1990; substitution: 
Stalin (high-related) or Marx (low-related) 
7. In what mythology was Venus known as the 
Goddess of Love? 
Reder and Kusbit, 1991; substitution: War 
 
9. Inspector Morse who does his policing in 
Oxford was invented by Colin Dexter. 
Sentence length and word position study (see 
Chapter 4); target at start; substitution: Inspector 
Clouseau  
(N.B. this example was not actually used) 
13. The archaeologist Schliemann discovered the 
ruins of the ancient city of Troy. 
Sentence length and word position study (see 
Chapter 4); target at end; substitution: Pompeii  
(N.B. this example was not actually used) 
 
The 7 control sentences were chosen at random from novels, newspapers, academic 
journal articles, and textbooks (see Table7.3). 
Table 7.3: Control sentences used and the type of printed material they were taken 
from. 
Sentence: Taken from: 
5. Calcium phosphate is a mineral salt and is the 
principal mineral constituent of bones and teeth. 
Textbook  
8. The future of Barclays, one of Britain’s biggest 
banking groups, was thrown into doubt yesterday with 
the shock resignation of its chief executive, Martin 
Taylor. 
Newspaper 
10. This particular pool of light moving in a mesmeric 
manner backwards and forwards picked out from time 
to time a long red island of spilt wine. 
Novel 
11. Subjects averaged 47 seconds longer to name ink 
colors of incongruent words than solid-color squares. 
Academic journal article 
12. Of course a certain number of scientists have to go 
mad, just to keep the tradition alive. 
Modern novel 
14. These results are consistent with the current 
literature on focalization and question the Erickson and 
Mattson (1981) claim that the Moses illusion is not 
dependent on a misdirection of focus. 
Academic journal article 
15. Away ran the girls, too eager to get in to have time 
for speech. 
Novel 
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Procedure: Participants were given questionnaire booklets consisting of 7 sheets of A4 
paper printed on both sides. Apart from the first task (which spread out over two facing 
pages), each task was laid out in such a way that all titles, instructions, examples and 
response ‘tick-boxes’ were printed on a single page. On the front-page of the 
questionnaire booklet the following general instructions were printed: 
This programme of sentence property rating scales has been designed as 
part of a research study about sentence processing. Each different scale 
attempts to tap into an aspect of what makes English sentences 
comprehensible, readable or even what makes them “comfortable” to 
process. 
 
Please read the instructions for each of the following scales carefully and 
rate each sentence according to these instructions on the scale provided. 
 
Please make a response for every sentence on each of the eleven rating 
scales – it should take about 25 - 30 minutes to complete the programme – 
and return the booklet using the envelope provided. 
 
 
The first task (the categorisation task) was laid out on a double spread of pages. At the 
top of the left-hand page task-title and instructions were printed: 
1.) What kind of text is it? 
Please classify each sentence by indicating the categories you think it fits. You may choose more 
than one category if you feel that this is appropriate. Also feel free to add other categories if 
needed: the categories presented are not exhaustive. 
Each sentence to be categorised was printed in full above a tick-box table with eleven 
categorisation options plus a space for ‘other’ possible categories, for example: 
1. Noah took two animals of each type on the Ark. 
News 
 
Opinion Fact Fiction Description Speech 
Narrative Textbook Academic Response to a 
question 
Magazine Other: 
_____________ 
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The rating scales (tasks 2 to 10) were all designed to have the same layout: the scale-
title was printed at the top of the page followed by a paragraph of instructions including 
example sentences with appropriate ratings. (See Appendix 7 for the instructions and 
examples for each individual scale.) Underneath this each sentence was printed directly 
above five possible rating tick-boxes (ranging from ‘0: not at all’ to ‘4: extremely’). The 
instructions for each of the nine scales had been phrased in such a way that each of the 
scale points could always be referred to by the same label, for example: 
1. Noah took two animals of each type on the Ark. 
not at all    
0 
slightly   
1 
moderately   
2 
very   
3 
extremely  
4 
 
The focus-determination task was printed on the last page of the questionnaire booklet. 
Again instructions and examples were printed at the top of the page: 
11.) Underline the part of each sentence that the main focus is placed upon. 
For example, “Newton discovered gravity by having an apple fall on his head” or  “The mist has 
dispersed a bit, but it is still a very gloomy looking swamp”. 
Then each sentence was printed with generous spacing between them. A thank-you note 
to the participants was printed at the bottom of the page. 
7.8 Results and discussion 
7.8.1 The categorisation task 
The number of times that each sentence was classified as a particular type of text was 
recorded. Since participants were allowed to classify each sentence as more than one 
specific kind of text, as they saw appropriate, the number of total categorisation 
responses varied for the different sentences. In order to be able to compare which 
categories were chosen most frequently for each individual sentence, percentages were 
determined for the sentences. Most sentences tended to be classed fairly consistently by 
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all participants as either one or two particular types of text see Table 7.4). The 
percentages of classification responses for each category were also determined for the 
two sentence groups (SITS and controls) (see Table 7.5). 
Table 7.4: Preferred description for each sentence (percentage of count > 20) 
Sentence: Modal categorisation: 
1. Noah took two animals of each type on the Ark. Narrative (34%) 
2. Bloodletting, generally accomplished with the aid of leeches, 
was thought to remove “poisons” from the blood. 
Textbook (33%); Fact (25%) 
3. It was President Kennedy, who was killed in Dallas in 1963. Fact (39%); Response (35%) 
4. Snow White was sheltered by seven dwarfs before marrying 
her prince. 
Fiction (50%); Narrative (34%) 
5. Calcium phosphate is a mineral salt and is the principal 
mineral constituent of bones and teeth. 
Fact (33%); Textbook (33%); 
Academic (21%) 
6. In the October revolution of 1917 the Bolsheviks took under 
the leadership of Lenin the power in Russia. 
Fact (40%); Textbook (27%) 
7. In what mythology was Venus known as the Goddess of 
Love? 
Other: Question (43%); Speech 
(22%) 
8. The future of Barclays, one of Britain’s biggest banking 
groups, was thrown into doubt yesterday with the shock 
resignation of its chief executive, Martin Taylor. 
News (58%) 
9. Inspector Morse who does his policing in Oxford was 
invented by Colin Dexter. 
Fact (44%) 
10. This particular pool of light moving in a mesmeric manner 
backwards and forwards picked out from time to time a long 
red island of spilt wine. 
Description (38%); Narrative 
(29%); Fiction (24%) 
11. Subjects averaged 47 seconds longer to name ink colors of 
incongruent words than solid-color squares. 
Academic (43%); Fact (27%) 
12. Of course a certain number of scientists have to go mad, 
just to keep the tradition alive. 
Opinion (48%); Speech (23%) 
13. The archaeologist Schliemann discovered the ruins of the 
ancient city of Troy. 
Fact (45%); Textbook (25%) 
14. These results are consistent with the current literature on 
focalization and question the Erickson and Mattson (1981) 
claim that the Moses illusion is not dependent on a misdirection 
of focus. 
Academic (49%); Opinion 
(20%) 
15. Away ran the girls, too eager to get in to have time for 
speech. 
Narrative (44%); Fiction (34%) 
 
Apart from sentences 1 (Noah), 4 (Snow White) and 7 (Venus) the SITS were generally 
classed as ‘fact’. Sentences 2 (Bloodletting), 6 (Bolsheviks) and 13 (Schliemann) were 
also categorised as ‘textbook’ material. Sentence 1 (Noah) appeared to cause some 
indecision amongst participants: while 33.9% agreed that the sentence could be classed 
as a ‘narrative’, there was no other single category in which the classification count 
exceeded the 20% cut-off mark. Nearest came the classification as ‘fiction’ at 18.8%, 
followed by ‘fact’ at 13.4% and ‘description’ at 12.5%. It seems likely that the division 
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of classifications of sentence 1 partially reflects the fact that this sentence is derived 
from a religious source: it seems plausible that Christian participants would have chosen 
to label this sentence as ‘fact’, while non-Christian participants would be more likely to 
choose ‘fiction’. Sentence 4 (Snow White) was categorised consistently as ‘fiction’ 
(50.0%) and also as a ‘narrative’. For sentence 7 (Venus) participants consistently 
thought that an extra category should be applied to class the sentence: 42.9% ticked 
‘other’ and added ‘question’ as a kind-of-text category. The next most frequently ticked 
box for sentence 7 was that for ‘speech’ (22.4%). What is interesting about the choice of 
the new category ‘question’ for sentence 7 is that it implies that participants believe that 
questions differ from other types of text. They appear to regard the question as 
belonging to its own category rather than classifying it as part of a specific genre of text 
based upon its contents. 
Table 7.5: Percentage of individual 
categorisations for each sentence type. 
 SITS Control 
News 2.7 8.6 
Opinion 1.3 12.4 
Fact 27.7 12.3 
Fiction 9.8 8.2 
Description 4.8 9.6 
Speech 4.3 4.6 
Narrative 11.5 11.2 
Textbook 13.3 10.8 
Academic 6.9 17.3 
Response 7.9 2.5 
Magazine 2.8 2.4 
Other 7.0 2.4 
 
The control sentences were classified in good agreement with their actual sources (see 
Table 7.6), suggesting that participants generally have a good feel for the kind of text 
that they are required to process, and thus it is possible that the attributed source of a 
sentence is taken into account when a sentence is processed. In the case of SITS the 
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single most frequently made classification is ‘fact’ (27.7). The high proportion of 
categorisations of SITS as ‘fact’ is also in keeping with the idea that participants are 
likely to feel that they know the material expressed in SITS quite well. 
Table 7.6: Sources of control sentences and preferred categorisations given (correct 
source attribution in bold). 
Sentence: Source Preferred categorisation: 
5. Calcium phosphate is a mineral salt and is the 
principal mineral constituent of bones and teeth. 
Textbook Fact (33%); Textbook 
(33%); Academic (21%) 
8. The future of Barclays, one of Britain’s biggest 
banking groups, was thrown into doubt yesterday 
with the shock resignation of its chief executive, 
Martin Taylor. 
Newspaper News (58%) 
10. This particular pool of light moving in a 
mesmeric manner backwards and forwards 
picked out from time to time a long red island of 
spilt wine. 
Novel Description (38%); 
Narrative (29%); Fiction 
(24%) 
11. Subjects averaged 47 seconds longer to name 
ink colors of incongruent words than solid-color 
squares. 
Academic 
journal article 
Academic (43%); Fact 
(27%) 
12. Of course a certain number of scientists have 
to go mad, just to keep the tradition alive. 
Modern novel Opinion (48%); Speech 
(23%) 
14. These results are consistent with the current 
literature on focalization and question the 
Erickson and Mattson (1981) claim that the 
Moses illusion is not dependent on a misdirection 
of focus. 
Academic 
journal article 
Academic (49%); 
Opinion (20%) 
15. Away ran the girls, too eager to get in to have 
time for speech. 
Novel Narrative (44%); Fiction 
(34%) 
 
7.8.2 The rating scales (tasks 2 to 10) 
For each rating scale, a t-test for paired samples was carried out comparing the two 
sentence types using participants as subjects. Mean rating scores for SITS and for 
control sentences were calculated for each participant to form the matched pairs, and 
overall mean ratings and standard deviations were recorded for sentence types for each 
scale. Additionally histograms were plotted of the percentage of ratings falling into each 
response category for each sentence type to gain insight into how the rating distributions 
varied between sentence types. The mean rating for each individual sentence was also 
recorded for each scale. Results and discussion are presented for each scale in turn. 
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7.8.2.1 Scale 2: Amount of background knowledge required 
SITS were perceived to require significantly less background knowledge than control 
sentences in order to be comprehended (t= -6.77; d.f.= 67; p<0.001). Mean ratings and 
standard deviations for sentence type are presented in Table 7.7. 
Table 7.7: Mean ratings and standard deviations for Scale 2: Background  
Sentence Type N Mean Std. Dev. 
SI sentences 68 1.44 0.56 
Control sentences 68 1.94 0.61 
 
From the histogram (Figure 7.1) it can be seen that SITS have a distinct modal rating of 
1 (slightly), while the control sentences’ ratings are evenly distributed across all five 
rating categories. This observation suggests that SITS form a more homogeneous group 
than the control sentences where the requirement for background knowledge is 
concerned. Participants rated most SITS as requiring a low to medium amount of 
background knowledge, whereas control sentences varied widely on this scale and on 
average required more background information to be understood. 
Figure 7.1: Categorised histogram for SITS and control sentences for Scale 2: 
Background  
 
Table 7.8: Means for individual sentences (SITS in bold) Scale 2: Background 
Sentence: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Mean 
rating: 
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1.3 
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3.7 
 
0.9 
 
These findings were in keeping with the hypothesis that SITS are seen as more self-
contained in comparison with most other instances of written language. Participants 
appear to view SITS to be comprehensible almost in isolation from other background, as 
they deal with facts that are ‘known’ (cf. ‘remember’ vs. ‘know’ judgements; e.g. 
Postma, 1999). 
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7.8.2.2 Scale 3: Importance of the context in which the sentence is presented 
A t-test showed that SITS were seen to be much less dependent upon the specific 
context in which they are encountered than control sentences, and can be understood on 
their own terms (t= -16.25; d.f.= 67; p<0.001). Mean ratings and standard deviations for 
sentence type are presented in Table 7.9. 
Table 7.9: Mean ratings and standard deviations for Scale 3: Context 
Sentence Type N Mean Std. Dev. 
SI sentences 68 0.79 0.54 
Control sentences 68 2.03 0.65 
 
The histogram (Figure 7.2) shows a clear mode of 0 (not at all) for the SITS, while the 
control sentence ratings are distributed evenly across the scale interval. Again SITS 
appear to be similar to each other, while the control sentences are seen as coming from a 
variety of sources. 
Figure 7.2: Categorised histogram for SITS and control sentences for Scale 3: 
Context 
 
Table 7.10: Means for individual sentences (SITS in bold) Scale 3: Context 
Sentence: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Mean 
rating: 
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As predicted, participants considered the SITS to be more independent of the context in 
which they were presented than control sentences. Whereas most control sentences were 
thought to be affected by context, SITS were seen to be comprehensible in isolation. 
Since SITS seem to deal only with apparently self-contained facts, they are virtually 
independent of the context in which they are presented. 
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7.8.2.3 Scale 4: How specific are the meanings of the individual words? 
SITS were seen to contain words which appear to be used with more specific meanings 
than words used in control sentences (t= 3.99; d.f.= 65; p<0.001). Mean ratings and 
standard deviations for sentence type are presented in Table 7.11. 
Table 7.11: Mean ratings and standard deviations for ratings on Scale 4: Words 
Sentence Type N Mean Std. Dev. 
SI sentences 66 2.37 0.79 
Control sentences 66 1.97 0.53 
 
As for scales 2 and 3, the histogram (Figure 7.3) shows a distribution with a peak at 2 
(moderately) for the SITS, although it is much less sharp than the respective peaks for 
the previous two scales. Again the control sentence ratings are evenly distributed. 
Figure 7.3: Categorised histogram for SITS and control sentences for Scale 4: 
Words 
 
Table 7.12: Means for individual sentences: (SITS in bold) Scale 4: Words 
Sentence: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Mean 
rating: 
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The results of Scale 4 weakly support the hypothesis that SITS use words in a specific 
and unambiguous way, presumably utilising more central meanings of the words 
involved. Since central meanings are easier to process, the fact that SITS seem to 
contain very specifically used words is likely to contribute towards the overall apparent 
ease of processing of these sentences, which in a semantic illusion situation might lead 
to a substitution detection failure. 
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7.8.2.4 Scale 5: How familiar is the content of the sentence? 
The t-test results show that SITS are seen as having far more familiar contents than the 
control sentences (t= 19.37; d.f.= 67; p<0.001). Mean ratings and standard deviations 
are presented in Table 7.13. 
Table 7.13: Mean ratings and standard deviations for Scale 5: Familiarity 
Sentence Type N Mean Std. Dev. 
SI sentences 68 2.64 0.60 
Control sentences 68 0.94 0.49 
 
The histogram (Figure 7.4) demonstrates this dramatically, with the modes of each of 
the two distributions clearly identifiable at opposite ends of the scale: for SITS the 
modal rating is 4 (extremely), for the control sentences it is 0 (not at all). 
Figure 7.4: Categorised histogram for SITS and control sentences for Scale 5: 
Familiarity 
 
Table 7.14: Means for individual sentences: (SITS in bold) Scale 5: Familiarity 
Sentence: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Mean 
rating: 
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These results support the hypothesis that SITS deal with very familiar ideas, whereas 
most other uses of written language are imparting new information. This suggests that 
SITS are not using the same conventions as most other sources of written material. 
Maybe the fact that material presented in SITS is very familiar to participants causes the 
sentences to be less carefully read than if there was much new material contained within 
the sentence. It seems plausible that participants might analyse SITS just sufficiently to 
allow retrieval of a previously stored version of the relevant facts from memory, judging 
the truth of the remembered rather than the perceived version. 
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7.8.2.5 Scale 6: How grammatical is the sentence? 
The t-test results showed that SITS are perceived to be more grammatical than control 
sentences (t= 2.06; d.f.= 67; p= 0.043). Mean ratings and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 7.15. 
Table 7.15: Mean ratings and standard deviations for Scale 6: Grammaticality 
Sentence Type N Mean Std. Dev. 
SI sentences 68 2.74 0.53 
Control sentences 68 2.61 0.66 
 
However, the histogram (Figure 7.5) shows that the distributions of responses are 
similar for each sentence type, with a modal rating of 4 (extremely) for both, suggesting 
that the difference between SITS and control sentences is not fundamental as for the 
other scales. 
Figure 7.5: Categorised histogram for SITS and control sentences for Scale 6: 
Grammaticality 
 
Table 8.20: Means for individual sentences: (SITS in bold) Scale 6: Grammaticality 
Sentence: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Mean 
rating: 
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The findings do not support the hypothesis that SITS might be regarded as 
ungrammatical because of their redundant phrasing. Instead it was found that SITS are 
not markedly different from the control sentences, and, if anything, are viewed as 
slightly more grammatical. It may be that perceived grammaticality facilitates 
processing and aids a sense of coherence. Maybe this contributes to the feeling of SITS 
being perfectly sensible sentences, which do not immediately strike a participant as odd. 
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7.8.2.6 Scale 7: How complex is the sentence? 
SITS are seen as significantly less complex than the control sentences (t= -17.39; d.f.= 
67; p<0.001). Mean ratings and standard deviation are presented in Table 7.17. 
Table 7.17: Mean ratings and standard deviations for Scale 7: Complexity 
Sentence Type N Mean Std. Dev. 
SI sentences 68 0.93 0.49 
Control sentences 68 2.06 0.51 
 
The histogram (Figure 7.6) shows that the modal rating for SITS at 0 (not at all) and for 
control sentences at 1 (slightly) are quite close, but the SITS distribution is much less 
divergent than the control sentence distribution. 
Figure 7.6: Categorised histogram for SITS and control sentences for Scale 7: 
Complexity 
 
Table 7.18: Means for individual sentences: (SITS in bold) Scale 7: Complexity 
Sentence: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Mean 
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As predicted in the hypothesis, SITS were regarded as less complex than controls. This 
is likely to be due to the fact that SITS deal with highly familiar ideas (see also Scale 5), 
leading to strong semantic expectations, facilitating processing. If a sentence deals with 
new information like the control sentences, it is likely to be perceived as more complex 
because of the requirement to integrate the new information. 
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7.8.2.7 Scale 8: How formal is the style of the sentence? 
SITS are seen as significantly less formally phrased than other sentences (t= -9.93; d.f.= 
67; p<0.001) Mean ratings and standard deviations are presented in Table 7.19. 
Table 7.19: Mean ratings and standard deviations for Scale 8: Formality 
Sentence Type N Mean Std. Dev. 
SI sentences 68 1.72 0.54 
Control sentences 68 2.27 0.43 
 
The histogram (Figure 7.7) shows a modal rating of 2 (moderately) for SITS, and a 
modal rating of 3 (very) for control sentences. The control sentence ratings are 
distributed more evenly across all ratings compared to the SITS ratings which peak 
sharply. 
Figure 7.7: Categorised histogram for SITS and control sentences for Scale 8: 
Formality 
 
Table 7.20: Means for individual sentences: (SITS in bold) Scale 8: Formality 
Sentence: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Mean 
rating: 
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The findings are in opposition to the predictions made about the perceived formality of 
SITS. It was thought that SITS would be seen as very formal as in very formal uses of 
language little or no attention is paid to the actual words used (cf. speech acts, e.g. Mey, 
2001). However, since semantic illusion research derives originally from a children’s 
game, the language used in SITS may have an overall tone of informality, leading to a 
more casual inspection of the individual words. 
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7.8.2.8 Scale 9: How natural is the sentence? 
SITS seem to strike people as significantly more likely to come up in normal discourse 
than any of the control sentences (t= 6.96; d.f.= 67; p<0.001). Mean ratings and 
standard deviations are presented in Table 7.21. 
Table 7.21: Mean ratings and standard deviations for Scale 9: Naturalness 
Sentence Type N Mean Std. Dev. 
SI sentences 68 1.88 0.71 
Control sentences 68 1.30 0.57 
 
The histogram (Figure 7.8) shows a dramatic difference in the distribution of the ratings 
for SITS (mode = 2, moderately) and control sentences (mode = 0, not at all). 
Figure 7.8: Categorised histogram for SITS and control sentences for Scale 9: 
Naturalness  
 
Table 7.22: Means for individual sentences: (SITS in bold) Scale 9: Naturalness 
Sentence: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
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These results were in opposition to the hypothesis that SITS would be seen as unnatural, 
but in keeping with other findings which indicate that SITS are generally viewed as easy 
to interpret, such as the high degree of familiarity (Scale 5) and the low level of 
formality (Scale 8). It seems that part of the causes underlying semantic illusions can be 
explained by the way in which SITS appear easy to process. 
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7.8.2.9 Scale 10: How literally is the sentence meant? 
SITS are perceived to be meant significantly more literally than other sentences (t= 
9.51; d.f.= 67; p<0.001). Mean ratings and standard deviations are presented in Table 
7.23. 
Table 7.23: Mean ratings and standard deviations for Scale 10: Literalness 
Sentence Type N Mean Std. Dev. 
SI sentences 68 2.90 0.58 
Control sentences 68 2.25 0.44 
 
While the modes for both SITS and control sentences are the same at 4 (extremely), the 
histogram (Figure 7.9) still shows clearly that SITS are considered to be more literal. 
The distribution of ratings for the control sentences is more even: control sentences are 
seen to vary more widely than SITS in terms of literalness. 
Figure 7.9: Categorised histogram for SITS and control sentences for Scale 10: 
Literalness 
 
Table 7.24: Means for individual sentences: (SITS in bold) Scale 10: Literalness 
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The results are in keeping with the predictions made about how participants would rate 
the literalness of SITS compared to control sentences. Because SITS are seen to be quite 
straightforwardly phrased and as presenting familiar ideas, people think of them as 
meant literally and not as performing another function. 
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7.8.3 The focus determination task 
A record was made of which part of each sentence was underlined as focus point by 
every participant. When all these data points were compiled, a number of potential 
focus points was chosen for each sentence. For example, sentence 1 (Noah) was divided 
as follows: 
[Noah]1 took [two animals]2 of each type on the [Ark]3. 
Focus point 1 was said to have been chosen whenever a participant underlined the name 
“Noah”, or when they underlined “Noah took” (“took” on its own was never underlined 
as sentence focus). Focus point 2 was said to have been chosen whenever “two”, 
“animals”, “two animals” or even “two animals of each type” had been underlined. 
Focus point 3 covered “Ark”, “the Ark” and “on the Ark”. The number of responses 
was recorded for each identified focus point. For most sentences one major focus point 
was found to emerge with half or more of the 68 participants choosing that particular 
focus. Only sentence 11 (Stroop) did not have a clear focus. Nevertheless the modal 
choice of focus for this sentence came to a count of 32 out of 68 (see Table 7.25). 
The SITS were then looked at separately from the control sentences, to determine if the 
hypothesis held that the point of focus would generally be perceived to fall on a word 
other than the target word. It was found that the point of focus chosen by participants 
coincided with the word that would be the target word when the relevant sentences had 
been used as semantic illusion sentences for 3 SITS (sentences 1, 3 and 4). For the other 
5 SITS, the focus and the target word were at two different positions in the sentence 
(see Table 7.26). 
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Table 7.25: Focus points for each sentence (including number of times each focus 
point was chosen for each sentence out of 68). 
Sentence  Focus point 
1 
Focus point 
2 
Focus point 
3 
Focus point 
4 
Focus point 
5 
Focus point 
6 
1 Noah 
(45) 
two animals 
(17) 
Ark 
(6) 
   
2 Bloodletting 
(60) 
leeches 
(2) 
“poisons” 
(6) 
   
3 President 
Kennedy 
(64) 
was killed 
(4) 
    
4 Snow White 
(54) 
sheltered 
(4) 
seven dwarfs 
(9) 
(missing data: 1)   
5 Calcium 
phosphate 
(61) 
mineral salt 
 (4) 
principal mineral 
constituent 
(3) 
   
6 October 
revolution 
(11) 
the Bolsheviks 
(42) 
Lenin 
 (2) 
power in Russia 
(11) 
  
7 what mythology 
(12) 
Venus 
(45) 
Goddess of Love 
(11) 
   
8 future of 
Barclays 
(56) 
was thrown into 
doubt 
(2) 
shock 
resignation 
(6) 
chief executive, 
Martin Taylor 
(4) 
  
9 Inspector 
Morse 
(50) 
Oxford 
 (2) 
was invented 
(4) 
Colin Dexter 
(12) 
  
10 This particular 
pool of light 
(44) 
mesmeric 
manner 
(2) 
long red island 
of spilt wine 
(20) 
   
11 Subjects 
(21) 
47 seconds 
longer 
(32) 
ink colors of 
incongruent 
words 
(15) 
   
12 Of course 
(6) 
certain number 
of scientists 
(37) 
have to go mad 
(21) 
the tradition 
(4) 
  
13 archaeologist 
Schliemann 
(58) 
discovered 
(2) 
ruins 
(1) 
ancient city of 
Troy 
(7) 
  
14 These results 
(36) 
consistent 
(4) 
current literature 
on focalization 
(11) 
Erickson and 
Mattson (1981) 
(4) 
Moses illusion 
 (9) 
misdirection of 
focus 
(3) 
15 Away ran 
(19) 
the girls 
(34) 
too eager to get 
in 
(14) 
speech 
(1) 
  
 
Table 7.26: Focus points and target words for SITS. 
Sentence Focus point Target word 
1. Noah took two animals of each type on the Ark. Noah 
2. Bloodletting, generally accomplished with the aid of 
leeches, was thought to remove “poisons” from the blood. 
Bloodletting leeches 
3. It was President Kennedy, who was killed in Dallas in 
1963. 
President Kennedy 
4. Snow White was sheltered by seven dwarfs before 
marrying her prince. 
Snow White 
6. In the October revolution of 1917 the Bolsheviks took 
under the leadership of Lenin the power in Russia. 
the Bolsheviks Lenin 
7. In what mythology was Venus known as the Goddess of 
Love? 
Venus Love 
9. Inspector Morse who does his policing in Oxford was 
invented by Colin Dexter. 
Inspector Morse Colin Dexter 
13. The archaeologist Schliemann discovered the ruins of 
the ancient city of Troy. 
archaeologist 
Schliemann 
Troy 
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The results of the focus determination task showed that there is good overall agreement 
about which part of a sentence is in focus. There appears to be little difference between 
control sentences and SITS – participants do not appear to be more consistent in 
determining the focus of SITS compared to control sentences. It was also found that the 
hypothesis that SITS would usually have a different focus point to the target word did 
not hold for three of the SITS used in this study. This is in keeping with previous 
findings (e.g. Brédart and Modolo, 1988; Brédart and Docquier, 1989) that focus alone 
is not responsible for the occurrence of semantic illusions. 
7.8.4 Factor Analysis 
In an attempt to see if the rating scales (Tasks 2 to 10) as a group could reveal anything 
about SITS as opposed to control sentences, a factor analysis was carried out using 
principal component extraction. After the factors had been rotated using varimax 
rotation with Kaiser normalisation, two factors emerged which explained 51 percent of 
the variance observed. The first factor, which accounts for 31 percent of the variance, 
shows a strong positive association with complexity and a strong negative association 
with familiarity. There is also a positive association with the need for context in order to 
understand each sentence, and there is a negative association with naturalness, 
suggesting that participants do not expect usually to find such sentences in normal 
discourse. This factor will be referred to by the label ‘Factor 1: Interpretive Load’ 
(Factor 1: IL). The second factor extracted accounted for a further 20 percent of the 
variance. This factor has strong positive associations with literalness, with formality and 
with the specificity of individual words used. This factor has been labelled ‘Factor 2: 
Semantic Transparency’ (Factor 2: ST). There is a positive association with background 
for both factors: people appear to require a certain amount of background knowledge 
whether they are dealing with the information content of a sentence or with the way in 
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which it is phrased. Grammaticality does not load onto either factor (see Table 7.27 for 
factor loadings) 
Table 7.27: Factor loadings for each scale (loadings < 0.5 only) 
 Factor 1: IL Factor 2: ST 
complexity .785  
familiarity -.739  
context .720  
naturalness -.667  
background .525 .533 
literalness  .663 
formality  .690 
individual words  .665 
grammaticality   
 
The mean loadings for each of the individual sentences were then plotted against the 
two major factors. Most of the semantic illusion sentences fell into roughly the same 
area of the plot, whereas the control sentences formed a much more widely spread 
group (see Figure 7.10). 
Figure 7.10: Distribution of sentences depending upon individual mean loadings 
upon factors 1 and 2. (Labels correspond to sentence numbers). 
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SITS appear in general to convey relatively little new information (Factor 1 loadings are 
low), and they appear to be neutral with regards to the transparency of their phrasing 
(Factor 2 loadings are distributed around zero.) The control sentences used in this study, 
on the other hand, varied widely across both dimensions, but provide much more novel 
information to the reader on average. It is worth noting, that participants did not feel 
that there was anything particularly odd about SITS compared with sentences taken at 
random from actual printed sources – if anything participants felt that some of the 
control sentences were more unnatural than SITS, which were each constructed 
specifically for the purposes of semantic illusion research. 
The scatter plot (Figure 7.10) shows that SITS and control sentences appear to come 
from two different populations of sentences. SITS are part of a distribution with a much 
lower standard deviation for both Factor 1 and Factor 2 loadings than the control 
sentences, and SITS clearly draw on familiar information rather than being used to 
convey novel material: SITS tend to score much lower on Factor 1: IL. On Factor 2: ST 
the SITS are much closer to zero than the control sentences. Overall, these findings 
appear to be in keeping with the hypothesis that semantic illusions can only occur where 
sentences are used which draw upon already established knowledge – indeed, they must 
do this if the type of confusion at the root of a semantic illusion is to occur. However, 
the results of this factor analysis are indicative only as the number of sentences used 
was very small. 
In order to ascertain that the clustering of the two sentence types is not an artefact of the 
way in which the factor analysis was carried out, mean factor loadings were also plotted 
for each participant and coded by gender: there is no evidence of clustering due to 
gender (see Figure 7.11), suggesting that SITS and control sentences load differently on 
Factors 1 and 2 due to different processing requirements and not due to chance. 
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Figure 7.11: Distribution of participants depending upon individual mean loadings 
upon factors 1 and 2. 
 
7.9 General discussion 
The study described in this chapter was designed to help identify how people perceive 
SITS when they encounter them and how such a perception might vary from the 
expectations that people have about how language is generally used. It is quite clear 
from the results of the categorisation task (Task 1) that participants have no difficulty in 
correctly assigning a kind of text to a likely source. For all the control sentences used in 
this study, the task was completed with remarkable accuracy. SITS appeared to be 
equally confidently pigeonholed. Most often they were seen as mere statements of fact. 
The fact that participants completed the classification task so competently – and 
especially the fact that an extra category was consistently added when the categories 
presented as options were not perceived to be adequate descriptors for a particular 
sample of text (for sentence 7 (Venus) 42 out of 68 participants added the category 
‘question’) – suggests that participants are likely to come to each sample of text they are 
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required to deal with expectations specific to how the sample of text is perceived (cf. 
Zwaan, 1994). Part of the reason why semantic illusions take place might therefore be 
due to the fact that most SITS are thought of as factual statements, and thus are treated 
as such. 
The results of the rating scales (Tasks 2 to 10) show that SITS are not just standard 
sentences but are highly atypical. SITS were judged to be significantly different from 
control sentences on all nine rating scales. For six of these scales the differences found 
between SITS and control sentences were in keeping with the predictions made. SITS 
were found to be less dependent upon background knowledge and specific context. 
They were seen to contain words with more specific (central) meanings and to contain 
material more familiar to the participants than control sentences. SITS were also seen to 
be less complex than control sentences and were thought to be meant more literally. But 
on the other three rating scales SITS and controls differed in the opposite direction to 
that predicted. Participants perceived SITS to be more grammatical than control 
sentences (although the difference on this scale is small). This may be indicative of the 
fact that participants fail to distinguish between syntactic and semantic cues when rating 
sentences on the grammaticality scale, because SITS contain highly familiar 
information (cf. Schlesinger, 1968). The phrasing of SITS was seen to be less formal 
rather than more formal as predicted. The observed pattern of results on the formality 
scale might be explained by the origin of SITS in a children’s game. Finally, SITS were 
also perceived as more natural (and likely to occur in normal discourse) than control 
sentences. Once again the high level of familiarity of SITS content may help explain 
these results: if information in a sentence feels very familiar it seems likely that it has 
been heard or read before, suggesting that it has already occurred in natural discourse at 
an earlier point in time. 
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The overall pattern of results from the rating scales suggests that participants appear to 
feel much more confident and comfortable in dealing with SITS than they do with the 
control sentences. This is in evidence both from the ratings given to these sentences on 
the rating scales in this study and from the fact that semantic illusions occur. The 
occurrence of semantic illusions may be in part explained by the fact that SITS feel 
straightforward to deal with, through phrasing, familiarity of context, choice of words 
and so on. 
When the data from the rating scales was examined by means of a factor analysis, the 
main conclusion drawn from the ratings scales that SITS were very atypical sentences 
was confirmed. It became clear that the main difference between SITS and control 
sentences was in the amount of new information that the different kind of sentences 
conveyed to a reader. SITS score lower on the major factor that emerges (Factor 1 : 
Interpretive Load) than control sentences and SITS score closer to zero for the second 
factor (Factor 2: Semantic Transparency). A plot of the factor scores showed SITS and 
control sentences to be parts of two different distributions. 
The focus determination task showed that generally there is good agreement about 
which part of a sentence is in focus. It was found that only five of the eight SITS 
investigated in this study had a definite focus on a word other than the target word. It 
was expected that generally the target word in a SITS would not be in focus (except in 
the case of sentence 3 (President Kennedy) which had been designed to have the target 
in focus; Brédart and Modolo, 1989). This lends further support to the claim that focus 
alone cannot account for the occurrence of semantic illusions. 
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7.10 Conclusions 
Overall the results of this study showed that SITS are highly atypical sentences that are 
nevertheless perceived to be part of normal discourse – and not just that – they are 
perceived as more ‘normal’ than many examples of written discourse taken from 
sources such as books, journals and newspapers. SITS are seen to be comfortable to 
process and participants do not appear consciously to notice anything unusual about 
them. It seems that asking participants’ opinions of SITS does not help in trying to find 
an explanation for semantic illusions, but it does provide evidence for the claim that the 
same processes used in ordinary processing lead directly to semantic illusion responses 
(see Chapter 1). 
In the second part of this thesis, semantic illusions are approached via the possible 
mechanisms which may be involved in processing them. The next chapter provides an 
overview of findings related to the way people think, store knowledge and process 
linguistic inputs, and suggestions are made about how these processes could link in with 
semantic illusion research. 
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Part Two: 
The problem with semantic illusions 
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Chapter 8: 
A problem solving approach to semantic illusions 
 
The experiments described in chapters 3 to 6 were all concerned with semantic illusions 
as a part of sentence processing, and with how the structural make up of the sentences 
might contribute to the occurrence of semantic illusions. It was found that neither 
priming, form class, sentence length, target word position nor language had much of an 
effect upon semantic illusion rate. Indeed only the syntactic form of the sentences either 
as a question or a statement (Chapter 4) had any appreciable effect at all, with question 
format leading to more semantic illusion responses than statements. Furthermore, the 
study presented in Chapter 7 which compared semantic illusion type sentences to 
sentences taken from sources of written discourse showed that SITS are not typical of 
other sentences, even if they are seen as easy and straightforward to process. But per se, 
none of these findings come much closer to explaining semantic illusions, and so far 
partial matching (see section 2.8) is still the best candidate for the mechanism 
underlying the semantic illusion phenomenon. 
But maybe a clue about semantic illusions can be gleaned from the facts that a) 
questions lead to more semantic illusions that statements (Chapter 4) and b) participants 
will consistently classify a sentence in question format not by its genre, but as a 
question (see section 7.8.1). Evidently people perceive questions differently from 
statements. This difference in perception may extend to processing, as questions appear 
to fulfil a different function to statements. Perhaps they are viewed as a kind of problem 
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to be solved according to a given set of rules (c.f. Grice, 1975). In order to explore this 
possibility, the second part of this thesis attempts to view semantic illusions from a 
problem solving perspective, including a consideration of the implications of partial 
matching. A number of observations about cognitive performance in syllogistic 
reasoning and other kinds of problem solving are described and related to semantic 
illusions to show that semantic illusions are not simply an isolated phenomenon arising 
from the mechanisms of language processing, but need to be viewed as similar to a wide 
range of cognitive tasks requiring attention, knowledge and insight. 
Under most circumstances partial matching is a mechanism which allows people to 
process incoming real world information quickly and effectively. It is a mechanism, 
which is by no means restricted to explaining semantic illusions as a cognitive 
phenomenon. In this chapter the semantic illusion phenomenon is related to a number of 
non-language specific cognitive mechanisms, in which partial matching strategies are 
also employed. 
8.1 Why does partial matching occur 
At the most basic level, the requirements that the environment makes upon the cognitive 
system are never constant from one instance to the next. Even situations that people 
class as deriving from the same category vary considerably, quite often in a number of 
different respects. One important ability that humans have is that they are able to ignore 
irrelevant distinctions and make approximations, which allow them to deal rapidly and 
efficiently with incoming data. If exact matches were needed in order to recognise or 
deal with any situation, real-time processing would be impossible. For example, an 
individual tree on different occasions is never exactly the same – the wind might be 
blowing the leaves differently, a new leaf may have grown, or it might be bare in 
winter. Yet a human observer still concludes that it is the same tree, summer or winter, 
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wind or rain. Similarly people can easily identify different chairs as being just that, 
never mind whether they have three legs or four, are covered in upholstery, made from 
moulded plastic or wood. From common sense and experience, people know that they 
cannot take in everything that goes on around them, and they also know that in order to 
deal with a specific input they need to ‘pay’ attention to it. In day-to-day usage of 
language expressions regarding attention, there is an implication that there is a cost to 
allocating attention to something (one ‘pays’ attention to something) – there is a distinct 
effort involved, and attention is a scarce resource to be deployed, and if one thing is 
attended, another must go unattended. 
The observation that the environment does not usually confront people with identical 
processing demands, leads to questions about the way in which pre-existing knowledge 
is stored in memory. People can usually generalise from one situation to the next 
without apparent effort, suggesting that human memory is not made up of static images, 
but that it possesses adaptive capability. One theory describing such active memory 
constructs is Bartlett’s ‘schema’ theory (1995[1932]), which essentially implies that all 
that can ever be hoped for is a partial match between a new situation and the 
representation of similar situations experienced in the past, which are stored in memory. 
8.2 Schema theory 
One way in which previous knowledge is stored and how it affects people’s responses 
and recall of certain situations is described in Bartlett’s book Remembering (Bartlett, 
1995[1932]), in which he presents a vast number of experiments about perception, 
images, recognition and recall. The experiments were designed to be as naturalistic in 
content as possible, while still providing a certain level of laboratory control, because 
Bartlett was interested in how human memory worked in the real world outside the 
laboratory. Most famously, Bartlett presented participants with a story called ‘The War 
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of the Ghosts’ (see Appendix 8) which was designed to be outside the usual frame of 
experience of the literature that would have been predominant at the time of Bartlett’s 
research. It was also written in a culturally unfamiliar style (since the story was based 
on a North American folk tale), which meant that participants generally had some 
difficulty in finding the relevant connections between different parts of the story. 
The experiment was very simple: participants were asked to read the story and then to 
reproduce it repeatedly at different time intervals, ranging from 15 minutes to 10 years 
after first reading the story as opportunity arose. Even though Bartlett made no effort to 
control the number or time intervals between recalls of the story (he felt that people 
were so different from each other anyway that there would be little benefit from 
imposing such controls), he nevertheless observed that certain predictable errors crept 
into the reproductions of the story. Overall he found that recall tended to be very 
inaccurate. Details would be omitted, in particular if the details in question were at odds 
with a participant’s understanding of the story. Any perceived inconsistencies in the 
story tended to be rationalised, in that participants would invent possible ways in which 
the details of the story could fit together to make the story seem more sensible and 
coherent. Sometimes transformations of the order of events in the story occurred – if, 
for example, something was of particular interest to a participant it might be brought 
forward in time in the retelling of the story – but generally the order of events was not 
much affected in participants’ retellings of the story. Participants’ attitudes and 
emotional reactions to the story also led to some distortions. Finally, the perceived 
importance of different events in the story sometimes led to changes of importance in 
the retelling, so that, for example, the ghosts in ‘The War of the Ghosts’ might be made 
more central to the plot upon recall than they were in the original. In short, participants 
appeared to reconstruct rather than remember the material they had been presented with, 
and they did this in such a way that the material fitted meaningfully into their 
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experiences of the world. They were making what Bartlett referred to as an ‘effort after 
meaning’. 
In order to explain his findings, Bartlett suggested that our memory did not consist of 
static images that could be reproduced via the re-excitation of a memory trace, but 
instead that it was likely to be made up of active knowledge structures called schemata. 
A schema was defined as an ‘active organisation of past reactions, or of past 
experiences, which must always be supposed to be operating in any well-adapted 
organic response’. Bartlett proposed that if responses appear to be in any way organised 
or regular, that is because each of these responses is related to other similar responses, 
which are organised serially and could be drawn from, when a new similar response is 
called for. Thus every new instance of a similar event to that stored in the schema would 
contribute towards the schema, changing it subtly. 
In terms of remembering, which involves determination by the past, the influence of 
such schemata could be viewed as one mechanism by which past experiences influence 
present processing. In the schematic form, past experiences operate together as a whole: 
all the instances of input relevant to a situation contribute to the schema relating to the 
knowledge of that situation. The latest inputs into each schema have a predominant 
influence upon the next response. Schemata are built more or less chronologically, but 
based upon the observations Bartlett made about recall, it seems that schemata can 
somehow be used ‘backwards’ to construct a probable past sequence of events from a 
present situation. In Bartlett’s own words: ‘It would then be the case that the organism 
would say, if it were able to express itself: ‘This and this and this must have occurred, in 
order that my present state should be what it is’.’ 
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In other words, schemata are interactive subconscious mental structures that are 
composed of old knowledge and added to and modified by newly acquired knowledge. 
A schema contains the information pertaining to certain situations, which are familiar to 
us, and thus they can be used to draw relevant conclusions about how these kinds of 
situations generally unfold. A similar idea has been used by Schank and Abelson (1977) 
who referred to the memory structures in question as ‘scripts’. For example, a restaurant 
script would include all the aspects that in our experience belong to a restaurant setting: 
waiters, food, chairs, tables, dishes, ordering a meal, paying the bill, the order in which 
events usually unfold… People possess schemata or scripts about many aspects of life – 
they help them deal with situations quickly and efficiently, because the regularities of 
the world and routine interactions with them are internally represented, ready to be 
called upon. 
But there is a price to pay for this largely automatic processing of information – the 
various cognitive processes always tend to drift in the direction of the familiar and the 
expected, because a schema only contains evidence of how a particular situation or 
input should appear. But since there is no representation within a schema of what it 
should not be like, errors such as semantic illusions can occur quite easily. Generally 
speaking many attempts at explaining human error incorporate the concept of schemata, 
by making a distinction between conscious, controlled processing and automatic, 
unconscious processing (e.g. Reason, 1990). The first could be referred to as processing 
under the attentional mode of control, which is limited, time-consuming and effortful. 
The second type of processing could be said to take place under a schematic mode of 
control, which deals very rapidly with familiar information, without any known limits 
and without conscious effort. But this mode of control cannot deal with unexpected 
differences between a situation at hand and the way the situation ought to be. This could 
explain why an ‘almost-right’ sentence such as a semantic illusion sentence passes as 
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perfectly unobjectionable. The sentence fits the relevant schema, the substitution fits the 
relevant role-slot well enough, and in an effort after meaning, the substitution goes 
unnoticed. 
Schema theory provides a plausible suggestion about how people store knowledge in 
long-term memory, but it isn’t explicit about how people think and deal with incoming 
data. How people think – or rather how they don’t think – is addressed in the next 
section. 
8.3 How people think: Syllogistic reasoning and semantic illusions 
The question of how the rules of thought can be described has concerned philosophers 
for a very long time, one of the most enduring suggestions being that logic is a 
condensed version of what goes on in people’s brains (e.g. Boole, 1847). But it seems 
quite clear from studying human cognition empirically that people have tremendous 
difficulty in thinking or reasoning logically. A good demonstration of this inability to 
cope with formal logic comes from studies of people’s performance when solving 
categorical syllogisms. 
Syllogisms are based on Aristotelian logic and involve reasoning about the relation 
between categories. A syllogism starts with two statements called the ‘premises’ that are 
to be treated as true and which are to be combined to draw a ‘conclusion’. For example, 
 All psychologists are wine drinkers. 
  All Italians are psychologists. 
One premise relates the subject of the conclusion (Italians) to a middle term 
(psychologists). The other premise relates the middle term to a predicate (wine 
drinkers). The task is to draw a conclusion about the relationship between subject and 
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predicate, if this is possible. In the example a valid conclusion would be All Italians are 
wine drinkers. 
The subject (S), predicate (P) and middle term (M) can be combined in a variety of 
ways using relations defined by the terms all, some, no and some…not. Each of the two 
premises of a syllogism can take the form of each of these four logical relations, so that 
the number of possible arguments is large. The four basic ways in which S, M and P can 
appear are known as ‘figures’: 
Fig 1. Fig 2. Fig 3. Fig 4. 
M – P 
S – M  
P – M 
S – M  
M – P 
M – S  
P – M 
M – S  
 
Combining the 16 logical arguments with the 4 figures means that there are 64 logically 
distinct variants in which a syllogism can appear. Some syllogisms – such as the 
example above – allow people readily to draw valid conclusions, but others such as: 
Some Italians are not wine drinkers; All Italians are psychologists; What follows if 
‘psychologists’ is the subject of the conclusion? hardly ever allow the correct conclusion 
to be drawn: Some psychologists are not wine drinkers (e.g. Johnson-Laird and Bara, 
1984). Not all syllogisms have valid conclusions, for example, All A are B; Some B are 
C does not have a valid conclusion, if C is the subject of the conclusion. 
8.3.1 The atmosphere effect and semantic illusions 
When people are given syllogisms to solve, they usually display a high error rate, and 
generally find it very hard to deal with this form of reasoning exercise. Woodworth and 
Sells (1935) proposed an explanation for people’s problems in dealing with syllogistic 
reasoning: people are likely to draw conclusions about a syllogism on the basis of the 
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‘atmosphere’ of the premises. A ‘negative’ premise (no/some…not) is said to create a 
negative atmosphere, even when the other premise is ‘affirmative’ (all/some), and a 
negative conclusion is likely to be drawn. Similarly a ‘particular’ premise 
(some/some…not) is said to create a particular atmosphere, even when the other premise 
is ‘universal’ (all/no), resulting in a particular conclusion. In addition to the atmosphere 
effect, Woodworth and Sells also used a ‘principle of caution’ to predict the way that 
conclusions are drawn: people are more likely to accept weak and guarded conclusions 
rather than strong ones (i.e. some/some…not, rather than all/no). The atmosphere effect 
accounts well for people’s responses in a number of studies (e.g. Begg and Denny, 
1969; Dickstein, 1978; Revlin; 1975; Sells, 1936). 
While the atmosphere effect implies that participants combine information from the two 
premises in a syllogism in order to draw their conclusion, there is an even simpler 
strategy for dealing with syllogisms, that also accounts well for the results observed: 
participants ‘match’ the conclusion to the more conservative of the premises (Wetherick 
and Gilhooly, 1990). 
Both matching and atmosphere strategies for syllogistic reasoning provide evidence for 
the fact that participants approach these kinds of problems in a superficial manner and 
with little understanding of the underlying relations (e.g. Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick 
and Wynn, 1993). In a similar way participants seem unable to pay attention to local 
details in semantic illusion sentences. Semantic illusion sentences generate an 
impression of coherence, and instead of processing the actual content of a sentence in 
depth, responses are based on the global perception of the sentence. 
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8.3.2 The belief bias effect and semantic illusions 
Another problem participants have when dealing with syllogisms is that they are 
generally unable to reason locally in the way such logic problems require. Instead, 
participants are influenced by the semantic content of a problem. This is called a ‘belief 
bias’ (Revlin, Leirer, Yopp and Yopp, 1980): conclusions that happen to coincide with 
participants’ real-life beliefs are more likely to be judged true, and conclusions that 
happen to coincide with something that participants do not believe anyway are more 
likely to be rejected. Instead of processing the local specifics of such a problem, people 
reason based on the totality of their knowledge, which is not what syllogistic reasoning 
requires. A similar processing strategy seems to underlie semantic illusions and similar 
phenomena – participants respond to the perceived overall meaning of a semantic 
illusion sentence and find it very hard to concentrate on local semantics. For example, 
“surviving dead” – a locally anomalous phrase – escapes notice remarkably often 
(Barton and Sanford, 1993; see section 2.9). 
8.3.3 Conversion errors and semantic illusions  
A further way in which syllogistic reasoning and semantic illusions are similar is that 
both are instances of processing in which a usual processing strategy from ordinary 
conversation is employed inappropriately. Many errors in syllogistic reasoning come 
from the fact that participants treat premises such as All A are B and All B are A as 
though they were identical. This is, however, not warranted: for example, All apples are 
fruit is not equivalent to All fruit are apples. Chapman and Chapman (1959) suggest 
that these ‘conversion errors’ are a result of the inappropriate use of a strategy that 
works quite often in day-to-day conversation – participants often hear and use 
statements like All three-sided figures are triangles which are reversible, and thus being 
able to convert statements from one form into another is a useful and sensible habit in 
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ordinary conversation. In processing semantic illusion sentences a similarly useful and 
well-practised habit – the rapid extraction of semantic content from the surface form of 
a sentence – also leads to an inappropriate response and a semantic illusion occurs. 
8.3.4 Expectations in solving syllogisms and responding to semantic illusions 
Finally it is also possible that people’s expectations about the form of a task affect 
performance. Perhaps people perform very poorly at many syllogistic reasoning tests, 
because these often contain many problems for which no valid conclusion can be drawn, 
when from their normal life experience people would expect most if not all problems in 
a test to have solutions (Chapman and Chapman, 1959). A similar sense of expectation 
may play a part in people’s processing of semantic illusion sentences. 
8.4 How semantic illusions are like problems: expectations and processing 
Expectations in general have a demonstrable effect upon people’s ability to process 
information and solve problems. These expectations arise out of people’s knowledge of 
the world and from their specific experiences in similar situations. In perception tasks, 
expectations allow participants to recognise degraded stimuli (e.g. Biederman, 1987). 
However, in problem solving, expectations can get in the way of a successful solution. 
People often adopt a certain attitude towards the task situation – often referred to as 
Einstellung (German for ‘attitude’) – which is influenced by their previous experience 
either of solving similar problems, or of the world in general. Such an Einstellung tends 
to be fairly rigid and can make it very hard for people to deal with the real 
characteristics of the problem. 
 137
8.4.1 Prior experience with day-to-day objects and problem solving 
One manifestation of Einstellung can be observed when a person finds it difficult to 
dissociate an object from its conventional function in the environment. This is 
sometimes called functional fixedness (Duncker, 1945). For example, when presented 
with a box of tacks, a book of matches and a candle, and given the task: mount the 
candle on the wall and light it, participants find it very difficult to dissociate the tack 
box from its containing function in order to use it as a part of the solution of the 
problem. (The model solution requires the participant to mount the box on the wall 
using the tacks and to place the candles on the box.) If presented with the same items, 
but with the tacks placed in a pile and the box empty, participants are less likely to think 
of the box as exclusively being a container, and are consequently more likely to solve 
the problem (Duncker, 1945; Adamson, 1952). 
Another example of functional fixedness can arise when participants are required to 
change their perception of what an object ‘can do’. For example, Maier (1931) 
presented participants with the following problem: in a large room, which contained 
many objects such as poles, ringstands, clamps, pliers, extension cords, tables and 
chairs, two strings were hung from the ceiling. The strings were long enough to reach 
the floor, but not long enough for a participant simply to hold onto the end of one string 
and walk over to the other string with it. The task was to tie the ends of the strings 
together. 
There were a number of ways in which this problem could be solved, but one solution 
was more insightful than others and not easy to come up with: to use a weight to set one 
cord swinging like a pendulum, while the other cord could be held and brought close to 
the swinging string, thus making one string ‘do’ part of the work. Maier suggested that 
the reason for the difficulty that participants experienced with this pendulum solution 
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was partially due to the ‘direction’ from which the problem was approached. In this 
solution, the second rope is required to move towards the other rope, which is being 
held by the participant, and – as opposed to direct action on part of the participant as in 
various other solutions – a way must be found in which the rope ‘performs an action’. 
Another difficulty was that the participant must find a way in which to see the rope as a 
pendulum, that is, to change their mental representation of the essentially static string 
into a mobile object. 
Maier’s experiment also showed other evidence of Einstellung – participants displayed 
a strong tendency to attempt variations on previously successful solutions. Maier stated 
that under the circumstances where an old solution to a similar but new problem does 
not work, the memory of the previous solution turns into an obstruction. He concluded 
from his studies that neither trial and error nor solving the problem by similarity to 
another one could adequately explain the sudden organisational shift in participant’s 
approach to the strings problem. ‘Direction’ appears to be a crucial factor in finding a 
solution. 
8.4.2 Specific prior experience and problem solving 
Functional fixedness does not have to be the result of long years of experience: even a 
single experience with an object can blind people to the object’s other properties. Birch 
and Rabinowitz (1951) carried out an experiment which was designed to determine 
what effect specific prior experience with objects had upon their usefulness as problem-
solving tools. Using the two-strings-problem described above, three groups of 
experimental participants were required to perform a pre-test task: one group was 
required to complete an electrical circuit on a board using a switch, another group had to 
complete a similar task – they were required to install a relay. The control group was 
given no pre-test task. 
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In the problem solving test only two objects could be used as weights to turn one of the 
strings into a pendulum: the switch or the relay used in pre-training. The results showed 
that for individuals who had previously used one of the objects on the pre-task, it was 
likely that they would choose the object not previously encountered as the pendulum 
weight. (For the control group, 50% used one object; the other 50% used the other 
item). When participants were asked why they had chosen either object as the pendulum 
weight, their replies further indicated that specific prior experience with an object had a 
noticeable effect upon their problem solving strategy. Their responses were identical – 
‘easier to attach’, ‘more compact’ – for both objects. There were no objective reasons 
for the participants’ preferences for either object, so it would appear that their choices 
were influenced by the effects that their previous experience with either object had upon 
their perceptions. 
Birch and Rabinowitz suggested that the type of prior experience with an object appears 
to limit the properties of that object that could be perceived by a person. Participants in 
each group appeared to see the pre-test object as an electrical component, whereas the 
‘new’ object could be seen also in terms of its mass, shape, attachability. It would 
appear, therefore, that there are two types of learning going on: a person acquires certain 
broad, non-specific, general notions about an object. This type of experience seems to 
provide what it takes to think productively – in a way that allows problems to be solved. 
The second type of learning involves much more specific limited perceptions about the 
functions of an object. It is this type of learning which leads to functional fixedness. 
8.4.3 Prior experience and semantic illusions 
While the analogy between sentences and objects with specific functions may not be 
immediately obvious, it seems safe to say that people are certain to make assumptions 
about the format of the sentences they process. Generally speaking, uttered sentences 
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would be expected to make sense, be truthful according to certain standards, and convey 
some new information or refer to already known information, to be relevant to the topic 
at hand and to be kept as short as possible (cf. Grice’s conversational maxims, 1975). 
Such a description covers most kinds of written material people are usually faced with 
in everyday life. Specific types of texts, such as tests and quizzes, conform to certain 
conventions and fulfil certain functions. 
According to such conventions, questions generally require an answer to what they are 
asking about, which can be retrieved from memory. Statements-to-be-verified generally 
require a check of truthfulness on a coherently expressed idea and would be perceived 
as a check of an individual’s state of knowledge. Truthfulness could be tested by 
forming a mental representation of such an idea and checking it against stored general 
knowledge. Semantic illusions fall outside these conventions and therefore they can be 
seen to be affected by a kind of functional fixedness. People perceive semantic illusion 
sentences as simply being questions or facts, whose function it is to tap into their 
general knowledge stores. They do not strike people as possibly having another ‘use’. 
This suggests an analogy with the effect of prior experience upon problem solving: 
Participants’ prior experience with sentences affects the way in which the sentences are 
approached. But in the case of semantic illusions the usual direction of approach does 
not lead to the desired response. In the case of questions, the usual task of answering the 
question will lead to an error. In the case of statements, the mental representation 
checked against knowledge is likely to withstand a quick check, as the error with such a 
statement is designed to ‘fit’ the context. As with the two strings problem it is not easy 
for participants to change their direction of approach. Simply telling participants about 
the presence of strangely phrased questions does not improve their performance at 
detecting the semantic illusion questions (e.g. Erickson and Mattson, 1981; Reder and 
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Kusbit, 1991). So maybe viewing semantic illusions as a kind of insight problem, rather 
than a processing error due to lack of attention and partial matching would lead us to a 
better understanding of the phenomenon? If participants were instructed to ‘solve’ each 
semantic illusion sentence as a problem, they might find it easier to detect the 
substitutions. 
8.4.4 Tried and tested methods: Luchins’ waterjars and semantic illusions 
An Einstellung can also be observed in people’s preference to solve problems using a 
tried and tested method, rather than continually searching for new solutions. Luchins 
and Luchins (1950) carried out a number of investigations on this form of Einstellung: 
they looked at the tendency towards developing a mechanised response in solving 
certain types of problems and how such a habitual response can stop people from seeing 
more direct solutions. 
The Luchins’ basic task (Luchins, 1942; Luchins and Luchins, 1950, 1959) consisted of 
volume-measuring problems. Participants were required to use a number of containers 
of different sizes (a, b, c) to figure out how to obtain a specific volume of fluid. Eleven 
problems were designed in such a fashion that problems 2 to 6 could all be solved by 
adhering to the formula b - a - 2c = [required volume], called the ‘Einstellung method’. 
Then there were two problems (7 and 8) which could be solved both by the established 
formula, but also by simpler (‘direct’) methods: a - c and a + c. The ninth problem 
could not be solved by the Einstellung method, but only by a - c. And the final two 
problems (10 and 11) were like 7 and 8 above. Problems 7 to 11 were called the ‘test 
problems’ or ‘criticals’, and Einstellung was measured by the percentage of participants 
who solved problems 7 and 8 by the Einstellung method, by the percentage of those 
who failed to solve problem 9 because they attempted to use the Einstellung method, 
and by the percentage of participants who solved problems 10 and 11 by that method, 
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rather than the direct method. Recovery from the Einstellung was measured by 
comparing the direct solutions achieved for problems 10 and 11 with the number of 
direct solutions for 7 and 8. For the more than 9000 participants who completed the 
basic task, the Luchins found that most showed Einstellung, and that recovery from 
mechanisation was not large. (See Table 8.1 for examples of the problems used.) 
Table 8.1: Luchins’ waterjars: examples of problems and solutions.  
Containers given (capacity in quarts) Problem 
number 
a b c 
To get Problem 
type 
Solution 
2 21 127 3 100 quarts b-a-2c 
3 14 163 25 99 quarts b-a-2c 
4 18 43 10 5 quarts b-a-2c 
5 9 42 6 21 quarts b-a-2c 
6 20 59 4 31 quarts 
Ein-
stellung 
problems 
b-a-2c 
7 23 49 3 20 quarts a-c (b-a-2c) 
8 15 39 3 18 quarts a+c (b-a-2c) 
9 28 76 3 25 quarts a-c 
10 18 48 4 22 quarts a+c (b-a-2c) 
11 14 36 8 6 quarts 
test 
problems 
(criticals) 
a-c (b-a-2c) 
(Table adapted from Luchins and Luchins, 1950, as cited in Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1968) 
8.4.5 Relating the waterjars to semantic illusions 
When an individual is faced with the usual kind of semantic illusion task, they are 
dealing with a situation closely analogous to a Luchins’ waterjars task: they are asked a 
series questions (or required to verify statements) of a particular format. But amongst 
the fillers are semantic illusion sentences, which, like the critical problems in the 
Luchins’ experiments, are superficially identical to all the other instances. However, 
there is now a different kind of problem to be solved, and the tried and tested method 
does not lead to the correct solution. In the case of semantic illusion questions, the 
participant is required to complete a totally different task – detect a word substitution, 
when on all other questions the task was to supply an answer. 
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For statements-to-be-verified the situation is similar, but less obvious. In the case of a 
verification task, the participant strictly speaking does not suddenly have to carry out a 
totally different task overall, as a semantic illusion statement is – on one level – no more 
than a false statement. But there are a number of ways in which a statement can be made 
false. Usually most people would expect a wrong basic fact to be detectable by virtue of 
having the wrong semantic associations (e.g. “The Eiffel Tower stands in Berlin.”). In 
semantic illusion sentences, however, the substitution is designed to fit adequately into 
the role-slot it occupies in a mental representation of the ideas contained within the 
statement. So again, it could be argued that there is a subtle change in task. Participants 
now do not need to find a wrong-seeming fact, but they need to find a substitution in a 
right-seeming statement. Similar to the Luchins’ critical problems, one solution seems 
to fit, when another is required. 
8.4.6 Trying to prevent Einstellung 
Luchins and Luchins carried out a number of variations upon the basic task of the 
waterjars task in an attempt to get participants to use the direct methods of solution as 
opposed to the Einstellung method. However, the results showed that it is virtually 
impossible to prevent Einstellung.  
8.4.6.1 Speed of responses 
For example, participants performed worse (more Einstellung solutions) when asked to 
solve the problems under speeded conditions, oftentimes even when they were 
instructed to solve the problems a second time. Luchins and Luchins suggested that this 
may in part be cause by ‘ego-motivated forces and social pressures’ experienced by the 
participants. 
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In van Jaarsveld, Dijkstra and Hermans’ (1997) study, a comparison between 
substitution detection performance under instructions stressing accuracy and 
performance under instructions stressing speed and accuracy equally was made. As with 
the waterjars task, the speeded task was performed less successfully, suggesting that the 
reading and processing of the sentences in question was carried out mechanically and 
fairly superficially, superseding any checking of details. If a question appears to be true 
at first glance, the participant is less likely to detect a substitution under speeded 
conditions than under conditions where accuracy is stressed. 
‘Ego-motivated forces and social pressures’ may also play a part in processing semantic 
illusions. The semantic illusion tasks are quite often presented in the form of a general 
knowledge quiz and consequently participants are likely to want to demonstrate their 
knowledge as accurately as possible. Since semantic illusion sentences, by necessity, 
tend to refer to something well-known, which participants are likely to feel they ought 
to know, it is possible that the same ‘ego-motivated forces and social pressures’ that the 
Luchins refer to are at work in participants completion of the semantic illusion tasks. 
8.4.6.2 Redundancy in the problem context 
Adding a fourth redundant jar to the problem caused a lot of confusion and poorer 
performance at solving the initial scene-setting problems. Luchins and Luchins 
comment that the fourth jar made the problem look more complicated, but also made for 
an unusual type of task, given the nature of school teaching: generally the solution of a 
problem in a school setting requires all present elements and does not tend to include 
redundant elements. 
While there is no direct parallel between the Luchins’ fourth jar variation and semantic 
illusions, it is nevertheless fair to say that semantic illusions are also an unusual type of 
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problem in a context of familiar problems. There is something misleading in the 
presentation of a problem which does not require all aspects of it to be involved in 
meeting the precise demands of the task (the detection of the substitution). So in the jars 
situation having a fourth unnecessary jar is confusing and distracting, just as the 
‘answer’ to a semantic illusion question has nothing to do with the actual task as it is 
perceived. A closer analogy between the fourth jar and its effect upon Einstellung and 
semantic illusions can be observed in the Brédart and Docquier (1989) study, where 
underlining the substituted word created a slightly unusual problem (sentences in 
normal discourse do not tend to include capitalised and underlined words to which 
particular attention needs to be paid). The manipulation also led both to an increase in 
detections and to an increase in false detections, just as the fourth jar decreased 
Einstellung responses for both the critical problems and decreased the number of correct 
solutions for the training problems (problems 2-6). 
8.5 How people actually process: Memory for gist 
Even if semantic illusions are regarded as a kind of problem to be solved, they 
nevertheless are also sentences to be processed. Sentence processing is something that 
people are incredibly good at – they do it quickly and with little apparent effort. People 
can easily make sense of new sentences that they have never heard or read before and 
make mental representations of the content of such sentences. But how do people deal 
with all the linguistic inputs that they are faced with in everyday processing, given that 
there is potential for infinite variety? Earlier in the chapter, it was stated that there must 
be a kind of partial matching process in our day to day processing, which leads to errors 
in the case of semantic illusions. The following section is concerned with a number of 
experiments which look at how people integrate and process incoming linguistic 
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information in order to make sense of it. Meaning, it would appear, is what is 
remembered and not surface detail. 
8.5.1 Meaning vs. form 
Given the idea that our world knowledge is stored in schemata in long-term memory, it 
seems only natural that only the meaningful content of verbal interactions is retained. 
When language is comprehended, it seems that the meaning of what is heard or read is 
remembered, but unless special attention is paid to the specific characteristics of the 
words, surface details are rapidly forgotten. Sentences appear to be encoded only with 
respect to their meaning, and the precise grammatical form – and even to a certain 
extent the precise wording – are important only to support comprehension (c.f. Sachs, 
1967). 
These findings can essentially be seen as a way of optimising our performance in 
language processing. They provide a possible explanation for why anything other than a 
partial matching process would be impossible when dealing with general knowledge 
questions such as those carried out in semantic illusion type tasks. It is possible that by 
the time a participant responds to a semantic illusion question, the substituted word will 
have been instrumental in creating a coherent mental representation which would have 
been used to reply to the question, while the actual word used will have been forgotten. 
This assumption is corroborated by the fact that often the question is recalled with the 
correct name in it, when participant are asked to recall it after the semantic illusion task 
has been carried out (Erickson and Mattson, 1981). 
Similarly, Bransford and Franks (1971) demonstrated that people spontaneously 
integrated information expressed by a number of semantically related but not 
consecutively placed sentences into holistic semantic ideas. The results of a series of 
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experiments designed to test the ‘abstraction of linguistic ideas’ showed clear evidence 
of what Bransford and Franks referred to as ‘productivity’ – participants integrated the 
ideas presented and ‘recognised’ new sentences made up of a novel combination of 
propositions that fitted the relations learnt during acquisition, as well as recognising old 
sentences, but sentences that combined previously unassociated ideas were confidently 
rejected as not having been seen before. 
It is possible that semantic illusions are the result of a similar ‘productivity’ or 
integration process: because of the semantic associations between the substitution and 
the correct word (which are analogous to the learnt relations in Bransford and Franks’ 
experiment), a participant reading a semantic illusion sentence might incorrectly 
recognise the idea expressed in the sentence and thus overlook the substitution. 
8.5.2 Comprehension requires an active contribution 
Human beings do a lot of language processing with little conscious control, but in a very 
efficient way, which allows them to integrate and deal rapidly with new input. This 
raises the question of how language and general knowledge fit together. In a series of 
studies Bransford and Johnson and various others investigated the relationship between 
language comprehension and extra-linguistic knowledge, such as general knowledge of 
the world and context. Using inference and recall as measures of comprehension, they 
used a basic strategy of asking participants if they (falsely) recognised information that 
they had not been presented with during an acquisition phase, and which therefore could 
only have been inferred. 
It can be shown, for example, that participants will ‘recognise’ different sentences 
describing the same spatial relations as a previously encountered but differently phrased 
sentence. Thus participants ‘recognise’ “Three turtles rested on a floating log and a fish 
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swam beneath it” as the sentence they had been presented with previously: “Three 
turtles rested on a floating log and a fish swam beneath them” (Bransford, Barclay and 
Franks, 1972). 
Similarly, participant make inferences about the consequences of input events which are 
not mentioned in the information studied For example, “The spy threw the secret 
document into the fireplace just in time since 30 seconds longer would have been too 
late” would generally lead to the inference that the spy burned the secret document 
(Johnson, Bransford and Solomon, 1973). 
Most people have little trouble when required to process sentences in which two 
proposition are linked in a way that requires some form of justification (e.g. The floor 
was dirty because Sally used the mop), but they would usually assume additional 
information (i.e. that the mop was dirty). This suggests that participants’ understanding 
depends not only upon what is heard/read but also upon the implications of such 
information in conjunction with their prior knowledge. Such processes of inference and 
creating justifications are a part of the normal course of comprehension – a listener is 
essentially required to solve the problem of creating a situation in which, for example, a 
because-structure makes sense. (Bransford and Johnson, 1972; Bransford, McCarrell 
and Nitsch, 1976). 
By analogy with these facts about language comprehension semantic illusions can be 
regarded as an instance where a participant has understood the context of a given 
sentence and has identified the relevant referents from their knowledge, while failing to 
notice that the substituted word does not strictly speaking match the idea that it is seen 
to refer to. The participant has essentially made the kind of active contribution towards 
understanding that is often necessary under normal processing circumstances. In a 
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semantic illusion sentence this mechanism leads to an error, when usually it would lead 
to comprehension. 
8.6 Onwards 
Chapter 8 was concerned with finding another approach to semantic illusions, treating 
them as in instance in which usually efficient processing strategies can be demonstrated 
to lead to errors similar to those encountered in the study of problem solving. An 
attempt was made to relate these observations to semantic illusions and to partial 
matching as a theoretical explanation of semantic illusions. 
It appears that people’s ‘rough and ready’ partial matching approach may be related to 
the way in which information is stored in long term memory: as dynamic schemata. In 
an ‘effort after meaning’ all incoming information is quickly integrated and much detail 
about surface-structure is forgotten. 
Findings from the study of syllogistic reasoning provided an example of how an 
inability to focus upon certain specific aspects of incoming information can lead to a 
faulty approach to a problem. People have a tendency to go with their impression of a 
situation and to relate it to the totality of their knowledge, finding it hard to step back 
and analyse things logically and in depth. 
The attitude or Einstellung a person has towards a task or problem has a profound effect 
upon performance. People often have great difficulty in shifting their perception of a 
given situation away from previous experiences of a similar nature, so that they cannot 
easily tackle the problem that a semantic illusion task presents: to carefully monitor the 
details contained within a sentence rather than making sense of its broad content. 
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Meaning plays a very important part in the human ability to deal with linguistic inputs 
and it affects how they later remember such inputs. Various studies on language 
comprehension provide evidence of the fact that a hearer must take an active part in 
processing language, in order to be able to make sense of language as a symbol system 
or indeed as a kind of machine which generates understanding by operating 
(Wittgenstein, 1958). This active contribution is what can lead to failures in detecting 
substitutions in semantic illusion tasks. 
In the next three chapters further experiments on semantic illusions are described, which 
are concerned not so much with the nature of semantic illusion sentences themselves, 
but with the way in which they are approached and processed. Chapter 9 describes the 
effects of instructions and presentation format of semantic illusion sentences on 
semantic illusion rate; Chapter 10 is concerned with how the context provided by the 
filler items affects semantic illusions; and Chapter 11 describes two experiments 
investigating working memory and semantic illusions to explore processing demands 
and likely depth of processing in dealing with semantic illusion sentences. 
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Chapter 9:  
Experiments 4a and 4b: Changing the point of view 
 
Since neither the overall length nor the position of the target word within the sentence 
have great effects upon the rate at which semantic illusions occur, but the syntactic form 
of the sentence (questions or statements) does, it seems possible that the manner in 
which semantic illusions and semantic illusion tasks are presented is the major 
determinant of the likelihood of semantic illusions occurring. In Chapter 4 it was shown 
that questions lead to more semantic illusion responses than statements. It was argued 
that this was caused by different processing requirements for questions which – by 
convention – need an answer. This can be seen, for example, by people’s consistent 
classification of the question used in the categorisation task described in Chapter 7. This 
chapter is concerned with an attempt to prevent the kind of superficial processing that 
leads to semantic illusions, first by varying the instructions given and then by 
manipulating the way in which the sentences in a semantic illusion task are presented. 
As suggested in Chapter 8, sentences create a specific set of expectations (Grice, 1975) 
analogous to an Einstellung which stops people from seeing an item as anything other 
than its usual function (e.g. Duncker, 1945). People appear to find it hard to focus on 
specific words and are obviously affected by the global meaning of a sentence, and 
semantic illusion sentences are often responded to depending on how ‘right’ they feel, a 
little like the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning (Revlin, Leirer, Yopp and Yopp, 
1980). The way that semantic illusion sentences are presented encourages this tendency. 
 152
A superficially familiar idea is presented in a familiar ‘quiz’ format (true/false choice), 
so that it appears participants are encouraged to misinterpret the task at hand. Thus a 
statement-to-be-verified might be seen to test knowledge about a specific fact that is 
expressed in a coherent sentence. A participant might expect a false statement to be 
more obviously false than semantic illusion statements usually are. Following this line 
of argument, it seems likely that participants find it difficult to perceive the semantic 
illusion statement as having another ‘use’ than simply testing a participant’s knowledge 
and thus that it is an insight problem of a kind. This suggestion is corroborated by the 
observation that once attention is directed to the substituted word after the fact, most 
participants have a type of Aha!-experience (cf. Wallas’ (1926) stage of illumination), in 
which they are suddenly able to see the substitution clearly. 
A second analogy would be to compare semantic illusion sentences to the ‘critical’ 
problems in Luchins and Luchins’s waterjar experiments (Luchins and Luchins, 1950): 
semantic illusion sentences are superficially identical to the true filler sentences used in 
semantic illusion experiments, but a different kind of problem has to be solved. For a 
true statement to be verified, a set of facts has to be recognised and checked against a 
‘forgiving’ memory representation, such as a schema (Bartlett, 1995[1932]), which can 
accommodate a certain degree of discrepancy between a stimulus and the stored 
information in the process of verification. For a semantic illusion statement, this 
strategy leads to the wrong response. Here the best strategy to produce a correct 
response would be to check every word against the schema to identify the extraneous 
element within the semantic illusion sentence. 
Two experiments were designed based on these analogies, to see if participants would 
be more successful at detecting substituted words in semantic illusion statements, if the 
presentation of the task was altered. In Experiment 4a, the instructions were presented 
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in a non-standard way to attempt to reassign the task focus and to encourage participants 
to think differently about the actual phrasing of the statements at hand. Experiment 4b 
took this idea a step further, by changing the task demands more drastically at the same 
time as eliminating any possibility of functional fixedness effects created by complete 
sentences: in this experiment participants were presented with a series of sentence 
puzzles consisting of the component parts of sentences that they were required to 
reconstruct before answering the question of whether or not each sentence was truthful. 
It was thought that this manipulation would force participants to pay more than 
superficial attention to each component of a sentence. 
9.1 Experiment 4a: Varying the instructions 
In Experiment 4a, the basic task was essentially the same as that used in many previous 
semantic illusion studies. Participants were required to read a series of statements and 
make a decision about whether or not they contained truthful information. However, the 
instructions were changed in order to avoid the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ which were 
thought to be ‘philosophically charged’ as a consequence of which participants might 
start speculating about the ‘Truth’ behind some of the claims they were asked to verify 
against their background knowledge. In fact, in Experiments 2 and 3 individual 
participants made comments to that effect about some of the statements-to-be-verified 
which related to well-known fictional characters. Instead participants were asked to 
decide if each statement was ‘natural’ or ‘unnatural’ according to the guidelines given 
in the instructions. It was thought that participants might find it easier to spot more 
substitutions with these instructions, as they might make the task seem as if it was a 
more subjective choice than a true or false decision to test participants’ knowledge state. 
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9.1.1 Method 
Participants: 18 adult volunteer participants with at least University level education 
took part in this study. 
Stimuli: A set of 52 true/false statements was presented to each participant. Twelve of 
the statements were target statements, which included a substituted name. The other 40 
sentences were fillers constructed along similar lines as the targets. Nine of these 
statements were false, the other 31 were true. 
Procedure: Each participant was given a leaflet of six sheets of A4 paper, with the 
following instructions printed on the first page: 
For Section 1. 
Below you are going to see a series of 52 statements. Some of these statements are correct and contain 
everyday trivia or facts. Such sentences are considered to be “NATURAL”. Some of the statements 
contain elements that are incorrect thus making the sentence “UNNATURAL”. (Please take myths 
and legends on their own terms: if that’s how the story goes, it’s “natural” for the purposes of this 
quiz.) 
Your task is to read each statement and to judge which category each sentence belongs to and then to 
indicate (by placing an “X” in the brackets [ ] next to your choice of answer) EITHER “NATURAL” 
OR “UNNATURAL”. 
Please note that this research is as much concerned with your immediate reaction as with your actual 
answer, so please response promptly. If you should wish to correct an answer you have made, please 
indicate this by placing a “1” in the bracket by your immediate response, and a “2” in the bracket by 
you final response. 
For Section 2. 
Please do not look at part 2 until you have completed section 1. 
Section 2. consists of 12 multiple-choice questions. Please enter the letter corresponding to your 
choice of answer in the space provided. 
Thank you very much for taking part! 
 
The final page of the booklet was there to provide a knowledge check: twelve multiple-
choice questions, which tested whether participants had the prerequisite knowledge to 
experience a semantic illusion. Instructions for section 2. were printed at the top of the 
last page: 
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Section 2. Knowledge check. 
Please indicate for each of the following statements which option (a), (b), (c) or (d) best fits in the gap 
in order to make the statement “natural”. If you do not know the answer at all, please indicate this. 
 
(An example of the questionnaire is presented in Appendix 9). 
 
9.1.2 Results 
A response was coded as a semantic illusion response only for statements where the 
participant judged the statement to be natural and gave the correct answer in the 
multiple choice knowledge check. If a participant responded correctly to the statement 
and the corresponding knowledge check, the response was coded as correct. The 
number of semantic illusion responses made for each target sentence was recorded, as 
was the number of correct responses. Then the semantic illusion rate and the correct 
response rate were calculated for each individual sentence. 
A t-test for paired samples was carried out using sentences as subjects, to compare the 
mean semantic illusion rate in this study to the mean semantic illusion rate for the same 
sentences presented as straightforward statements-to-be-verified (asking participants to 
make a true/false judgement about the statement). Contrary to the hypothesis, the mean 
semantic illusion rate for the ‘instructions’ task was not found to differ significantly 
from the basic statements-to-be-verified task (t= -0.410; d.f.= 11; p= 0.345, one-tailed. 
Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 9.1; see also Figure 9.1). 
Table 9.1: Mean semantic illusion rate (percent) and standard deviations for 
statements-to-be-verified in the ‘Instructions’ task and for the basic statements-to-
be-verified task. 
 N  Mean SI rate Std. Dev. 
Instructions  12 22.2 14.6 
Basic Statements 12 24.5 14.7 
 
 156
Figure 9.1: Mean semantic illusion rate for statements-to-be-verified for the 
‘Instructions’ task compared with mean semantic illusion rate for basic 
statements-to-be-verified task. 
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Correct response rates were also compared for the instructions task and the basic task 
using a t-test for paired samples with sentences as subjects. It was found that 
significantly fewer correct responses were made in response to the instructions task than 
for the basic task (t= -1.937; d.f.= 11; p= 0.04, one-tailed; see Table 9.2 and Figure 9.2). 
Table 9.2: Mean correct response rate (percent) and standard deviations for 
statements-to-be-verified in the ‘Instructions’ task and for the basic statements-to-
be-verified task. 
 N  Mean correct rate Std. Dev. 
Instructions  12 49.1 17.7 
Basic Statements 12 60.4 16.1 
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Figure 9.2: Mean correct response rate for statements-to-be-verified for the 
‘Instructions’ task compared with mean semantic illusion rate for basic 
statements-to-be-verified task. 
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9.1.3 Discussion 
Even though the semantic illusion rate with changed instructions was not significantly 
different to the semantic illusion rate in the basic statements-to-be-verified task, the 
correct response rate for the instructions task was significantly lower, suggesting that 
there is an effect of type of instruction upon processing, even if it was not the 
anticipated effect. It had been hypothesised that instructions for a slightly less familiar 
task (deciding the ‘naturalness’ of sentences according to the provided guidelines) 
would carry with them fewer task-dependent expectations, from previous experiences 
with the similar tasks. The results of the experiment confirmed that this was the case, 
but the effect of the change in instructions was to reduce overall accuracy and not to 
decrease semantic illusion rates as predicted. It seems likely that participants found the 
unfamiliar task of judging the naturalness of a statement to be somewhat confusing, 
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leading to fewer correct judgements. The fact that the semantic illusion rate did not 
differ could be explained by the idea that participants may have mentally converted the 
task requirements from the instructions to the more familiar and well-practised 
true/false paradigm, thus eradicating the potential effect of the instructions upon 
semantic illusion rate. Either way, the change from the true/false task to the 
natural/unnatural task did not affect the semantic illusion rate or increase the number of 
correct responses, suggesting that this manipulation did not help participants in the 
detection of substitutions. 
9.2 Experiment 4b: Varying the presentation format 
Since simply varying the instructions did not decrease the semantic illusion rate, a 
stronger manipulation with which to change the perception of the task at hand was used. 
Turning the sentences into puzzles – by decomposing the sentences into their 
component parts and asking participants to decide whether or not each sentence puzzle 
could be turned into a truthful statement – was chosen to provide a sufficiently different 
task. It was hypothesised that participants would be compelled to pay attention to each 
individual word within a sentence puzzle, as they had to decide how it fitted into the 
overall statement. This task was also thought to remove the risk of the statement-to-be-
verified structure leading participants into a functionally fixed approach to the verbal 
materials presented, in which they would respond primarily to how ‘right’ the individual 
statements feel. The hypothesis was that in the sentence puzzle paradigm, participants 
would be more likely to correctly identify substituted words, because the sentence flow 
was not given from the onset but had to be constructed from the individual elements of 
each sentence, so that each sentence component had to be considered individually. 
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9.2.1 Method 
Participants: 16 adult volunteer participants with at least University level education 
participated in this study. 
Stimuli: 26 sentence puzzles were presented to each participant. (For examples of 
sentence puzzles, see description below in the Procedure section and Appendix 10.) Six 
of the sentence puzzles were targets, which included a substituted name. The other 20 
sentence puzzles were fillers constructed along similar lines as the target. Four of these 
fillers could not be made into a complete and truthful sentence, the other 16 could. 
Procedure: Each participant was given a leaflet of four sheets of A4 paper, with the 
following instructions printed on the first page: 
Sentence puzzle quiz 
For Section 1. 
 
Below you will see a series of 26 sentence puzzles. Each of these puzzles consists of a number of 
meaningful components represented by one or more words in square brackets (e.g. [Last year’s], 
[took place], [in Sydney], [Olympic Games] ). Please look carefully at the sentence components. 
Without changing any of these components, is it possible to combine all of the components into a 
truthful statement? Please circle the appropriate answer. If you answer YES, please write down the 
sentence, if you answer NO, please note down why it does not work. So, for the example above, the 
correct answer would be “YES” and the truthful statement would be “Last year’s Olympic Games 
took place in Sydney.” (N.B. the first element of each sentence starts with a capital letter.) 
 
And here is another example: 
[released], [Ali Baba], [the lamp], [by rubbing], [the genie] 
The correct answer in this case would be NO. While the components could be made into a coherent 
statement (“Ali Baba released the genie by rubbing the lamp.”), the statement itself is not true: 
Aladdin rubbed the lamp, not Ali Baba. 
 
Alternatively the answer could be wrong for another reason: 
e.g. [the Prime Minister], [Tony Blair], [of the United Kingdom] 
The correct answer in this case is NO because there is no verb, and therefore the components cannot 
be turned into a truthful complete sentence. 
 
For Section 2. 
 
Please do not look at section 2 until you have completed section 1. 
 
Section 2. consists of 6 multiple-choice questions. Please answer these as accurately as possible. 
 
Thank you very much for taking part in this study. 
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The final page of the booklet was there to provide a knowledge check: twelve multiple-
choice questions, which tested whether participants had the prerequisite knowledge to 
experience a semantic illusion. Instructions for section 2. were printed at the top of the 
last page: 
Section 2. Knowledge check. 
Please indicate for each of the following statements which option (a), (b), (c) or (d) best fits the gap in 
order to make the statement truthful. If you do not know the answer at all, please indicate this. 
 
9.2.2 Results 
Unfortunately not all participants in this study complied with the instruction to make a 
note of the reason why they classified sentence puzzles as being solvable or not, nor did 
all participants write down the correct solution as they saw it for each puzzle. Hence a 
response was coded as a semantic illusion response for sentence puzzles where the 
participant responded “Yes” to the puzzle and gave the correct answer in the multiple 
choice knowledge check. If a participant responded correctly to the statement and the 
corresponding knowledge check, the response was coded as correct. The number of 
semantic illusion responses made for each target puzzle was recorded as was the 
number of correct responses. Then the semantic illusion rate and the correct response 
rate were calculated for each individual puzzle. 
A t-test for paired samples was carried out using sentences as subjects, to compare the 
mean semantic illusion rate for the puzzle task to the mean semantic illusion rate for the 
same sentences presented as straightforward statements-to-be-verified (asking 
participants to make a true/false judgement about the statement). As predicted, the mean 
semantic illusion rate for this study was found to be significantly smaller than the 
semantic illusion rate for the basic statements-to-be-verified task (t= -5.398; d.f.= 5; p= 
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0.002, one-tailed. Mean semantic illusion rates and standard deviation are presented in 
Table 9.3; see also Figure 9.3). 
Table 9.3: Mean semantic illusion rate (percent) and standard deviations for 
statements-to-be-verified in the ‘Puzzle’ task and for the basic statements-to-be-
verified task. 
 N  Mean Std. Dev. 
Puzzles 6 11.5 7.3 
Basic Statements 6 25.0 10.5 
 
Figure 9.3: Mean semantic illusion rate for statements-to-be-verified for the 
‘Puzzle’ task compared with mean semantic illusion rate for basic statements-to-
be-verified task. 
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Correct response rates were also compared for the ‘puzzle’ task and the basic task using 
a t-test for paired samples with sentences as subjects. In keeping with the findings from 
the semantic illusion rate analysis, it was found that significantly more correct responses 
were made in response to the ‘puzzle’ task than for the basic task (t= 3.532; d.f.= 5; p= 
0.09, one-tailed; see Table 9.4 and Figure 9.4). 
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Table 9.4: Mean correct response rate (percent) and standard deviations for 
statements-to-be-verified in the ‘Puzzle’ task and for the basic statements-to-be-
verified task. 
 N  Mean correct rate Std. Dev. 
Puzzles  6 83.5 6.4 
Basic Statements 6 67.7 11.5 
 
Figure 9.4: Mean correct response rate for statements-to-be-verified for the 
‘Puzzle’ task compared with mean semantic illusion rate for basic statements-to-
be-verified task. 
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9.2.3 Discussion  
As hypothesised, participants were much more likely to detect substitutions in this task 
than in the straightforward statement-to-be-verified paradigm. It seems that presenting 
semantic illusions as problems to be solved rather than as facts to be verified does make 
them easier to detect, as is also suggested by the increase in correct response rate in the 
‘puzzle’ task. However, a number of semantic illusion responses still occurred even 
with this task. The semantic illusion rate for the sentence puzzles at 11.5 percent is 
comparable to that in focus-shifting semantic illusion paradigms for the condition in 
which the substituted word is placed in focus. For example, Brédart and Modolo’s 
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(1988) focus-condition showed a semantic illusion rate of 9 percent. This suggests that 
the importance of meaning extraction is greater than the ability to pay attention to 
specific details, even in situations where that meaning has to be constructed by 
rearranging different elements of a sentence. It is possible that the semantic illusion rate 
in this task reflects the strategy used by some of the participants of first constructing a 
sentence out of the available materials and then deciding if the sentence was true or 
false. There is some evidence for this in that nine out of the sixteen participants in this 
experiment did not make any semantic illusion responses and a further four only made 
one semantic illusion response each. 
9.4 Conclusions 
The two experiments described in this chapter were concerned with changing the way in 
which participants approached the statements in a statement-to-be-verified task, as it 
was assumed that semantic illusions ensued from a type of functional fixedness in 
which the expectations made about the task and sentences at hand prevented participants 
from spotting the substitutions made in semantic illusion statements. An attempt to 
increase participants’ sensitivity to substitutions by changing the basic task (‘true/false’) 
to a slightly ‘unusual’ task (‘natural/unnatural’) had no significant effect upon the 
semantic illusion rate, possibly because participants reinterpreted the ‘unusual’ task to 
be equivalent to the basic task. However, the unusual task lead to fewer correct 
responses, suggesting that changing the instructions affects overall performance, but not 
in the way predicted. When the nature of the task was shifted by a stronger manipulation 
of requiring participants to decide if a number of sentence puzzles could be assembled 
to form truthful statements, the semantic illusion rate dropped significantly, suggesting 
that this task forced participants to pay more attention to each component of the 
sentence. This finding was also supported by the fact that the correct response rate in the 
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‘puzzle’ task was significantly higher than that in the basic task. But semantic illusions 
were still not eradicated. 
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Chapter 10:  
Experiment 5: Expectation from context 
 
Section 8.3 described how people’s thinking is far from logical, and how it is subject to 
a variety of biases related to the way in which information is presented (e.g. Woodworth 
and Sells, 1935; Wetherick and Gilhooly, 1990), and to what is believed about the world 
(Revlin, Leirer, Yopp and Yopp, 1980). Since it is unlikely that such biases are confined 
to syllogistic reasoning, this chapter is concerned with the question of how the context 
provided within each semantic illusion task affects the rate at which semantic illusions 
occur. 
In experiment 2 (see Chapter 5) and experiment 3 (see Chapter 6) the correct response 
rates for true and false filler statements were compared to examine the assumption that 
false statements were generally harder to identify than true statements. The results 
showed that participants gave significantly more correct responses to true fillers than to 
false fillers. It was also found that the correct response rate for false filler statements 
was statistically indistinguishable from the correct response rate for target statements 
(i.e. semantic illusion detections). This could be due to the fact that semantic illusion 
statements are technically just false statements, but the semantic illusion research 
described so far provides no empirical evidence to support this assumption. The 
explanation that was suggested in Chapter 5 to explain participants’ performance was 
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that in general positive statements are easier to process than corresponding negative 
ones, as the negative statements require extra steps in processing (see section 5.4). 
Similarly it can also be shown that participants take longer to verify an incorrect 
statement when comparing sentences against pictures (Clark and Chase, 1972). By 
analogy it seems likely that it is easier to verify a truthful statement against stored 
knowledge than it would be to disconfirm a false statement, as was found in experiment 
2 (see section 5.6.3). 
Given the nature of statement-verification tasks used in semantic illusion research to 
date, there may however be another cause contributing to the greater rate of correct 
responses to true filler statements than to false fillers: a form of Einstellung (see 
Chapters 8 and 9). In the case of a statement-to-be-verified task, the target sentences are 
usually surrounded by many true fillers and only few false statements apart from the 
target sentences. This set-up might in itself lead to a Luchins and Luchins (1950) –type 
Einstellung, that is based on the use of a previously successful response strategy which 
does not work for certain superficially identical problems. 
In Chapter 9 (Experiment 4b) it was demonstrated that semantic illusion sentences as 
sentences are subject to a type of functional fixedness (cf. Duncker, 1945; Birch and 
Rabinowitz, 1951; see Chapter 8). Participants find it virtually impossible to break the 
habit of processing sentences as holistic units and for meaning, even if they are asked to 
pay attention to details (cf. ‘literal’ tasks; Reder and Cleeremans, 1990; Reder and 
Kusbit, 1991). This difficulty in analysing the component parts of a sentence is a little 
like a global version of the Stroop effect (1935): just as a printed colour word interferes 
with the task of naming the colour of the ink in which the word is printed, so people 
cannot help processing the semantic content of a sentence. The ink colour of the word as 
a physical characteristic of the stimulus in the Stroop effect is analogous to the 
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individual words connected in a sensible fashion in the sentence in a semantic illusion 
task: attention can be paid to each word individually, but it is much easier to process the 
gist of the sentence. 
Since it can be shown empirically that Einstellung affects the processing of semantic 
illusion sentences, and since many statement-to-be-verified tasks in semantic illusion 
research to date have used a majority of fillers that were true, it is possible that the 
difficulty of processing negative as opposed to positive statements is not the only reason 
for participants’ poorer performance in verifying false and semantic illusion statements. 
The correct response rates for semantic illusion statements (all plausible and dealing 
with reasonably familiar topics) in experiments 2 and 3 were not different from the 
response rates for other false statements (often more obviously incorrect than semantic 
illusion sentences). This suggests that maybe the overall context of the task, in which 
the participants were required to make a large number of “true” responses to the true 
filler statements, had a direct effect upon semantic illusion rate. Perhaps in the context 
of many true statements the semantic illusion sentences appear more likely to be true at 
first glance, so that – if there is any doubt – a participant might be inclined to accept the 
statement as true based on a combination of the feeling of coherence associated with the 
sentence and the overall context of the task involving many true responses. Conversely, 
a target sentence surrounded be many false fillers might under similar circumstances by 
more likely to be rejected. 
To test this assumption a questionnaire was designed and distributed via the internet. 
One version of the questionnaire was designed to consist of primarily false statements, 
while the other version was similar in design to the format used in earlier statement-to-
be-verified studies, with most fillers being true. It was hypothesised that the semantic 
illusion rate in a questionnaire consisting of a majority of false fillers would be lower 
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than the semantic illusion rate in a questionnaire with a majority of true fillers. 
Furthermore it was thought that comparing the correct response rates for true fillers and 
for false fillers for the two versions of the questionnaire would shed light on whether or 
not the better performance on correct fillers in experiments 2 and 3 was due to an 
‘expectation’ effect, or whether false statements are actually harder to verify than true 
statements. It was hypothesised that the correct response rate would be greater for the 
true version of each filler statement than for the false version, if negative statements 
were harder to analyse than positive ones. 
Finally, a context effect could be tested for by comparing the correct response rates for 
true and false fillers and for targets in each group. If there is a context effect, one would 
expect to see a different pattern of response rates for each group: a questionnaire 
consisting of a majority of false fillers should lead to the greatest correct rate for 
responses to false statements, while for a questionnaire consisting primarily of true 
statements, the greatest correct rate should be for responses to true statements, 
regardless of whether or not false statements are harder to verify than true ones. 
10.1 Method 
Participants: 138 volunteers participated in this study. Participants were recruited by 
email informing them of the web-address of the questionnaire used in the study. They 
were invited to forward the address to as many people as possible to find further 
participants. The website was left active for a week to gather data, and then taken off-
line. Participants were assigned randomly to one of the two versions of the 
questionnaire. 65 participants saw version one (‘Mostly false’) and 73 participants saw 
version two (‘Mostly true’). 
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Stimuli: 50 true/false statements were presented to each participant. Twelve of the 
statements were target statements, which included a substituted word. The other 38 
sentences were fillers constructed along similar lines as the target. The two versions of 
the questionnaire were: 1 (‘Mostly false’) and 2 (‘Mostly true’). For the ‘Mostly false’ 
version 27 filler statements were false and eleven were true; for the ‘Mostly true’ 
version the same statements used in version 1 were manipulated so that the 27 
previously false statements were now presented as 27 true statements and the eleven 
previously true statements were presented as false statements. 
The questionnaire was presented via the internet as an interactive online quiz written in 
PHP3 script (see Appendix 11 for screen captures of the website used). The data was 
recorded and sent directly to a secure databank from which it could downloaded for 
analysis.  
Procedure: When a participant opened the questionnaire website, the first screen 
showed instructions to read each statement as quickly as possible and to respond by 
using the mouse to click either a true or a false button displayed below the statement. 
The statements-to-be-verified were displayed one at a time and disappeared only when 
the participant made a response. The next statement was then displayed. Once all 50 
statements had been answered, a knowledge check was displayed. This consisted of a 
‘fill-the-blank’ version of each statement used with 4 multiple choice options to 
complete it. The 50 knowledge check statements were all displayed on the same screen 
and participants were instructed to respond to these as accurately as possible, by 
‘ticking’ one of the response options for each with the mouse. Once a participant had 
‘ticked’ one of the multiple choice options for each statement, a button at the bottom of 
the screen could be clicked for feedback – this displayed the knowledge check-list with 
correct answers highlighted. Wrong answers that had been given were also highlighted 
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in a different colour. Participants were also presented with a score out of fifty for the 
first half of the experiment. 
10.2 Results 
10.2.1 Semantic illusion rate and correct response rate 
A response was coded as a semantic illusion response for statements where the 
participant judged the statement to be true and gave the correct answer in the multiple 
choice knowledge check. When a participant gave the correct response to both a 
statement and the corresponding knowledge check, the responses was coded as correct. 
The semantic illusion rate and the correct response rate were recorded for each target 
statement for each group.  
A t-test for paired samples was carried out comparing the semantic illusion rate for each 
target sentence in the ‘Mostly false’ version to that for the corresponding statement in 
the ‘Mostly true’ version (i.e. sentences were used as subjects). In keeping with the 
hypothesis, the mean semantic illusion rate in the ‘Mostly false’ version was found to be 
significantly lower than that in the ‘Mostly true’ version of the questionnaire (t= -4.296; 
d.f.= 11; p= 0.001, two-tailed). The means and standard deviations are shown in Table 
10.1 (see also Figure 10.1). 
Table 10.1: Mean semantic illusion rates (percent) and standard deviations for 
‘Mostly false’ and ‘Mostly true’ versions. 
Version N  Mean SI rate Std. Dev. 
‘Mostly false’ 12 18.3 9.6 
‘Mostly true’ 12 26.6 13.5 
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Figure 10.1: Mean semantic illusion rates for ‘Mostly false’ and ‘Mostly true’ 
versions. 
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A t-test for paired samples was also carried out comparing the correct response rate in 
the ‘Mostly false’ version to that in the ‘Mostly true’ version, using sentences as 
subjects. In keeping with the finding that fewer semantic illusion responses were made 
in the ‘Mostly false’ group, it was also found that the number of correct responses to 
target statements was significantly greater in the ‘Mostly false’ version than in the 
‘Mostly true’ version of the questionnaire (t= 2.524; d.f.= 11; p= 0.028, two-tailed). The 
means and standard deviations are shown in Table 10.2 (see also Figure 10.2). 
Table 10.2: Mean correct response rates (percent) and standard deviations for 
‘Mostly false’ and ‘Mostly true’ versions. 
Version N  Mean correct rate Std. Dev. 
‘Mostly false’ 12 56.1 22.8 
‘Mostly true’ 12 49.3 21.0 
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Figure 10.2: Mean correct response rates to target statements for ‘Mostly false’ 
and ‘Mostly true’ versions. 
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10.2.2 Correct response rates for true fillers, false fillers and targets 
To test the hypothesis that a positive statement is easier to process than a negative 
statement, correct response rates for each filler statement were also recorded. A filler 
was coded to have been answered correctly when the correct response had been given 
during the verification task (i.e. ‘true’ for true fillers and ‘false’ for false fillers) and the 
knowledge check had been answered correctly. 
A t-test for paired samples was carried out comparing the correct response rate for each 
filler in its true form to the correct response rate for its false form. As predicted, the 
truthful version of a statement was found to be significantly easier to judge correctly 
than the false version of the same statement (t= 1.785; d.f.= 37; p= 0.042). But while 
significant, the difference in correct response rate for true and false statements is not 
very large (see Table 10.3 and Figure 10.3). 
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Table 10.3: Mean correct response rate (percent) and standard deviations for true 
and false statements. 
 N Mean correct rate Std. Dev. 
True 38 67.8 21.1 
False 38 62.1 20.5 
 
Figure 10.3: Mean correct response rates for true and false statements. 
A repeated measures analysis of variance was carried out on the correct response rates 
for correct target responses, correct false fillers and correct true fillers, for both groups 
(‘Mostly false’ and ‘Mostly true’) combined, to determine if there was an overall effect 
of statement type on correct response rate. (Participants were used as subjects). 
Mauchly’s test of sphericity was found to be significant (W= 0.931; d.f.= 2; p= 0.008) 
and Pillai’s Trace was used to determine the significance of the analysis of variance. 
The effect of type was found to be significant (F= 18.108; d.f.= 2, 135; p<0.001) and 
there was a significant interaction between type and group (F= 57.505; d.f.= 2, 135; 
p<0.001). A series of post-hoc comparisons were carried out, using t-tests for paired 
samples with a Bonferroni correction (p<0.0167 for 0.05 level of significance). It was 
found that false fillers led to fewer correct responses than true fillers (t= -2.648; d.f.= 
137; p= 0.009, two-tailed). True fillers led to more correct responses than targets 
(t=5.533; d.f.=137; p<0.001, two-tailed). False fillers also led to more correct responses 
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than targets (t= 3.572; d.f.=137; p<0.001, two-tailed). These results were consistent with 
the hypothesis that true statements are easier to verify than false statements (see Table 
10.4 for means and standard deviations). 
Table 10.4: Mean correct response rate (percent) and standard deviations for each 
type of statement. 
Type of statement N Mean correct rate Std. Dev. 
True filler 138 64.2 17.4 
False filler 138 57.9 17.7 
Target 138 52.2 20.6 
 
To explore the interaction, the mean correct rates were calculated for each combination 
of group and type of statement (see Table 10.5 and Figure 10.4). 
Table 10.5: Mean correct response rates (percent) and standard deviations (in 
parentheses) for each combination of group and statement type. 
Statement type  
Group False True Target 
‘Mostly false’ 66.0 (16.5) 52.4 (15.1) 53.3 (20.1) 
‘Mostly true’ 50.7 (15.7) 74.8 (11.5) 51.1 (21.1) 
 
Figure 10.4: Mean correct response rates for each combination of group and 
statement type. 
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A separate repeated measures analysis of variance was carried out for each group to 
examine the effect of statement type. For the ‘Mostly false’ group, Mauchly’s test of 
sphericity was significant (W= 0.852; d.f.= 2; p= 0.006) and Pillai’s Trace was used. 
There was a significant effect of type of statement on correct response rate (F= 23.489; 
d.f.= 2, 63; p<0.001) and a series of post-hoc t-tests was carried out using a Bonferroni 
correction. It was found that in the ‘Mostly false’ group, participants made significantly 
more correct responses to false statements than to either targets (t= 5.987; d.f.= 64; 
p<0.001, two-tailed) or true statements (t= 4.904; d.f.= 64; p<0.001, two-tailed). There 
was no statistical difference between the correct response rate for true statements and 
targets (t= -0.313; d.f.= 64; p= 0.755, two-tailed). 
For the ‘Mostly true’ group, the sphericity assumption was not violated. There was a 
significant effect of type of statement on correct response rate (F= 73.699; d.f.= 2, 144; 
p<0.001) and a series of post-hoc t-tests was carried out using a Bonferroni correction. 
It was found that in the ‘Mostly true’ group, participants made significantly more 
correct responses to true statements than to either targets (t= 9.738; d.f.= 72; p<0.001, 
two-tailed) or false statements (t= -10.909; d.f.= 72; p<0.001, two-tailed). There was no 
statistical difference between the correct response rate for false statements and targets 
(t= -0.193; d.f.= 72; p= 0.847, two-tailed). 
The findings from these two analyses are consistent with the hypothesis that the context 
of the questionnaire affects the correct response rate depending upon which kind of 
statement is predominantly used for fillers. 
10.3 Discussion 
As predicted, target sentences embedded in a context of mostly false filler statements 
were less likely to lead to semantic illusion responses (and conversely to more correct 
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responses to target questions) than the same target statements in a context of mostly true 
fillers. This indicates that the context of the task has an effect upon how the sentences 
are processed. If participants find a large number of statements-to-be-verified to be 
false, they appear to be more likely to assume any sentence to be false, if there is any 
doubt about its truthfulness, as is potentially the case for semantic illusion sentences. 
This assumption was also supported by the results of the analysis of the correct response 
rates for each group. In the ‘mostly true’ group, participants gave the greatest number of 
correct responses to true fillers. The combined analysis of correct response rates for 
both experimental groups provided evidence for the claim that truthful statements are 
easier to verify than false ones (cf. Horn, 1989; Clark & Chase, 1972). 
In terms of semantic illusions and their occurrence, these results imply that there is an 
effect of the overall context of the specific task in which the target sentences are 
included on the semantic illusion rate, but this effect is small and the correct response 
rate to target sentences is not affected by the task context: indeed for both types of 
context, the correct response rate for semantic illusion sentences is very similar to the 
correct response rate for the not-favoured type of filler (i.e. in a ‘mostly false’ context it 
is similar to the correct response rate for true fillers). 
The finding from the ‘mostly true’ group seems straightforward enough: semantic 
illusion sentences are strictly speaking false statements, and hence the correct response 
rate for semantic illusion sentences is the same as that for false fillers. But the finding 
from the ‘mostly false’ groups suggests that something else is going on: in a ‘mostly 
false’ context the semantic illusion sentences appear to be treated as if they were true 
statements. This finding is in keeping with the data described in Chapter 7, which 
showed that semantic illusions are not like other sentences. 
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It seems as if a functional fixedness explanation as put forward in the introduction of 
this chapter cannot account for these data. Maybe a better – less obvious – analogy 
would be to describe the response strategy used by participants as a variant of the 
matching effect observed in syllogistic reasoning. In the matching effect (Wetherick & 
Gilhooly, 1990), the premises of a syllogism are processed superficially and the 
participant makes a response by matching the more conservative of the two premises. In 
the semantic illusion matching analogy, a statement about which there is any doubt – 
such as a target statement which may lead to a semantic illusion – is matched to other 
statements already verified, and the more conservative response is given depending on 
the context. 
10.4 Conclusions 
The experiment described in this chapter was concerned with the effect of filler 
statements on semantic illusion rate. It was assumed that a semantic illusion would be 
less likely to occur for the same target sentence, when it was encountered in the context 
of mostly false fillers. The results of this study confirmed this assumption. However, the 
context did not appear to affect people’s ability to spot substitutions in the target 
sentences, as there was no effect of context on the correct response rate for semantic 
illusions. The data from this study also re-confirmed the claim that false statements on 
the whole are harder to verify than true statements as discussed in chapter 5. It also 
showed that semantic illusions were even harder to verify than false statements 
providing further evidence that semantic illusion sentences are highly atypical as 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
Once again it seems that semantic illusions are difficult to process successfully even 
though they do not appear to be difficult to understand. This raises the question of 
whether semantic illusions occur as a result of the capacity limits of the processing 
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system. The next chapter will explore the processing demands semantic illusion 
sentences place upon the system by relating semantic illusion to working memory 
research. 
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Chapter 11: 
Working Memory and Semantic Illusions 
 
From previous research including the experiments described in Chapters 3 to 6, it seems 
clear that it is not easy to affect semantic illusion rate by anything short of a drastic 
manipulation such as changing the sentence format into a kind of puzzle (Chapter 9) or 
by changing the focus of the sentence by a syntactic mechanism such as putting the 
substituted word into a cleft phrase (Brédart and Modolo, 1988). But even with these 
relatively extreme measures to draw participants’ attention to the substitution, the 
occurrence of semantic illusions is not entirely eradicated. In fact, none of the 
experimental manipulations to date have managed successfully to prevent semantic 
illusions from taking place. In Chapter 7, semantic illusion type sentences were 
investigated in comparison with sentences taken from sources of written discourse. 
Participants rated semantic illusion type sentences (without a substituted target word) on 
a series of scales designed to provide information about the nature of semantic illusion 
sentences compared to other sentences. It was found that semantic illusion sentences are 
markedly different from other forms of written discourse. Furthermore, in Chapter 10 it 
was demonstrated that the task context in which semantic illusion sentences are 
presented has a significant effect upon semantic illusion rate. Building on these 
findings, this chapter is concerned with how semantic illusion sentences are handled 
within the cognitive system and examines the interaction between semantic illusions 
and working memory. 
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11.1 Working memory 
The term ‘working memory’ refers to that part of our cognitive system which is in 
charge of ongoing processing. It is also a temporary storage place in which information 
can be held long enough for a cognitive process to be carried out. Working memory – as 
originally proposed by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) – consists of a central executive, 
which is responsible for reasoning, decision making, and for the co-ordination of the 
operation of the subsidiary ‘slave’ systems, which form the other major components of 
working memory. The central executive has a limited capacity of three to four ‘chunks’ 
of data which can be dealt with at any one time (e.g. Baddeley, 1986). The ‘slave’ 
systems are essentially no more than specialised rehearsal loops in which a limited 
amount of information can be held until the central executive is ready to deal with it. 
Baddeley and Hitch suggested two such systems. One is the visuo-spatial sketchpad, 
which maintains and rehearses visual and spatial inputs – as though sketched down 
rapidly on a pad of paper (e.g. Logie, 1995). The other is the articulatory loop (now 
often called the phonological loop) which maintains and rehearses verbal inputs by 
essentially repeating them over and over until the central executive is free to deal with 
the input (e.g. Baddeley, 1986).  
Since semantic illusions are primarily a verbal phenomenon, even when presented in 
written format, the phonological loop will be described in greater detail. Since past 
research (e.g. Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick and Wynn, 1993) provided only limited 
evidence for the use of the visuo-spatial sketchpad and no evidence for the use of 
visualisation in problem solving, the visuo-spatial sketchpad will be ignored. 
A number of phenomena, such as the phonological similarity effect which can be 
observed for both read and heard material (e.g. Baddeley, 1966; Conrad, 1964) provides 
evidence for the involvement of the phonological loop in reading comprehension. 
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People generally find it harder to recall words or letters (especially in the order in which 
they were presented) when these words or letters sound alike, whether such words or 
letters are presented aurally or visually (as written material). This implies that when 
participants are asked to remember a verbal sequence they appear to translate visually 
presented material into a phonologically based code for temporary storage. 
The observation that semantic illusion sentences are often misremembered as having 
been presented in a correct version (e.g. Erickson and Mattson, 1981) could be seen as 
evidence for one of the major changes that the working memory model has undergone, 
since its original description by Baddeley and Hitch. Current working memory theory 
(e.g. Logie, 1995) has one key difference to Baddeley and Hitch’s theory: in Logie’s 
model, working memory is not seen as a gateway between perceptual inputs and long-
term processing and memory. Instead, working memory is seen as an active structure in 
which all components can interact with prior knowledge as stored in a knowledge base, 
and ongoing perceptual inputs are constantly being interpreted via the knowledge base. 
This point of view is very similar to the view that knowledge is stored in schemata in 
long-term memory (Bartlett, 1995[1932]; see section 8.2). 
11.1.1 Working memory and prior knowledge 
The relationship between working memory and long-term knowledge appears to be 
interactive: material in temporary memory is influenced by information from long-term 
knowledge as well as by the operation of the components of working memory. The 
retrieval of information relevant to a current task appears to be a major role for working 
memory. The central executive activates and integrates representations in long-term 
memory to facilitate and make sense of the task at hand. There is empirical evidence to 
suggest that the phonological loop’s performance of short-term memory verbal tasks is 
in fact subject to long-term knowledge influences. For example, the memory span 
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(usually 7±2 items or ‘chunks’; Miller, 1956) of the phonological loop is greater for 
words in sentences (15-16 words) than for unrelated words (5-6 words) (Baddeley, 
Vallar & Wilson, 1987). Similarly non-words that approximate English result in better 
immediate recall than those that do not (e.g. Gathercole and Baddeley, 1989), and 
familiarising participants with non-words increases immediate serial recall capacity 
(Hulme, Maughan & Brown, 1991). These findings suggest that previous information 
from long-term memory allows participants to chunk short-term inputs more efficiently. 
A similar situation might arise when semantic illusion sentences are processed. As 
semantic illusion sentences – by their very definition – deal with old knowledge that has 
already been stored in long-term memory at a previous point in time, it seems 
reasonable to assume that this information from long-term memory is activated via the 
central executive as the sentence is read and is used to deal more efficiently with the 
contents of the sentence at hand. It is possible that the propositions within a semantic 
illusion sentence are dealt with as chunks to increase the speed and efficiency of 
processing, and the chunking process obscures the substitution within the semantic 
illusion sentence, as the part of the sentence containing it is contracted into a 
meaningful unit. 
11.1.2 Working memory and language comprehension 
The idea of working memory involvement in language comprehension can help make 
sense of familiar experiences as well as laboratory phenomena. For example, most 
people have experienced the sudden need for reinterpretation of so-called ‘garden path’ 
sentences such as “I saw that gasoline can explode. And a brand new gasoline can it was 
too”. Usually “can” would first be interpreted as a verb, but with the added information 
from the second sentence, it is reinterpreted as a noun. So maybe working memory 
provides a buffer in which the exact wording of connected discourse can be held briefly, 
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so that one can achieve the kind of rapid re-interpretation required in understanding 
garden path sentences. However, there is a need for chunking information even in short 
sentences in order to process these, and this can lead to disinformation as the example 
above demonstrates. 
Two models of language understanding in particular have attempted to relate working 
memory to language comprehension. Clark and Clark’s (1977) 4-step model of 
language comprehension implies an important role for a hypothetical structure that can 
easily be identified with the phonological loop. In the first step of Clark and Clark’s 
model, the comprehender constructs a phonological representation of the message in 
working memory. This is then used to identify the content and function of the separate 
components of the message. From this information, a hierarchical structure of the 
sentence is built using the underlying propositions within the message. Then the 
working memory representation of the original input is wiped and the comprehender 
retains the meaning of the message, but not its exact wording (e.g. Sachs, 1967). Even 
though Clark and Clark do not identify the working memory component carrying out 
the buffering function described in their model, it corresponds directly to the 
phonological loop, which is specialised for temporary storage of the phonological form 
of the language material being processed. 
But not all understanding is based on the analysis of working memory representations in 
this ‘off-line’ fashion: there is empirical evidence that lexical semantic information can 
be accessed very rapidly within a few hundred milliseconds. For example, spoken words 
are on average recognised within 200 ms of the onset of the acoustic signal and both 
sensory and contextual cues influence the word recognition process (e.g. Marslen-
Wilson, 1987; Marslen-Wilson and Tyler, 1980). The very speed of the process implies 
that at least at the single word level of comprehension, lexical semantic information can 
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be accessed without the need of a working memory representation. But in the case of 
semantically or syntactically complex sentences the message interpretation may well 
proceed off-line with recourse to working memory representations. 
In a second model of text comprehension (Kintsch and Van Dijk, 1978; Van Dijk and 
Kintsch, 1983) another aspect of working memory processing is stressed which 
corresponds much more closely to the central executive. Van Dijk and Kintsch’s model 
suggests that the message is processed in cycles, each cycle representing a chunk 
containing several propositions. In this model, the theoretical component analogous to 
the central executive holds as many of the propositions as it has ‘space’ for in its limited 
capacity, and the propositions form the basis of coherence processing. Text will be 
accepted as coherent if a certain amount of overlap is found between propositions 
within any given chunk and an earlier chunk stored in the working memory buffer. If 
there is no such overlap, inferences have to be made by reference to long-term memory 
when necessary. The need for inferences places a much heavier load upon general 
processing resources. Thus, when dealing with particularly complex messages, some of 
the limited capacity available for processing may be allocated to aspects of processing 
other than the short-term storage of propositions. According to the model, therefore, 
working memory requirements for sentence processing are likely to vary as a function 
of the syntactic and semantic complexity of the sentences being processed. 
11.1.2.1 The phonological loop and language comprehension 
There are two main theoretical approaches to the relationship between the phonological 
loop and language comprehension. Both these theories share the assumption that 
comprehension of simple syntactic/semantic clauses or sentences occurs ‘on-line’, 
without reference to a phonological representation of the message held in working 
memory. This assumption is of interest with regard to the question of working memory 
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involvement in semantic illusion occurrences. As stated in Chapter 7, participants 
appear to regard semantic illusion sentences as perfectly normal and of relatively low 
complexity. If this is indeed the case in terms of the processing demands, there should 
be no effect of articulatory suppression upon the semantic illusion rate compared to a 
control condition. If there is an effect of articulatory suppression upon semantic illusion 
rate, however, this would imply that semantic illusion sentences are more complex in 
processing terms than they seem and thus require the construction of a working memory 
representation, which according to Clark and Clark (1977) will lead to the purging of 
the actual wording of the sentence from working memory as the sentence is being 
processed. 
The first theory about the involvement of the phonological loop in sentence 
comprehension is that phonological working memory is used as a buffer store to be 
consulted during off-line linguistic analysis (e.g. Saffran and Marin, 1975; Baddeley, 
Vallar and Wilson, 1987; Martin, 1987). The kinds of sentences that require back-up 
from such a buffer are usually highly complex and may not have a single pragmatic 
interpretation based upon the words present; the comprehender has to carry out fairly 
detailed syntactic and semantic analysis off-line (e.g. Caramazza, Basili, Koller and 
Berndt, 1981; Saffran and Marin, 1975). In fact, it can be shown that only long and 
complex sentence structures are affected by the disruptive effect of articulatory 
suppression (e.g. Baddeley, Eldridge and Lewis, 1981) and that neither speed nor 
accuracy are affected in a simple verification task of active sentences such as “Canaries 
have wings” vs. “Canaries have gills” (Baddeley, 1978). A similar requirement for a 
phonological representation in order for successful sentence comprehension to take 
place exists also in the case of long sentences, in which word order is critical (e.g. in an 
anomalous sentence like “One could reasonably claim that sailors are often lived on by 
ships of various kinds”). It has been argued that for such sentences, a phonological 
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representation of the full word sequence is required for the interpretation of the full 
sentence form, and thus comprehension of these forms places higher demands upon the 
limited capacity of working memory (Baddeley, Vallar and Wilson, 1987; Martin, 
1990). 
Another suggestions has been put forward by Caplan, Waters and colleagues (Caplan, 
Baker and Dehaut, 1985; Waters, Caplan and Hildebrandt, 1987): the working memory 
representations held in the phonological loop is used as a post-syntactic checking 
mechanism for syntactically complex sentences in which there is no straightforward 
assignment of lexical items to the proposed syntactic structure. For example, Waters, 
Caplan and Hildebrandt (1987) demonstrated that participants’ performance in a 
semantic acceptability judgement task declines with articulatory suppression, implying 
phonological loop involvement in the task. But articulatory suppression does not 
interfere more with syntactically complex sentences than simple ones, while it does 
interfere more with two-proposition than one-proposition sentences. Waters, Caplan and 
Hildebrandt interpreted this as evidence that the phonological loop is not involved in the 
syntactic analysis of a sentence, but in the post-syntactic interpretative processes 
involved in the acceptability judgement task. In other words, the phonological loop 
plays a role in interpreting the semantic content extracted from a complex sentence’s 
syntactic structure. 
Articulatory suppression thus appears to have an effect upon the reading of sentences 
for meaning, but only for sentences which are relatively complex and/or lengthy. Based 
on this finding it seems likely that an articulatory suppression task would interfere with 
the sentence-verification task often used in semantic illusion research, and thus that 
articulatory suppression would have an effect upon semantic illusion rate. 
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11.1.2.2 The central executive and language comprehension 
There is considerable evidence linking the general processing resources of the central 
executive to language processing for meaning. Daneman and Carpenter (1980) used the 
term working memory to refer to general-purpose cognitive resources upon which the 
process of understanding connected discourse (written or spoken) must draw to meet 
processing demands. These resources correspond closely to the central executive of 
working memory (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; Logie, 1995). This theory draws upon the 
notion that language comprehension involves both a processing and a storage aspect. 
Processing is required for word recognition from surface representations, to access 
syntactic and semantic information, and to interpret the meaning of sentences. The 
storage requirement arises from the need to store intermediate representations of 
linguistic material to provide input for more advanced processing activities. Thus, if 
there is a common limited pool of cognitive resources, there will be a trade-off between 
processing and storage whenever a processing task exceeds the limited resources 
available (cf. attention theory, for example, Broadbent, 1958; Treisman, 1964; Deutsch 
and Deutsch, 1963). 
Daneman and Carpenter (1980) developed the reading span test, which is highly 
correlated with other language skills, as a measure of an individual’s working memory 
capacity, because individual differences in the capacity of working memory influence 
the point at which the hypothesised trade-offs between processing and storage occur for 
any particular person. In the reading span test, participants are required to read a number 
of sentences for comprehension, while holding the last word of each of the sentences 
read in memory for later sequential recall. The reading span is defined as the largest 
number of sentences read for which a participant can perform this task correctly. 
Daneman and Carpenter suggested that participants’ capacities for processing and 
storing linguistic information (as determined by the reading span) would directly 
 188
determine the accuracy and efficiency of the participants’ ability to process language for 
meaning. 
Once individual working memory capacity is determined using the reading span test, 
certain theories implicating central executive involvement in the processing of certain 
comprehension tasks can be tested empirically. For example, Daneman and Carpenter 
(1983) hypothesised that working memory capacity would have a drastic effect upon the 
ease with which readers can integrate new material with preceding text. In a text like 
“…he went and looked among his baseball equipment. He found a bat that was very 
large and brown and was flying back and forth in the gloomy room…” the initial 
context would usually lead a reader to interpret “bat” as the object used for baseball, but 
the following information about the bat flying about forces the reader to re-interpret the 
word as referring to the animal. Daneman and Carpenter assumed that, in order to 
achieve this re-interpretation, a reader must recover active representations of the 
original surface form of the word “bat” (thus drawing on storage requirements). As 
predicted, the results showed that readers with small reading spans were especially poor 
at recovering from such textual ambiguities when there was a sentence boundary 
between the ambiguous word and its disambiguating context. Readers with larger 
reading spans performed much better in this task. 
11.1.3 Working memory and error detection in texts 
It has been shown that semantic errors are harder to detect in written texts, than 
orthographic or typographical errors (e.g. Sommers, 1980). This might be due to the fact 
that the detection of semantic errors requires text comprehension and thus generates a 
higher workload in working memory (Hacker, Plumb, Butterfield, Quathamer and 
Heineken, 1994). If the working memory workload is too great, semantic errors are no 
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longer detected, even if participants are actively looking for semantic errors and know 
how to correct them when processing demands are lower (e.g. Markman, 1985). 
Several factors affect the cognitive demands placed upon working memory by the 
specific requirements of an error detection task. For example, semantic error detection 
improves if participants are specifically asked to read a text for comprehension (Beal, 
Bonitatibus, Garrod, 1990; cf. van Jaarsveld, Dijkstra and Hermans, 1997 on semantic 
illusions and task demands). Similarly drawing attention to specific portions of text by 
using paratextual cues, such as bold print, increases the detection of all error types (e.g. 
Hacker, Plumb, Butterfield, Quathamer and Heineken, 1994). Working memory load 
also decreases with repetition and with successive re-readings, while the detection of 
syntactic and semantic errors improves (Levy, Newell, Snyder and Timmins, 1986). 
One can assume that the load upon the central executive to be greater when processing 
for meaningful errors (such as semantic, syntactic or spelling errors) than when 
processing for typographical errors. It also appears likely that the greater the amount of 
text that has to be processed for an error to be identified, the greater the load upon the 
central executive. Similarly the phonological loop would also appear to be more 
involved in the detection of errors requiring processing above the word level, such as 
semantic errors or errors spanning a greater amount of text. 
Larigauderie, Goanac’h and Lacroix (1998) tested these assumptions in a series of 
experiments using articulatory suppression and random generation as secondary tasks to 
observe the effects of these upon error detection. With articulatory suppression as a 
secondary task, participants’ overall processing speed did not increase, but performance 
on semantic or syntactic error detection above the word level (i.e. relating to individual 
words at a time) declined significantly. On the word level, error detection was as good 
as in the control group. 
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When the secondary task was random generation, the overall time taken to complete the 
detection task increased significantly. Despite the increase in processing time there was 
still a significant decline in the detection rate for semantic or syntactic and also for 
orthographic errors, while typographical errors and errors involving only word-level 
processing remained constant. The random generation task always led to a greater 
decline in performance than articulatory suppression, and the decline in error detection 
was always particularly strong where integrative processing was required. Larigauderie, 
Goanac’h and Lacroix concluded that these results showed that the demands on the 
central executive were greater when the detection of errors required any meaningful 
processing and/or memory search processes, such as those required by an orthographic 
check. 
11.1.4 Semantic illusions and working memory  
Empirical evidence from working memory studies suggests that both the phonological 
loop and the central executive are involved in language comprehension. The 
phonological loop plays an important role in the processing of long and complex 
sentences, while the central executive is involved in processing information for lexical 
and semantic content.  
Semantic illusion sentences are generally fairly long and complex with a certain amount 
of redundancy included (e.g. the statement “Two animals of each kind went on the Ark” 
could be verified and understood easily without reference to Noah at all), although 
participants subjectively do not perceive the type of sentence that can be turned into an 
semantic illusion sentence as being particularly hard to interpret (see Chapter 7). This 
may be due to the fact that the semantic illusion sentences generally deal with familiar 
material, whereas most forms of natural written discourse serve the purpose of 
imparting new information. 
 191
But how complex are semantic illusion sentences really? 
Since there is evidence that complex sentences require the involvement of the 
phonological loop component of working memory in order to be interpreted for 
meaning, but syntactically simple sentences do not, an experiment was designed to 
examine the processing demands that semantic illusion sentences make upon our 
cognitive resources. If phonological loop involvement in the processing of semantic 
illusion sentences can be demonstrated, a case can be made for the idea that semantic 
illusion sentences require high working memory effort to comprehend. As a result of 
this it could be argued that the target word might fall victim to a trade-off between 
storage and processing, as hypothesised by Daneman and Carpenter (1980). 
The following studies were designed to attempt to find a dissociation between the 
involvement of the phonological loop and that of the central executive in the processing 
of semantic illusion sentences. Using the well-documented method of articulatory 
suppression to test for the involvement of the phonological loop, it was assumed that 
there would be an increase in semantic illusion rate in an articulatory suppression 
condition, due to the higher processing demands made by semantic illusion sentences. A 
further increase in semantic illusion rate was anticipated when participants were asked 
to perform a secondary task involving the central executive. In the first experiment the 
task was concurrent mental addition. In the second it was a random generation task. It 
was thought that even without the added demands of a secondary task, semantic illusion 
sentences would need a great proportion of all available resources to be comprehended 
and for the substituted word to be identified successfully. 
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11.2 Experiment 6a 
11.2.1 Method 
Participants: 54 Oxford Brookes psychology students took part in this study as a part of 
a practical class for a course in Human Information Processing.  
Stimuli: 24 target sentences were constructed and mixed with 60 fillers. The target 
sentences took the form of true/false statements of roughly equal length and form as the 
filler sentences (a list of target sentences used is presented in Appendix 13). 
Procedure: 3 experimental groups were tested: the control group was presented with 
each statement individually. A sentence appeared in the middle of a computer screen in 
14 point Times New Roman font and was displayed until the participant made a 
response, by hitting either one of two response keys. (T and F on a standard keyboard 
were chosen for “true” and “false” respectively, despite their relatively awkward 
positioning, as they were considered to be intuitive for the relevant responses. 
Participants also could respond by hitting the x-key if they felt that they really did not 
know the response to any of the statement-to-be-verified.) Response times to first 
keystroke and the response made were recorded. After each response the screen went 
blank for a 100 millisecond inter-stimulus interval. The sentences were presented in 5 
blocks of 16. At the end of each block the screen displayed the message “Hit the 
spacebar when you are ready to continue.” Before recording the data, participants were 
given a ‘tryout block’ to familiarise them with the program (written in Superlab 2.0) 
worked. Then the five experimental blocks were run continuously and all data recorded. 
The articulatory suppression group was required to follow the same basic procedure as 
the control group, but simultaneously they were asked to say “the-the-the-” out loud 
throughout the experiment. The experimenter reminded participants as necessary to 
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maintain this task throughout the course of the experiment. Again participants were 
given the opportunity to ‘try out’ a few sentences to get a feel for the procedure. 
The mental addition group had to carry out a secondary task of mental addition of 
double-digit numbers while verifying the statements. A sum of two double-digits was 
displayed above the sentences in larger and different coloured font. Participants were 
instructed to verify the statements by hitting the T or F key as appropriate before 
entering the result of the addition task using the number pad on the keyboard. 
Responses and response times for both tasks were recorded. Before participants did the 
dual-task experiment, baseline performance rates for the mental arithmetic and the 
statement-verification task were established separately. Then participants were given a 
chance to practice doing both tasks simultaneously. After participants felt reasonably 
confident about performing the two tasks concurrently, they performed the double task 
for 3 blocks of 16 trials. 
Knowledge check: After the experiment was completed participants were asked to 
complete a knowledge check consisting of 24 multiple choice questions based upon the 
target sentences. 
11.2.2 Results 
Data from 48 participants was used in the analysis. Data from 5 participants, one from 
the control group and four from the articulatory suppression group, had to be excluded 
from the analysis, because no knowledge check data was available for these 
participants. Data from a further participant from the mental addition group was 
excluded as this participant had consistently given the response to the mental arithmetic 
task first, so that there was no record of the statement verification response. For the 
remaining 48 participants only the data for the target statements was analysed. 
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11.2.2.1 Semantic illusion rate, correct response rate and “don’t know” rate 
A record was made of all target statements answered in each group, including correct, 
semantic illusion and “don’t know” responses. A semantic illusion was considered to 
have occurred when participants had judged the respective statement to be “true” and 
had given the correct response to the corresponding knowledge check question. A 
response was classed as correct if the participant responded with “false” during the 
verification task and gave the correct answer in the knowledge check. All other 
responses were classified as “don’t know” responses. The mean semantic illusion rate 
was calculated for each group, as a percentage of all responses to statements which 
could have led to a semantic illusion (see table 11.1). 
Table 11.1: Mean rates (percent) of correct, semantic illusion and “don’t know” 
responses for each group. 
Group Number of 
participants 
SI rate Correct rate Don’t know 
rate 
Control 17 39.3 50.7 9.9 
Articulatory suppression 15 41.3 38.8 20.0 
Mental addition  16 36.5 42.2 21.4 
 
A one-way analysis of variance was carried out on the semantic illusion rate data using 
participants as subjects. The results of the analysis of variance were found to be 
insignificant (F= 0.43; d.f.= 2, 45; p= 0.653) indicating that there was no effect of the 
type of secondary task upon the semantic illusion rate. 
Similar analyses were also carried out for the correct response rate and the “don’t 
know” response rate, to investigate if secondary task type affected performance. For the 
correct response data, the one-way analysis of variance was found to be insignificant 
(F= 2.134; d.f.= 2, 45; p= 0.130), and no effect of secondary task type upon the rate of 
correct responses was observed. Neither was secondary task type found to affect the rate 
of “don’t know” responses (F= 2.613; d.f.= 2, 45; p= 0.084). 
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11.2.2.2 Response times 
The mean response times were recorded for each group and each type of response 
(semantic illusion, correct and “don’t know”; see table 11.2 and Figure 11.1). 
Table 11.2: Mean response times (seconds) for semantic illusion responses 
compared with correct and “don’t know” responses in each experimental group. 
Group SIs Corrects Don’t Knows 
Control 3.2 3.8 4.1 
Articulatory suppression 4.0 4.6 5.5 
Mental addition 8.6 9.3 10.1 
 
Figure 11.1: Mean response times (seconds) for semantic illusion responses 
compared with correct and “don’t know” responses for each experimental group. 
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A repeated measures analysis of variance was carried out upon the response time data, 
using participants as subjects. Mauchly’s test of sphericity was found to be significant 
for type of response (W= 0.738; d.f. = 2; p<0.001) and Pillai’s Trace was used to 
determine the significance of this effect. Response times were significantly different for 
type of response (F= 9.137; d.f.= 2, 44; p<0.001) with semantic illusion responses being 
made most rapidly for each group, followed by correct responses and then “don’t know” 
responses for all three secondary task groups. Response times were also significantly 
different for each group (F= 706.724; d.f.= 2, 45; p<0.001) with participants in the 
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control group responding most rapidly for all three types of responses, followed by the 
articulatory suppression group. Response times were longest for the mental addition 
group for each response type. There was no significant interaction between group and 
response type (F= 0.167; d.f.= 4, 90; p= 0.955). 
To investigate the observed effects further, a series of post-hoc tests was carried out. For 
the between-participants factor of secondary task type, a Student-Newman-Keuls test 
was carried out. It was found that the response times for the mental addition group were 
significantly longer than those for either of the other two groups. There was no 
significant different between response times in the control group and the articulatory 
suppression group (see Table 11.3). 
Table 11.3: Student-Newman-Keuls post-hoc test showing homogeneous subsets 
for the effect of secondary task type upon response times (p= 0.05). 
Subset Secondary task 
type 
N 
1 2 
Control 17 3.7  
Articulatory 
Suppression 
15 4.7  
Mental 
Addition 
16  9.5 
Significance  0.076 1.0 
 
The within-participants factor of response type was further investigated by using a 
series of paired samples t-tests with a Bonferroni correction (p= 0.0167 for a 
significance level of 0.05). The results indicated that semantic illusion responses were 
made significantly more rapidly than correct responses (t= -3.226; d.f.= 47; p= 0.002) or 
“don’t know” responses (t= -3.956; d.f.= 47; p<0.001). However – allowing for the 
Bonferroni correction – correct responses were not made significantly more rapidly than 
“don’t know” responses (t= -2.072; d.f.= 47; p= 0.044), although there is a definite trend 
in that direction. 
 197
For the mental addition group, individual response times for the mental arithmetic only 
and the sentences only tasks were calculated to provide a baseline against which to 
compare the performance for the joint task. Since the processing times for the mental 
addition group are extremely long compared to the other two experimental groups, 
mean response times for the combined task were worked out and then compared to the 
sum of the two baseline response times for each participant. The paired samples proved 
to be highly correlated (correlation coefficient = 0.714; d.f.= 14; p= 0.002) and a paired 
samples t-test was carried out upon the mean response times. The overall time taken for 
participants to perform the combined task was found to be significantly shorter than the 
time taken to perform one task after the other (t= -2.148; d.f.= 15; p= 0.048, two-tailed); 
see also table 11.4 for means and standard deviations). 
Table 11.4: Mean time taken (seconds) for the performance of both maths and 
sentences simultaneously and for maths and sentences consecutively in the mental 
addition group. 
 N Mean Std. Dev. 
Simultaneously 16 9.5 2.0 
Consecutively 16 10.4 2.3 
 
11.2.3 Discussion 
In contrast to the hypothesis that secondary tasks requiring working memory 
involvement would affect the rate at which semantic illusion responses would occur, the 
results of this study found that neither the semantic illusion rate, the correct response 
rate nor the “don’t know” response rate varied significantly between the experimental 
groups. It was thought that this finding could be an unwanted side effect of the way in 
which the experiment was conducted. There was, for example, no way of monitoring 
whether participants in the articulatory suppression group maintained a constant stream 
of verbal output and due to restrictions of the Superlab Program used the accuracy of 
the mental arithmetic task could not be checked. 
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The response time data, however, did indicate that there is an effect of the secondary 
task upon processing. The control group verified the sentences most rapidly, while the 
articulatory suppression group’s response times were slightly (but not significantly) 
slower than those of the control group. The mental addition group took significantly 
longer to respond to the sentence verification task than either of the other two groups. 
This finding suggests that the unexpected absence of a difference in semantic illusion 
response rates for the three experimental groups could be explained by a trade-off 
between accuracy and processing time: in order to achieve the same level of accuracy in 
the sentence verification task, participants had to spend more time on each sentence to 
compensate for the secondary task requirements upon working memory. It seems 
possible that in the mental addition group, participants performed the two tasks 
consecutively rather than simultaneously as the instructions required, because the 
response times were so much greater than those for the other two groups. However, 
compared to the performance when the mental addition and the sentence verification 
tasks were performed separately, the joint maths-and-sentences task appears to have 
been performed more rapidly than if the tasks had been done one after the other. 
Nevertheless, it is still highly likely that the tasks were performed with participants 
effectively switching between maths and sentence verification. 
Response times also varied with the type of response given to each sentence. Semantic 
illusion responses were made most rapidly within each group. Correct responses were 
made slightly more slowly, suggesting that unmasking the substitution required more 
processing time than simply dealing with its gist (c.f. Reder and Kusbit, 1991 for similar 
response time findings; and van Jaarsveld, Dijkstra and Hermans, 1997 for a discussion 
of the trade-offs between speed and accuracy). “Don’t know” responses took the longest 
time to be made, as would be expected based upon theories of memory search when no 
match can be found (cf. serial exhaustive scanning model, Sternberg, 1966). However, 
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this difference did not reach significance in a post-hoc check, and only cautious 
conclusion can be drawn. The finding that semantic illusion responses were made more 
rapidly than other incorrect responses (i.e. “don’t know” responses) is in keeping with 
the idea that semantic illusion responses are a type of processing error and not related to 
retrieval failures (cf. Reder and Kusbit, 1991). 
Overall the results from this experiment clearly showed that the load upon working 
memory affects the speed at which sentences are processed for verification. It seems 
extremely unlikely that the semantic illusion rate is truly independent of working 
memory load, as suggested by the results of this study, rather it is likely that inadequate 
control over performance of the secondary tasks was the explanation of the lack of 
effect upon the semantic illusion rate. As a consequence it was decided to repeat this 
study with more carefully monitored secondary tasks. 
11.3 Experiment 6b 
11.3.1 Method 
Participants: 48 participants from a number of different educational backgrounds were 
invited to take part in this study. As an incentive a £10 cash prize was raffled off 
amongst the participants. 
Materials: 96 general knowledge statements were created using material from general 
knowledge and trivia quizzes found on the world-wide web, as well as previous 
statements used by other semantic illusion researchers in the past. 24 statements were 
target statements, designed to lead to potential semantic illusions (see Appendix 13). 
Three target statements were used in the trial phase of the experiment. One additional 
statement proved to be considered “false” by almost all participants for reasons other 
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than the substituted target word. This sentence was later excluded from the analysis as 
were the three sentences used during the trial phase. 72 filler statements were 
constructed along the same format as the target sentences, and varied in topic as well as 
in overall length. 
The statements were presented individually one after the other in the centre of a 
computer screen using Cedrus Superlab Pro Version 2.0 for Windows. The order of 
presentation of the sentences was arranged so that no two target sentences ever followed 
on from each other directly, and so that they were relatively evenly spread through the 
experimental blocks. Each block consisted of 16 or 17 statements presented 
consecutively with a 100 millisecond inter-stimulus interval after each response made 
by a participant during which the computer screen was left blank. There were five 
experimental blocks and one initial trial block of statements-to-be-verified. 
Design: There were three experimental groups in this experiment, and participants were 
randomly assigned to these groups, so that at the end each group included data from 16 
participants. The three groups were referred to as Control, Articulatory Suppression and 
Random Generation. 
The control group: In this group the participants were required to verify the statements 
presented on the computer screen by hitting either a “true” or a “false” key on a six 
button response box (RB-600), on which two adjacent keys had been labelled as “true” 
(key 3) and “false” (key 4) respectively. The response box was arranged in such a way 
that participants could place it either to the left or the right of the computer screen 
depending upon their hand-preference. Participants were required to read each sentence 
as it came up on the screen and to decide as quickly as possible if they thought it was 
true or false. If they did not know an answer, they were encouraged to make a guess. 
 201
When a choice had been made by key press, the screen was cleared for 100 milliseconds 
until the next sentence appeared. In the background a cassette-tape player played back 
the sound of a metronome clicking once per second. Participants were instructed to 
ignore the sound. Participants were given the trial block of 16 statements to try out the 
task, at the end of which there was an opportunity for a brief break and for any 
questions that participants might have about the procedure. Once participants felt ready 
to tackle the experiment proper, the five experimental blocks were run with the 
opportunity for short pauses between blocks at participants’ discretion. After all 
statements had been verified, each participant completed a knowledge check consisting 
of 24 multiple choice questions testing for correct knowledge of the facts pertaining to 
the target statements used in the experiment. Data from 16 participants was gathered 
and used for this group. 
The articulatory suppression group: In this group the participants were required to 
complete a secondary task of articulatory suppression (e.g. Levy, 1971, 1975; Murray, 
1967): in time with the tape-recorded metronome clicks, participants were asked to 
repeat the digits one to four (i.e. “1, 2, 3, 4, 1, 2, 3, 4, 1, 2 …” and so on). First a 
baseline articulation rate was measured for each participant, as they performed the 
counting task on its own for two minutes. The experimenter measured the time for the 
baseline articulation, while a voice-key attached to the secondary computer recorded the 
timing of each participant’s articulation once per second. Inter-response intervals were 
calculated for each participant. 
Participants were then asked to perform the statement-verification task in the same 
fashion as the control group while at the same time continuing with the articulatory 
suppression task. The joint task of statement-verification and articulatory suppression 
began with a trial block as for the control group. Then five experimental blocks were 
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run, with potential for breaks between the blocks. After the end of the verification task, 
the participants were asked to complete the knowledge check for the target statements 
as before. Again, inter-response intervals were calculated for the articulatory 
suppression secondary task. Data from 16 participants was gathered and analysed for 
this group. 
The random generation group: The last experimental group was the random generation 
group. The secondary task for this group was random number generation (e.g. Baddeley, 
Lewis and Vallar, 1984; Farmer, Berman and Fletcher, 1986; Logie, Baddeley, Mane, 
Donchin and Sheptak, 1989; Saariluoma, 1991; Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick and Wynn, 
1993; Larigauderie, Goanac’h and Lacroix, 1998) in time with the pre-recorded 
metronome click. Participants were asked to randomly generate numbers between zero 
and nine (e.g. “ 4, 2, 3, 3, 7, 2, 0, 1…”) A performance baseline for the random 
generation task was established, by each participant performing the random generation 
task on its own for about two minutes. The experimenter recorded in writing each 
number generated, while the voice-key recorded the timing of the responses. Inter-
response intervals and randomness scores were calculated for each participant. 
Then participants were required to perform the random generation task simultaneously 
with the statement-verification task. Trial phase and the experimental blocks were run 
as for the other two experimental groups, as was the knowledge check after the end of 
the verification task. Data from 16 participants was gathered for this group, but data 
from 1 participant was excluded from the analysis as they had completely abandoned 
any attempt at random number generation, repeating the same digit over and over while 
they verified a statement, and only then changing to a new digit which was then 
repeated until the next statement had been verified. 
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Apparatus: The statements-to-be-verified were displayed using a PC running Superlab 
Pro 2.0 for Windows. A 6-button response box (RB-600) from Cedrus was attached to 
accept input for the verification task. The middle two buttons (3 and 4) were labelled as 
“true” and “false”, while the other buttons (1, 2 and 5, 6) were covered over with 
cardboard sleeves to avoid confusion. 
On a second computer (Apple Macintosh Classic II) data from the two number 
generation tasks was recorded using a small hand-held microphone, which was set up as 
a voice-key using Superlab 1.34 for Macintosh. The voice-key was set up to take a 
reading once every second, so that inter-response intervals could be calculated. To 
facilitate the generation of numbers at a rate of one per second, a metronome click was 
recorded onto a cassette-tape and played back using a basic tape deck. Participants were 
encouraged to generate in time with the clicks, but told not to worry unduly if they felt 
they were out of synch with it, as long as the speed of their number generation remained 
as constant as possible. 
11.3.2 Results 
11.3.2.1 Semantic illusion rate and correct response rate 
The rate of semantic illusion occurrence was calculated for each target sentence for each 
group. 20 sentences were analysed. The three sentences that had been used during the 
trial phase of the experiment were excluded from the analysis, as was one sentence used 
in the main part of the experiment, as a large proportion of the participants pointed out 
that they had not recognised the semantic illusion in question but had thought the 
sentence wrong for other reasons (“spider”; see Appendix 13). As previously a semantic 
illusion was considered to have occurred when a participant had responded to the 
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relevant statement with “true” and had given the correct response in the knowledge 
check (see table 11.5 for semantic illusion rates). 
Table 11.5: Mean semantic illusion rate (percent) and standard deviations in each 
experimental group. 
Group N Mean SI rate Std. Dev. 
Control 20 24.1 17.0 
Articulatory suppression 20 31.6 15.0 
Random generation 20 35.0 15.4 
 
A repeated measures analysis of variance was carried out on the remaining data using 
sentences as subjects. The sphericity assumption was not violated for any of the effects 
measured. There was a significant effect of secondary task type upon mean semantic 
illusion rate (F= 5.293; d.f.= 2, 38; p= 0.009). In order to determine if all three groups 
differed significantly from each other, a post-hoc Bonferroni t-test was carried out with 
the significance criterion adjusted to p<0.0167. Only the difference between the control 
group and the random generation group proved to be significant (t= -2.970; d.f.= 19; p= 
0.004, one-tailed) in the post-hoc analysis, with the semantic illusion rate being greater 
in the random generation group than in the control group. The articulatory suppression 
group was not significantly different from either the control group (t= -1.914; d.f.= 19; 
p= 0.036, one-tailed) or from the random generation group (t= -1.342; d.f.= 19; p= 
0.098, one-tailed). 
Correct response rates were similarly analysed for each experimental group, using 
sentences as subjects. A correct response was considered to have occurred when a 
participant had responded correctly to a statement and the corresponding knowledge 
check question (see table 11.6 for mean correct response rates). 
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Table 11.6: Mean correct response rate (percent) and standard deviations in each 
experimental group. 
Group N Mean correct 
rate 
Std. Dev. 
Control 20 64.1 19.4 
Articulatory 
suppression 
20 57.5 17.6 
Random generation 20 52.7 16.6 
 
A repeated measures analysis of variance was carried out on the correct response data. 
The sphericity assumption was not violated. As with the analysis of the semantic 
illusion rate data, there was a significant effect of secondary task type upon mean 
correct response rate (F= 4.980; d.f.= 2, 38; p= 0.012). The effect was further 
investigated in a series of post-hoc t-tests using a Bonferroni correction (significance 
criterion adjusted to p<0.0167). The only difference to prove significant in the post-hoc 
analysis was that between the correct rates in the control condition and the random 
generation condition (t= 2.713; d.f.= 19; p= 0.007, one-tailed), with the correct response 
rate being significantly greater in the control group than in the random generation 
group. As with the semantic illusion rate analysis, the articulatory suppression group 
was not significantly different from either the control group (t= 1.926; d.f.= 19; p= 
0.035, one-tailed), or from the random generation group (t= 1.517; d.f.= 19; p= 0.075, 
one-tailed). 
11.3.2.2 Processing times 
11.3.2.2.1 Total time taken 
The total processing time taken to complete Blocks 1 to 5 (excluding pauses at the 
‘between-blocks’ display on the computer screen) was recorded for each participant, 
and mean processing times and standard deviations were calculated for each group. (see 
Table 11.7). 
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Table 11.7: Mean processing times (seconds) for all 5 blocks in total: 
Group N Mean time Std. Dev. fastest time slowest time 
Control  16 379 147 143 672 
Articulatory suppression 16 279 112 127 468 
Random generation 15 285 95 169 489 
 
A one-way analysis of variance was carried out. There was a significant effect of 
secondary task type upon mean processing times (F= 3.454; d.f.= 2, 44; p= 0.040) and a 
Student-Newman- Keuls post-hoc test was carried out. The results of the post-hoc test 
suggested that the observed difference in processing times was unlikely to reflect a real 
difference, suggesting that secondary task type did not have an effect upon the total time 
taken to complete the task (see table 11.8 for the results of the Student-Newman-Keuls 
test). 
Table 11.8: Student-Newman-Keuls post-hoc test showing homogeneous subsets 
for the effect of secondary task type upon total processing times (p= 0.05). 
Subset Secondary task type N 
1 
Control 16 279 
Articulatory 
Suppression 
15 285 
Random generation 16 379 
Significance  0.063 
11.3.2.2.2 Mean response times for correct responses and semantic illusion 
responses by sentence 
The mean response times for each semantic illusion sentence were recorded for both 
correct responses and for semantic illusion responses and a repeated measures analysis 
of variance was completed comparing performance for correct and semantic illusion 
responses on each of the 3 experimental groups. Mauchly’s test of sphericity was used 
to test the sphericity assumption and found to be significant for the group effect (W= 
0.619; d.f.= 2; p= 0.021) and Pillai’s Trace was used to determine if the secondary task 
requirements affected the response times for semantic illusion sentences. There was a 
significant effect of secondary task upon response times (F= 9.182; d.f.= 2, 16; p= 
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0.002). Whether the participants gave a correct or a semantic illusion response did not 
affect the response times (F= 0.004; d.f= 1, 17; p= 0.953), although there was a 
significant interaction between group and response given (F= 17.341; d.f.= 2, 34 ; p= 
0.001). 
To investigate the actual times measured further, three a priori comparisons were made 
to compare the response times for correct and semantic illusion responses within each 
group (the significance criterion was adjusted to p<0.0167; see Table 11.9 for mean 
response times and standard deviations). 
Table 11.9: Mean response times (seconds) and standard deviations for type of 
response in each group. 
Group Response N of participants Mean Std. Dev. 
control C 18 4.6 0.7 
 SI 18 3.6 1.2 
C 20 3.2 0.5 articulatory suppression 
SI 20 3.3 0.9 
random generation C 20 3.0 0.6 
 SI 20 3.9 1.3 
 
While there was a significant difference between the time taken to give a correct 
response to an semantic illusion statement and the time taken to make the incorrect 
semantic illusion response in two of the 3 groups: in the control group (t= 4.031; d.f.= 
17; p= 0.001, two-tailed) and in the random generation group (t= -2.758; d.f.= 17; p= 
0.013, two-tailed), the direction of that difference is opposite for the two experimental 
groups. In the control condition, correct responses were given more slowly than 
semantic illusion responses. Whereas in the random generation group, semantic illusion 
responses were the ones given more slowly. However, there was no overall significant 
effect of the type of response given across all 3 groups (t= -0.219; d.f.= 57; p= 0.827, 
two-tailed). 
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11.3.2.3 Secondary task analysis 
Mean inter-response intervals were calculated for each participant, both for base rate 
number generation and for number generation as secondary task during the course of the 
main part of the experiment (the two measurements are referred to as BR and IRI/Snt 
respectively). For the articulatory suppression group, there was no significant difference 
between BR and IRI/Snt (t= 0.350; d.f.= 15; p=0.731, see table 11.10 for means). 
Table 11.10: Mean inter-response intervals (milliseconds) and standard deviations 
for articulatory suppression task on its own (BR) and as secondary task (IRI/Snt). 
 N Mean Std. Dev. 
BR 16 1007 249 
IRI/Snt 16 1006 243 
 
For the random generation group, sentence processing did not affect the rate of random 
number generation (t= -0.520; d.f.= 14; p= 0.611, see table 11.11 for means). The 
randomness of numbers generated was also determined using a runs-test with a cut-off 
point at 4.5 (since participants had been instructed to randomly produce digits between 
0 and 9), and the number of runs was recorded for each participant. Randomness was 
defined as: 
R=(r-d/2)2 
d/2 
Where R = randomness, r = number of runs, and d = number of digits generated. With 
this definition of randomness, an R-value of 0 indicates truly random production of 
digits; the greater the R-value, the less random the production of digits. When the 
randomness of numbers generated was compared for single-task random generation and 
dual-task random generation, it was found that the numbers generated were significantly 
more random when the random generation task was not combined with the sentence 
processing task (t= -2.340; d.f.= 14; p= 0.035, see table 11.11). 
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Table 11.11: Mean inter-response intervals (milliseconds) and standard deviations 
for random generation task on its own (BR) and as secondary task (IRI/Snt) 
including mean measure of randomness of numbers produced. 
  IRIs (msec) Randomness 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
BR 15 1060 324 0.828 0.897 
IRI/Snt 15 1080 356 4.364 5.840 
 
11.3.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 6b, there was a significant effect of secondary task upon the semantic 
illusion rate, at least between the control group and the random generation group, and 
the semantic illusion rate for the articulatory suppression group was larger than that for 
the control group and smaller than that for the random generation group. Though the 
difference was not found to be significant, the trend was in keeping with the 
hypothesised effect. The results of the analysis of the correct response rates mirrored 
these effects. Even so, the differences in semantic illusion rate were smaller than 
expected, suggesting that the central executive of working memory is involved 
relatively peripherally in the occurrence of semantic illusions. This could be due to the 
labour-saving partial matching process that underlies semantic illusions (Reder and 
Kusbit, 1991) and which seems to be an automatic aspect of human processing. Since 
much of our previous knowledge of the world is stored in active schemata (Bartlett, 
1995[1932]), recognising the contents of a new sentence to verify them requires a 
matching process of some sort to take place and since linguistic information is not 
normally presented in exactly the same form twice, the form that a linguistic message 
such as a sentence takes is not remembered. This can be demonstrated empirically 
(Sachs, 1967) as can the fact that linguistic information is very rapidly integrated once 
we start processing it. This was demonstrated by experiments on the abstraction of 
linguistic ideas (e.g. Bransford and Franks, 1971) in which participants were shown to 
integrate information rapidly without being able to distinguish what they had seen and 
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what was new but in keeping with the ideas they had previously learned (see Section 
8.5.1). 
Another factor that could have affected the overall semantic illusion rates in this study is 
the possibility of a trade-off between speed and accuracy (cf. van Jaarsveld, Dijkstra 
and Hermans, 1997; see also Section 11.2.2.2). However, the analysis of the processing 
times was found not to support this hypothesis, and participants took the same overall 
time to complete the task in all three groups. If anything, participants in the control 
group appeared to take longest to perform the sentence verification task, with the 
longest processing times in the control group being noticeably longer than those in 
either of the two groups which also performed secondary tasks. One possible 
explanation for this could be that participants in the control group were wrong-footed by 
the apparent ease of the task, and so spent more time looking for any catches or trick 
questions. This could be regarded as a processing luxury which the other groups could 
not afford as they also had a secondary task to perform. Despite this hypothesised 
search for trick questions, however, the semantic illusion rate for the control group was 
still well within the usual parameters for semantic illusion experiments, and even 
apparent caution at responding to the statements-to-be-verified did not help participants 
in the detection of substitutions (c.f. Erickson and Mattson, 1981; Reder and Kusbit’s 
co-operative hypothesis (1991); van Jaarsveld, Dijkstra and Hermans, 1997). 
In an attempt to replicate the response time findings for type of response from 
Experiment 6a (see section 11.2.2.2), the mean response times for correct  and semantic 
illusion responses were compared. Contrary to expectation, however, there was no 
significant effect of the type of response upon response time. There was an effect of 
group and a significant interaction between group and type of response. For the control 
group, the findings were in keeping with previous studies looking at response times 
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(e.g. Reder and Kusbit, 1991): semantic illusion responses were given significantly 
more rapidly than correct responses. In the articulatory suppression group the type of 
response did not affect response times in either direction. But for the random generation 
group, semantic illusion responses were made significantly more slowly than correct 
ones. This finding could indicate that when the central executive meets heavy 
processing demands, the integrative processing that leads to semantic illusion responses 
takes longer and is more arduous, than when that process is the only task that needs to 
be performed. 
Since secondary task demands did not seem to have much effect upon primary task 
(sentence verification) performance, performance on secondary tasks was examined. It 
was found that articulatory suppression did not suffer at all when participants verified 
sentences simultaneously – the inter-response intervals remained constant. Similarly, 
inter-response intervals for the random generation task were not affected by the 
sentence verification task, but the numbers produced were significantly less random 
when participants verified sentences compared to when they generated the numbers on 
their own. This provides some evidence that a trade-off takes place between the 
sentence verification task and random number generation, and most participants in this 
study chose to concentrate on the sentence task over the number generation task. 
11.4 Conclusions 
Both the experiments described in this chapter showed evidence of the involvement of 
working memory in the processing of semantic illusions. While the results were far 
from identical on the surface, they appeared to support the same basic finding.  
In Experiment 6a, the secondary tasks, which participants were required to perform in 
order to allow for an examination of which components of working memory were 
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involved with semantic illusion processing, did not lead to any change in overall 
semantic illusion rate and participants in each of the three experimental groups made the 
same number of semantic illusion responses on average. However, the overall response 
times increased with secondary task: participants in the articulatory suppression group 
responded more slowly than those in the control group, while participants in the mental 
addition group responded much more slowly than participants in either of the other two 
groups. The results suggested that working memory is required to process semantic 
illusions, and there is evidence for a trade-off between accuracy and processing times, 
as had been previously demonstrated by van Jaarsveld, Dijkstra and Hermans (1997), 
for example. The processing times also varied with the type of response given. Semantic 
illusion responses were made most rapidly, followed by correct responses, and finally, 
“don’t know” responses took the longest to be made. It was thought that this last finding 
might reflect a serial search process of the knowledge relevant to the sentence at hand. 
In Experiment 6b, which had been designed as a better controlled version of Experiment 
6a, the processing time findings were not replicated: for the control group, the mean 
response times closely resembled those described by Reder and Kusbit (1991), and 
semantic illusion responses were made most rapidly, followed by correct responses. 
However, in the articulatory suppression group there was no difference in response 
times for semantic illusion responses and correct responses, and in the random 
generation group semantic illusion responses were the ones that took longest to be 
made, while correct responses were made more rapidly. The finding, that semantic 
illusion responses in this group required more time to be processed, might be due to the 
fact that in the random generation group the cognitive resources, that would normally be 
assigned to completing the integrative process that allows partial matching requirements 
to be met by a substituted target word, are not available. This would make the 
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integration of the substituted word a slightly harder task than usual, which requires more 
time for successful processing. 
Even though the response time data were not conclusive, evidence from the semantic 
illusion rates and from an analysis of secondary task performance again showed that at 
trade-off between speed and accuracy seems likely. In this experiment speed seems to 
have been considered more important, and as a consequence the semantic illusion rate in 
the random generation group was significantly higher than in the articulatory 
suppression group, which in turn was slightly higher than that in the control group. Data 
from the secondary task analysis showed that participants did not need to slow the 
average rate of number generation when responding to the sentences in the primary task 
compared to number generation on its own. But for the random generation group, the 
randomness of the numbers generated was significantly better (more random) when 
participants only generated numbers and did not verify statements at the same time. 
The results from both experiments indicate that the central executive is certainly 
involved in dealing with semantic illusion sentences, as was expected, and that either 
more semantic illusion responses are likely to occur, or it takes longer to process the 
relevant statement if the central executive is otherwise engaged. However, the 
phonological loop does not appear to play an important role in the occurrence of 
semantic illusions: the semantic illusion rate does not appear to be significantly affected 
by a secondary task involving the phonological loop such as articulatory suppression. 
While Experiment 6a seemed to show that statements take longer to be processed when 
participants are involved in articulatory suppression, the time difference was not great. 
This suggest that semantic illusion sentences are not only easy to process because they 
deal with familiar ideas, but also because they were phrased in a straightforward-to-
process fashion, which did not require phonological loop involvement to disentangle for 
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meaning. It would appear the participants’ subjective opinion of semantic illusion 
sentences (as shown in Chapter 7) that they are not difficult to process is corroborated 
by the results of this study, which used a more objective measure of processing 
difficulty. 
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Chapter 12: 
General Discussion 
 
This chapter provides an overview of all that is known about semantic illusions from 
previous studies (as reviewed in Chapter 2) and from the studies described in this thesis. 
These findings are related to the aims of the thesis as presented in Chapter 1 and 
implications are discussed, and finally directions for future research are proposed, 
building on the findings of experiments described in previous chapters. 
The main aim of the thesis was to explore semantic illusions as a phenomenon, to relate 
these findings to theories of cognitive processing and to examine what semantic 
illusions can reveal about ordinary sentence processing. Semantic illusions are not only 
important because of the implications that their existence has for theories of human 
information processing, but also because they imply that great care has to be taken to 
ascertain that routine communications do not contain unexpected details, as it appears 
very hard to pay attention to anomalous elements of an otherwise coherent context. For 
example, questions in examinations have to be phrased in accordance with examinees’ 
expectations of the format a problem on a certain topic should take, if the examinees’ 
knowledge is to be assessed fairly. If for example, a question in a multiple choice exam 
were to be phrased in a similar way to semantic illusion sentences, it would be highly 
likely to lead to roughly 30 percent of the individuals taking the exam and who possess 
the relevant knowledge failing to apply their knowledge correctly in response to such a 
‘trick’ question. 
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Previous research on semantic illusions has been remarkably unsystematic, and there is 
little coherence in what is revealed about semantic illusions in the literature. Some 
researchers used names only, others used a mix of names and other words; some 
reported correct response rates, some reported semantic illusion rates; some used 
questions, some used statements-to-be-verified. Individual researchers appeared to 
follow particular interests in a rather sporadic fashion, dealing with one issue or another, 
but with little systematic follow-through. In this thesis, an attempt was made to organise 
these findings and to establish a profile for semantic illusions, including – where 
necessary – further empirical investigation. 
12.1 On the surface: A description of semantic illusions 
In this section, the profile of semantic illusions that emerges from previous research and 
from the studies in this thesis is reviewed. 
1. Semantic illusions are a sentence processing phenomenon in which an individual 
mis-processes a substituted word within a sentence context dealing with a familiar 
topic, as if the substitution was identical in meaning to the word it replaces, without 
awareness of this on the part of the individual. 
2. Semantic illusions are remarkably robust. They can withstand – to some degree – all 
experimental manipulations that have been carried out upon semantic illusions to 
date, implying that the mechanism underlying semantic illusions is very 
fundamental to sentence processing. Semantic illusions occur not only for names, 
but also for words from different form classes (Chapter 3, Pilot study). They also 
occur in a number of different languages (see Chapter 6). 
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3. Semantic illusions are not under the conscious or deliberate control of the 
reader/listener (Erickson and Mattson, 1981; Reder and Cleeremans, 1990; Reder 
and Kusbit, 1991), except to a minor degree when given specific instructions 
stressing the importance of giving accurate responses to the task at hand (van 
Jaarsveld, Dijkstra and Hermans, 1997). The effect of task demands upon semantic 
illusion rate is fairly small. Unless explicit warning about semantic illusion 
sentences is given and participants are specifically instructed to respond as 
accurately as they can, effects of task demands are not manifest (e.g. Chapter 9, 
experiment 4a). 
4. The position of sentence focus has an effect upon semantic illusion rate, and 
substitutions that coincide with the sentence focus are more likely to be detected. If 
a manipulation is performed to ascertain that the point of focus is on the substituted 
word, semantic illusion rates are generally lower than for matched control sentences. 
However, many of the manipulations used to draw attention to the substitution are 
problematic. Using cleft-phrases (“It was X, who…”) causes both a syntactic and a 
semantic change (such a cleft would generally indicate a requirement to confirm the 
assertion in the initial phrase, or it would indicate an enhanced focus). Nonetheless, 
this manipulation does not entirely eradicate semantic illusion responses (Brédart 
and Modolo, 1988). Using typographical cues, such as capitalisation or underlining 
– either in the target sentence itself, or in a prime preceding the presentation of the 
target sentence – leads to both an increase in detection rate (Brédart and Docquier, 
1989) and to a response bias causing participants to be inclined to make many false 
detections (Kamas, Reder and Ayers, 1996). Even sentences which naturally have 
the substitution in the position that is perceived to be the focus of the sentence lead 
to semantic illusions (Erickson and Mattson, 1981; Chapter 7, focus determination 
task). The fact that the physical position of the substitution within a target sentence 
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has no effect upon semantic illusion rate (Chapters 5 and 6, Experiments 2 and 3) 
suggests that the target word position cannot be used as a guideline to determining 
the sentence focus as had been suggested by Erickson and Mattson. 
5. It is clear that target word and substitution have to be similar to each other for a 
semantic illusion to occur. Both phonological and semantic similarity contribute to 
semantic illusion rate (Erickson and Mattson, van Oostendorp and de Mul, 1990, 
van Oostendorp and Kok, 1990; Shafto and MacKay, 2000). Semantic similarity 
plays the more important role, but what exactly is required for terms to be 
considered similar is not clear – as long as a substitution provides a satisfactory 
match for the role-slot it occupies, the exact nature of the similarity does not appear 
to matter. More or less similar terms have different effects upon ‘literal’ and ‘gist’ 
tasks (see section 2.2). More similar terms facilitate processing in a ‘gist’ task, as it 
is easier to process a sentence as if there was no substitution if the substitution is 
very similar to the word it replaces. More similar terms also lead to a greater 
semantic illusion rate in a ‘literal’ task, as it is harder to detect a substitution that is 
very similar to the word it replaces. Less similar terms have the opposite effect – 
they are easier to detect and harder to ignore (van Oostendorp and de Mul, 1990; 
van Oostendorp and Kok, 1990; van Jaarsveld, Dijkstra and Hermans, 1997). The 
substitutions that are most likely to lead to the greatest semantic illusion rate are 
those that are both phonologically and semantically similar to the target word 
(Shafto and MacKay, 2000). 
6. Of the two tasks used in semantic illusion research, statement-verification and 
question-answering, the latter leads to a far greater semantic illusion rate in a 
straightforward comparison (Chapter 4, Experiment 1). However, there are also 
many more “don’t know” responses for questions than for statements-to-be-verified. 
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Apart from the different in overall semantic illusion rate, statement-verification and 
question-answering are affected differently by various experimental manipulations. 
The similarity effect (see section 2.4) differs for statements and question depending 
on the position of the substitution within the sentence. For questions, a substitution 
closer to the start of the sentence leads to a greater similarity effect than a 
substitution nearer the end of the sentence. For statements, there is no difference in 
the size of the effect between the two positions (van Jaarsveld, Dijkstra and 
Hermans, 1997). Similarly, extra information contained in the target sentence (i.e. 
sentence length) has a different effect for the two tasks. In the question-answering 
task, the more information relevant to the answer is contained in the sentence, the 
higher the likelihood of a semantic illusion response (Reder and Cleeremans, 1990; 
Reder and Kusbit, 1991). But in the statement-verification task, there is no effect of 
sentence length on semantic illusion rate (Chapter 5, Experiment 2). 
7. When compared with other examples of written discourse, semantic illusions are 
seen to be part of a different group than control sentences taken from day-to-day 
sources of written materials. They are more alike to each other than to other 
sentences, are seen to be more stand-alone, to deal with more familiar topics, and 
they appear less formal or complex and as such are easy and straightforward to 
process, at least when rated on a series of rating scales (Chapter 7). 
12.2 Beneath the surface: Mechanisms that might underlie semantic illusions 
In this section various theoretical suggestions that have been made to explain semantic 
illusions are reviewed. 
1. Semantic illusions cannot be explained by a failure to encode the substitution. 
Reading the sentences aloud, thus ascertaining that the word is processed at least at 
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a phonemic level, has no effect upon semantic illusions. There is also no evidence 
from studying participants’ reading times for individual words that there is 
particularly shallow processing of substituted words when a semantic illusion 
occurs. Nor can semantic illusions be explained by participants’ failure to retrieve 
the relevant knowledge from long term memory, as even when the facts relevant to 
semantic illusions are studied in advance of the semantic illusion task, the semantic 
illusion rate is not substantially affected (Reder and Kusbit, 1991). 
2. It seems likely that participants adopt a partial matching approach to processing in 
general, which allows rapid and efficient information processing (Reder and Kusbit, 
1991). Such a strategy is in keeping with a schema theory of how knowledge is 
stored in long term memory (Bartlett, 1995[1932]). The partial match is likely to be 
carried out on a basis of the global goodness-of-fit (Barton and Sanford, 1993). 
These strategies, which can lead to an error in processing semantic illusion 
sentences, are extremely useful in real life situations, where the rapid extraction of 
meaning from any number of possible situations takes precedence over the need to 
pay attention to small details. There appear to be two mechanisms, which contribute 
to partial matching: one is related to integrating information from the sentence 
context, the other is related to connecting the information from the sentence with 
previous knowledge (Hannon and Daneman, 2001). 
3. There is evidence that semantic illusions are subject to interference from the context 
in which they are presented (Chapter 10; Experiment 5), so that the fact that many 
semantic illusions are presented in a context of largely correct statements-to-be-
verified or properly phrased questions is likely to discourage participants from 
noticing anything untoward with semantic illusion sentences. If the context includes 
a majority of false fillers, more semantic illusions are detected. However, this effect 
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is small, and the context is less likely to affect people’s actual detection rates, and 
more likely to be the result of a processing bias not unlike the bias that is observed 
when the target word is underlined (Brédart and Docquier, 1989; Kamas, Reder and 
Ayers, 1996). When target words are underlined, participants appear to detect more 
semantic illusions, but they also make many more ‘false-alarm’ responses. When 
target statements are surrounded by many false fillers, participants appear to detect 
more semantic illusions, but they also give fewer correct responses to true fillers. 
Both these observations indicate a response bias, rather than a change in sensitivity 
to substitutions. 
4. There appears to be a strongly ‘automatic’ element to sentence processing, not 
unlike the Stroop effect (1935), in which an incongruous colour name interferes 
with the naming of the colour in which the stimulus is printed. Evidence for this 
claim comes from the observation that far fewer semantic illusion responses are 
made when the sentences containing semantic illusions are not presented as 
straightforward sentences, but as ‘sentence-puzzles’ made up of jumbled-up 
sentence chunks (Chapter 9, Experiment 4b). It was argued that this manipulation 
removed the automatic component of sentence processing, which uses a partial 
matching process to achieve comprehension as quickly as possible, since with the 
puzzles, participants had to process every chunk of the sentence in more depth. 
5. Depending on the processing load in working memory, semantic illusions are more 
or less likely to occur (Chapter 11, Experiments 6a and 6b). When the central 
executive is busy, there is an increased number of semantic illusion responses, 
suggesting that semantic illusion sentences place a fairly large load on working 
memory while being processed. It is likely that in the course of processing a 
semantic illusion sentence, a ‘chunking’ process takes place, during which the 
 222
substituted word is incorporated into a larger processing unit relevant to 
comprehension. If working memory is not busy, this ‘chunking process may not 
lead directly to a semantic illusion, as the system may still have a record of the 
actual phrasing of the sentence, permitting a belated correction of the processing at 
hand. But since most semantic illusions are fairly long and complex, a heavy load is 
placed upon working memory and it seems unlikely that these kinds of sentences are 
processed ‘on-line’. 
12.3 A conspiracy amongst minnows: Semantic illusions as a combination of 
effects? 
Even though none of the explanations for semantic illusions tested to date is on its own 
sufficient to fully account for the frequency of occurrence of semantic illusions, it seems 
possible that the phenomenon is due to a combination of some or all of the effects 
observed. This theory can be crudely tested by summing the percentages of semantic 
illusion responses that each variable alone can account for. The size of each effect was 
estimated by subtracting the semantic illusion rate in each experimental condition in 
which a significant reduction in the semantic illusion rate was observed, from the 
corresponding control or comparison condition. The resulting value representing the 
reduction in semantic illusion rate was then transformed into a percentage of the 
control/comparison semantic illusion rate. This value is referred to as ‘percentage of 
semantic illusion accounted for’ (see Table 12.1 for details). Where more than one 
study has explored a particular effect, as for example in the case of sentence focus 
(Brédart and Modolo, 1988, Brédart and Docquier, 1989, Reder, Kamas and Ayers, 
1996), an average effect size was estimated. All concerns regarding possible biases were 
disregarded for the purpose of this estimate.  
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In the studies concerned with the effect of working memory load upon semantic 
illusions (see Chapter 11), experimental manipulations were found to increase semantic 
illusion rate. In these cases, the effect size was estimated by calculating the percentage 
by which the manipulation had increased in experimental conditions compared to the 
control condition. 
Table 12.1: Breakdown of percentage of semantic illusions accounted for by each 
effect studied (indicative only). 
Effect Mean SI rate in 
control/comparison 
condition  as a 
percentage of  all 
responses made 
(SIC) 
Mean SI rate in 
experimental 
condition as a 
percentage of all 
responses made 
(SIE) 
Effect size as a 
percentage of all 
responses made  
(E=│SIC- SIE│) 
Percentage of 
SIC accounted 
for by E. 
(E ⁄ SIC x 100) 
Focus 34.4 21.1 13.3 38.7 
Task demands 31.3 20.3 11.0 35.1 
Similarity 34.3 21.7 12.6 36.7 
Word position 30.7 24.7 6.0 19.5 
Automatic 
processing 
 
29.6 
 
11.5 
 
18.1 
 
61.1 
Filler atmosphere 24.3 18.3 6.0 24.7 
Working memory 
load 
 
24.7 
 
33.3 
 
9.2 
 
37.2 
 
The calculation described above demonstrated rather dramatically that the sum of all the 
effects of variables implicated in the Moses Illusion more than accounted for the overall 
observed semantic illusion rate. In fact, the percentage of semantic illusions that can be 
explained by a combination of all effects studied is no less than 253 percent. It is 
impossible to avoid the conclusion, therefore that the observed semantic illusion 
frequency effect observed in particular studies probably results from a combination of 
the factors known to affect semantic illusion rate, each contributing a relatively small 
proportion of the total effect. Under specific experimental conditions, presumably, only 
a subset of these factors work together, and if each factor could be simultaneously 
controlled, it should be possible to entirely eradicate semantic illusion responses. 
Perhaps a little disappointingly, it seems that there is no one ‘big effect’. Instead, it 
 224
seems likely that the question “How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the 
Ark?”, for which Erickson and Mattson (1981) observed a semantic illusion rate of 
more than eighty percent, constitutes an example in which many of the factor associated 
with semantic illusion rate just happen to act in conjunction. No mysterious sea 
monster, but a conspiracy of minnows. 
12.4 Out in the world: How semantic illusions relate to real life 
In this section, the relevance of semantic illusions to research and some possible 
applications of the knowledge gained through the study of semantic illusions are 
discussed. 
1. As mentioned previously (Chapter 1), semantic illusions are of interest to theories of 
sentence processing in much the same way that visual illusions help evaluate 
theories of visual processing. The processes that lead to illusions are likely to be the 
same processes that lead to successful processing under different circumstances, and 
hence the nature of the errors made in an illusion situation allows the researcher to 
gain insight into the mechanisms underlying human information processing. Being a 
part of sentence processing, semantic illusions can provide evidence supporting, or 
indeed, calling into question previous theoretical suggestions about how sentences 
are comprehended. Semantic illusions confirm the importance of the role of context 
upon comprehension; they provide evidence for the ‘effort-after-meaning’ that 
people make in processing linguistic material (Bartlett, 1995[1932]); and they 
suggest that – comprehension being the essential goal of most sentence processing 
activity – processing is geared primarily towards ‘making sense’ of an input, while 
detail of wording becomes quickly irrelevant and is forgotten (Sachs, 1967). In this 
way, semantic illusions can be interpreted as evidence for a model of sentence 
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processing which requires a mental representation to enable comprehension (e.g. 
Clark and Clark, 1977). 
2. The existence of semantic illusions draws attention to people’s lack of ability to pay 
attention to details in the process of comprehension. As people are constantly 
bombarded with diverse linguistic inputs, a filtering strategy which can ignore 
discrepancies such as those encountered in semantic illusions is generally beneficial, 
allowing for rapid and efficient processing. However, the existence of semantic 
illusions and the robustness of the phenomenon demonstrates that the approximate 
nature of sentence processing is not under conscious control, and hence cannot be 
adjusted easily in situations where attention to detail is of importance. This implies 
that special care has to be taken when this kind of attention is required to design 
appropriate equipment to assist monitoring, or in the case of printed materials for 
which monitoring equipment cannot be provided, it is important to phrase text in a 
way that meets processing expectations, and is transparent and easy to follow. Such 
a manipulation would ensure that the processing load on the central executive of 
working memory is minimised, allowing more resources to be allocated to the 
understanding of details. 
3. The fact that expectation-based contributions play a large part in the processing of 
language materials, as demonstrated by semantic illusions, may be a direct result of 
the way in which people in Western countries are usually educated. Generally, 
teaching and learning conform to a ‘didactic contract’ (e.g. Schubauer-Leoni, 1986) 
in which specific bodies of knowledge are transferred according to certain sets of 
expectations. For example, in the teaching of mathematics, it is usual that only a 
certain type of problem is dealt with at any one time, in which the formal structure 
of the problem conforms to the expectation, that all elements presented in the 
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problem are required for a successful solution. In the case of semantic illusions, the 
expectations about the task at hand, raised by its familiar structure as a general 
knowledge test, lead the participant astray with regard to the actual task. This line of 
reasoning raises the question of how well standard school teaching helps to prepare 
people for the problem solving in the real world, and whether different didactic 
methods, encouraging and requiring a variety of reanalyses of teaching problems, 
could better prepare children for the processing requirements of the real world. 
12.5 In future: Suggestions for further research 
One of the most intriguing findings of this thesis was the fact that semantic illusion type 
sentences are viewed as different from control sentences taken from real sources of 
printed material. However, this finding was based entirely on subjective judgements of 
the participants involved in the rating scale study (Chapter 7). In order to explore the 
nature of the different between semantic illusion type sentences and sentences from 
ordinary discourse further, it might be enlightening to examine functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) scans of brains engaged in the processing of sentences. Will 
there be different patterns of activation for the two types of material? Further, a 
comparison of fMRI scans of cases in which semantic illusions occurred to cases in 
which the substitution is detected might be of theoretical interest, potentially revealing 
if participants really fail to detect the substitution, or if the only fail to detect it 
consciously (cf. inattentional blindness, Mack and Rock, 1998). 
Another issue that might benefit from further investigation is the question of familiarity 
and mental flexibility in the processing of semantic illusion sentences. In all the studies 
described in this thesis and in those described in the literature, the participants were 
educated normal adults. These participants were assumed to have a certain level of 
‘general knowledge’, from which certain familiar ideas were drawn to design 
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experimental stimuli. These participants are also all likely to have a degree of mental 
flexibility which allows processing to proceed smoothly, even in the face of problems 
such as substituted words. 
It has also been argued (Reder and Cleeremans, 1990) that not everybody is equally 
likely to experience semantic illusions. People who are experts on given topics were 
thought not to fall for semantic illusions (e.g. Christian or Jewish clergy would not be 
expected to confuse Noah and Moses!). Similarly, someone to whom a topic was of 
special importance would not usually experience semantic illusions. It might be 
possible, for example, that a child would not confuse Moses and Noah either, because 
the story of the Ark might be much more important to them than to an adult.  
Another reason why children might not be as likely to experience semantic illusions 
could be that their mental flexibility is still developing and hence not as adaptable to 
processing problems associated with semantic illusions. In order to investigate whether 
mental flexibility has an effect upon semantic illusions, a questionnaire could be handed 
to children and to sufferers of Parkinson’s Disease, which has mental rigidity as one of 
its symptoms. Comparing semantic illusion rates from these two groups of participants 
to the semantic illusion rates for a group of normal adults might provide an insight into 
the role of mental flexibility in the processing of semantic illusion sentences. 
12.6 A last word 
On the whole, it appears as if the phenomenon of semantic illusions is far from 
exhausted, either in terms of theoretical implications, or in terms of directions for future 
research. While this thesis has succeeded in providing a more detailed picture of what 
semantic illusions are like, there has been little progress towards a more complete 
explanation for the occurrence of semantic illusions. So far, partial matching on the 
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basis of global good fit is still the best candidate theory, but exactly how it works is still 
not fully understood – it seems at least in part related to processing habits and 
experiences and in part to working memory limitations. At the end of this thesis, it looks 
as if – maybe – the wrong question has been asked all along. If semantic illusions are a 
direct result of ordinary sentence processing strategies, why they occur is not nearly as 
interesting a question as its converse: Why do semantic illusions not occur a lot more 
often than they do? 
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